B.J.J. Crum

The Multilevel Parliamentary Field: a framework for theorizing representative democracy in the EU

This article introduces the concept of the ‘Multilevel Parliamentary Field’ as a means for analysing the structure of democratic representation in the European Union (EU). This concept is warranted for several reasons. First, the multilevel configuration that makes up the EU contains two channels of democratic representation: one directly through the European Parliament, the other indirectly through the national parliaments and governments. These two channels are likely to persist side by side; hence, both the European and the national parliaments can claim to represent ‘the people’ in EU decision-making. Second, this structure of representation is in many respects without precedent; it does not fit established concepts of democratic representation derived from the nation-state or from international relations, such as a federal two-channel system or a parliamentary network. Third, the representative bodies in the EU are interlinked, also across levels. Up until now, no proper conceptual apparatus has been devised that can capture the distinctive traits of this EU multilevel representative system, and help to assess its democratic quality. The concept of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field fills both these tasks. It serves as a heuristic device to integrate the empirical analysis of the different forms of democratic representation in the EU’s multilevel system, and it provides new angles for analysing the democratic challenges that this system faces.

Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy

This article explores the implications of the financial crisis for the relationship between monetary integration and democratic government in the European Union (EU). As the crisis has exposed the original balance that economic and monetary union (EMU) sought to maintain between monetary integration and policy diversity to be unsustainable, the eurozone is put before the choice of one of three governance models: executive federalism, democratic federalization or EMU dissolution. Notably, these three governance models perfectly illustrate Dani Rodriks ‘trilemma of the world economy’, which maintains that of the three goods – economic (and monetary) integration, the nation‐state and democratic politics – one will always have to give. In light of this, the article concludes that the present course towards executive federalism can be justified for preventing euro dissolution and recognizing the value of national self‐government. Nevertheless, it threatens to come at a democratic price. Hence, it is imperative to consider possible flanking measures that can mitigate this effect.

Party stances in the referendums on the EU constitution: Causes and consequences of competition and collusion

This article examines political party behaviour around the referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005. Starting from the presumption that this behaviour needs to be analysed in the light of the domestic government-opposition dynamics, a set of hypotheses on the causes and consequences of party behaviour in EU Treaty referendums is developed and reviewed for the EU member states in which a referendum was held or anticipated. As it turns out, with the exception of some right-conservative parties, all mainstream parties endorsed the Constitutional Treaty. However, because significant proportions of opposition party supporters are bound to go to the ‘No’ side, government parties are eventually crucial in securing a majority in favour of EU Treaty revisions.

Politics and power in the European Convention

The Convention on the future of the European Union has been heralded by many as a unique political setting. So far the process of EU Treaty change was subject to the collision of national political interests in Intergovernmental Conferences. By contrast, the Convention appears to promise a fundamentally open and normatively informed arena. This article probes the validity of this promise by dissecting the political dynamics of the Convention along three dimensions: political behaviour and alliance formation; agenda management; and the norms informing its proceedings.

Accountability and Personalisation of the European Council Presidency

Abstract While the European Council has come to be a key institution in the EU, its accountability has been rather indirect and limited. Individually its members are held to account in their domestic systems. Collectively, however, accountability appears limited to the presidential addresses to the European Parliament. This may well change if the rotating European Council Presidency were to be replaced by a permanent, elected president. This article presents a systematic analysis of the principle of rotation versus that of a permanent European Council President in terms of democratic representation and accountability. It concludes that a permanent president would open up opportunities to increase the public accountability of the European Council to the European Parliament. More specifically, it suggests that whenever such a president would seek to expand his powers, automatic balancers within the EU institutional architecture would ensure that these powers were checked and subject to parliamentary control.

Parliamentarisation of the CFSP through informal institution-making? The fifth European Parliament and the EU high representative

Abstract This article examines whether the European Parliament has been able to use the institution of the High Representative as a lever to increase its powers in the EUs common foreign and security policy. Since it is found that the EPs strategy towards the HR has neither brought it any informal powers nor been instrumental in forcing the proposal of an EU Foreign Minister, a formal intergovernmentalist position appears to be vindicated. Yet from an institutionalist perspective it may be retorted that the few attainments of the EP so far are a consequence of it having a far higher sensitivity to failure on CFSP-related issues than on well-institutionalized European Community policies. As a future Foreign Minister will be better able than the HR to secure some degree of political independence from the Council, this may well lead the European Parliament to reassess its strategy and to adopt a more assertive stance.

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance : What role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

ABSTRACT How has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level, governments’ decisions have become constrained and national parliaments find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive power has come to be shared across levels.

The EU Constitutional Process: A Failure of Political Representation?

This paper proposes to assess the representative quality of European Union decision-making by way of a micro-approach which traces the effectiveness of the mechanisms of representation that connect the European peoples to the decision-making process. In particular, it proposes to distinguish systematically between ‘upstream’ controls that delimit the mandate of political representatives and ‘downstream’ controls that allow political representatives to justify their decisions through deliberation. This approach is applied to the various phases of the making of the EU Constitutional Treaty and its dramatic failure due to the negative referendum verdicts in France and the Netherlands. Thus it is demonstrated that the EU Constitutional process has suffered from a lack of mechanisms for aligning politicians with public opinion. In particular, ‘upstream’ controls fell short in the very conception of the process in the 2001 Laeken Declaration and in the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Conference. On the other hand, ‘downstream’ controls remained under-activated in the European Convention and came too late in the ratification phase. Thus the Laeken process emerges as a process involving drifting political elites that, once brought face to face with their democratic principals again, failed to convincingly justify their actions. As the superimposition of the various phases had the overall effect of blurring all lines of political control and accountability over the process, it was eventually to the people to pull the emergency brake to prevent its outcome from taking effect.

Procedures, Justice, and Choice In Basic Education Policy

This article is about the way in which justice and procedures are related in the development of policies meeting new claims to choice in basic education. Building upon established approaches to procedural justice, I propose to study the interaction between questions of justice and procedures by way of the “gate model” as developed by Peters (1993) and Habermas (1994). This model is then applied in an analysis of education policymaking in Great Britain and Germany to demonstrate how the procedures through which political decision making is channelled reflect persisting problems of substantive justice.

Making Democracy the Priority in EU Economic Governance: Four Theses on the Foundations of the T-Dem Project

The T-Dem project of Hennette, Piketty, Sacriste and Vauchez puts the spotlight on, possibly, the main shortcoming of the flurry of recent Eurozone reforms: the lack of effective democratic controls. I offer a sympathetic comment on the initiative that goes to endorse and reinforce much of its intentions. However, I also raise two criticisms as I insist on the need to disentangle democratic reforms from any substantial policy proposals and advocate strengthening accountability relations between the present institutions rather than establishing a new Parliamentary Assembly for the Eurozone.