Avia Spivak
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
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Featured researches published by Avia Spivak.
Journal of Political Economy | 1981
Laurence J. Kotlikoff; Avia Spivak
Families can self-insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers. Interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings; they may simply reflect risk-sharing behavior of completely selfish family members. Although family annuity markets are incomplete, even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities. Given adverse selection and transaction costs, family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities. In the absence of public annuities, these risk-sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation.
Journal of Economic Theory | 1990
Uzi Segal; Avia Spivak
This paper defines a new concept of attitude towards risk. For an actuarially fair random variable ϵ, π(t) is the risk premium the decisionmaker is willing to pay to avoid tϵ. In expected utility, and as it turns out, in the case of smooth Freechet differentiability of the representation functional, π′(0) = 0. There are models (e.g., rank dependent probabilities) in which ∂π∂t|t=0+ ≠ 0. We call the latter attitude as being of order 1, and we call the first one attitude of order 2. These concepts are then applied to analyze the problem of full insurance.
Journal of Labor Economics | 1986
Laurence J. Kotlikoff; John B. Shoven; Avia Spivak
This paper examines the amount of precautionary savings and wealth inequality arising from life-span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangements, namely, when longevity risk can be pooled only with members of ones own family. The central findings of the paper are that (1) perfecting insurance arrangements can sharply lower savings in both intergenerationally altruistic and life-cycle economies and that (2) in altruistic economies perfecting annuity insurance can greatly influence inequality; indeed, in the long run in our model, switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the difference between absolute inequality and absolute equality.
Economic Theory | 1996
Uzi Segal; Avia Spivak
SummaryFirst-order risk aversion happens when the risk premiumπ a decision maker is willing to pay to avoid the lottery
European Economic Review | 1989
Uzi Segal; Avia Spivak
Review of World Economics | 1996
Arie Arnon; Avia Spivak
t \cdot \tilde \varepsilon , E[\tilde \varepsilon ] = 0
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty | 1988
Uzi Segal; Avia Spivak
European Economic Review | 1987
Avia Spivak; J. Weinblatt; B.Z. Zilberfarb
, is proportional, for smallt, tot. Equivalently,
International Journal of Central Banking | 2014
Zeev Kril; David Leiser; Avia Spivak
Economics Letters | 1988
Uzi Segal; Avia Spivak; Joseph Zeira
\partial \pi /\partial t|_{ t = 0^ + } > 0