Avner Kalay

Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints

Abstract This paper examines a large, randomly chosen, sample of bond indentures focusing on the constraints they set on dividend payments that have the potential to transfer wealth from the bondholders (i.e., payments which are financed by a new debt issue or reduced investment). The nature of these restrictions support the hypothesis that bond convenants are structured to control the conflict of interest between stockholders and bondholders. Further, the empirical evidence suggests that these constraints are not binding — i.e., stockholders do not pay themselves as much dividends as they are allowed to. Explanations of this puzzling empirical regularity are suggested.

Predictable events and excess returns: The case of dividend announcements

Abstract This paper hypothesizes that the risk per unit of time and the required rate of return are higher than normal during an event period whose timing can be predicted. Consistent with this hypothesis this paper presents empirical evidence indicating that the unconditional mean rate of return, the variance of stock returns and their systematic risk are higher than ‘usual’ during dividend announcement periods. However, the documented increases in the systematic risk are not large enough to fully explain the ‘excess returns’. This finding is puzzling and hard to reconcile with existing theory.

Wealth redistributions or changes in firm value: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders around dividend announcements☆

Abstract Past studies indicate that stock prices are affected by announcements of unexpected dividend changes, i.e., unexpectedly large dividends are associated with positive stock price response. Two explanations of this empirical regularity, ‘the information content hypothesis’ and the ‘wealth redistribution hypothesis’, imply different bond price behavior around dividend announcements. The information content hypothesis predicts a positive bond price response to unexpectedly large dividends, while the wealth redistribution hypothesis predicts the opposite. This paper distinguishes between the relative importance of the two hypotheses by empirically investigating bond price behavior around dividend announcements. The evidence presented is consistent with the information content hypothesis. However, the gains associated with positive information are captured by the stockholders, while the losses are shared with the bondholders.

Positive information from equity issue announcements

Abstract The Myers and Majluf (1984) model predicts a nonpositive price reaction to an announcement of a new issue of equity. This paper shows that the Myers and Majluf result is a direct outcome of their assumption that all potential projects facing the firm have a nonnegative net present value. Refining the Myers and Majluf model, by allowing for the realistic possibility of potential projects having negative net present values, leads to different predictions. The refined model predicts positive as well as negative stock price responses, consistent with recent empirical evidence concerning the stock price effects of new stock issues.

Firm value and seasoned equity issues: Price pressure, wealth redistribution, or negative information

Abstract Announcements of new equity issues have been seen to have a negative effect on stock prices. Potential explanations of this negative effect - the price-pressure, wealth-redistribution, and information-release hypotheses - imply different bond-price reactions to the announcements. By investigating bond-price behavior around the announcement of new equity issues this paper distinguishes the relative importance of these hypotheses. The evidence presented of a significant drop in bond prices is consistent with the information-release hypotheses.

Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut Dividends

Managerial aversion to reduce dividends is not only an assertion to be found in the financial literature (see, for example, [2], [4], [8], [9]), but is also the basis for the informational content of dividends hypothesis (see [8]). Furthermore, its existence, if known to investors, can explain dividend payments which involve tax and transaction related costs. Surprisingly, the empirical evidence on this assertion is less than satisfactory. This study examines the existing empirical evidence on this assertion and points out its limitations. A new test, that can refute the informational content associated with the reluctance to cut dividends, is then performed.

On the Asset Substitution Problem

In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller [11], [12] demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant, the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions. Furthermore, if capital markets are perfect, stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm (see [6]). Motivated by this assumption, the firm has been viewed as a “black box;†namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in a growing body of recent literature (see [1], [2], [7], [9], [13], and [14]), researchers recognize that the firm in an “imperfect†capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can, and do, conflict. Jensen and Meckling [9] study the roles of three important groups—the owner-manager, the stockholders, and the bondholders—focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them. They provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts.

THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF THE TIMING OF DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Abstract This paper contains a test of a new aspect of the informational content of dividend; namely, is there information in the timing of the announcements? The empirical evidence indicates that the market expects ‘bad news’ to be delivered late and that these expectations are confirmed. Mean excess returns of stock prices around late announcements are, depending on the assumed returns generating process, either significantly negative or insignificant while significantly positive around the entire population of announcements. Moreover, the proportion and magnitude of dividend reductions associated with late announcements are significantly larger than in the complete universe of announcements.

Dividends and Taxes: A Re-Examination

This study re-examines the impact of the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains on assets’ prices. Our analysis shows that the time horizon used to define and measure the dividend period is a key issue when interpreting the empirical results. Our results indicate that most of the return variation previously attributed to dividends is not because of a cross-sectional variation in returns, but due to the time-series variation in returns around the dividend payment. In light of the lack of cross-sectional return variation, interpreting the higher return around the dividend distribution as a tax effect is problematic.

Continuous Trading or Call Auctions: Revealed Preferences of Investors at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange

We use the move of Israeli stocks from call auction trading to continuous trading to show that investors have a preference for stocks that trade continuously. When large stocks move from call auction to continuous trading, the small stocks that still trade by call auction experience a significant loss in volume relative to the overall market volume. As small stocks move to continuous trading, they experience an increase in volume and positive abnormal returns because of the associated increase in liquidity. Overall, though, a move to continuous trading increases the volume of large stocks relative to small stocks.