Bahar Köymen

Preschoolers use common ground in their justificatory reasoning with peers

In the context of joint decision-making, we investigated whether preschoolers alter the informativeness of their justifications depending on the common ground that they share with their partner. Pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 146) were introduced to a novel animal with unique characteristics (e.g., eating rocks). In the common ground condition, the children learned about the animal together. In the one-expert condition, one learned about it, the other was naïve. In the two-experts condition, children learned about it separately. Later, the pairs had to decide together on 3 items that the novel animal might need. Both age groups referred to the unique characteristics of the animal in their justifications more in the 2 conditions without common ground than in the common ground condition. Thus, preschoolers begin to use common ground flexibly in their justifications and reason-giving in peer interactions.

Young children create partner-specific referential pacts with peers

In 2 studies, we investigated how peers establish a referential pact to call something, for example, a cushion versus a pillow (both equally felicitous). In Study 1, pairs of 4- and 6-year-old German-speaking peers established a referential pact for an artifact, for example, a womans shoe, in a referential communication task. Six-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, continued to use these same expressions with the same partner (even when they were overinformative) but shifted to simpler expressions, for example, shoe, with a new partner. In Study 2, both age groups were successful in establishing such partner-specific referential pacts with a peer when using a proper name. These results suggest that even preschool children appreciate something of the conventional nature of linguistic expressions, with significant flexibility emerging between ages 4 and 6.

Young children mostly keep, and expect others to keep, their promises

Promises are speech acts that create an obligation to do the promised action. In three studies, we investigated whether 3- and 5-year-olds (N=278) understand the normative implications of promising in prosocial interactions. In Study 1, children helped a partner who promised to share stickers. When the partner failed to uphold the promise, 3- and 5-year-olds protested and referred to promise norms. In Study 2, when children in this same age range were asked to promise to continue a cleaning task-and they agreed-they persisted longer on the task and mentioned their obligation more frequently than without such a promise. They also persisted longer after a promise than after a cleaning reminder (Study 3). In prosocial interactions, thus, young children feel a normative obligation to keep their promises and expect others to keep their promises as well.

Dialogic syntax and complement constructions in toddlers' peer interactions

Abstract Children start producing grammatically complex sentences during toddlerhood (Bloom et al. 1984; Diessel 2004). This study examines how toddlers use complement constructions as a communicative resource in peer interactions. The data come from an archival database, which consists of 500 hours of videorecordings of childrens naturalistic interactions in a daycare center. All complement constructions produced by seven target children were identified. The data illustrate children using “format tying” (Goodwin 1990, 2006) and “dialogic syntax”. They construct utterances “based on the immediately co-present utterance[s]” (Du Bois, this issue) of their own and others (caregivers) in the discourse, as means of demonstrating positive or negative alignment with their interlocutors, thereby negotiating the participation framework (Goffman 1981; Goodwin and Goodwin 2004). As children tie to prior utterances, and transform and embed them into matrix clauses with stance-indexing verbs like I said, I want, and Let me, complex complement constructions are built up dialogically over sequences of interaction.

Syntactic and semantic coordination in finite complement-clause constructions: a diary-based case study.

This study investigates the coordination of matrix and subordinate clauses within finite complement-clause constructions. The data come from diary and audio recordings which include the utterances produced by an American English-speaking child, L, between the ages 1;08 and 3;05. We extracted all the finite complement-clause constructions that L produced and compared the grammatical acceptability of these utterances with that of the simple sentences of the same length produced within the same two weeks and with that of the simple sentences containing the same verb produced within the same month. The results show that L is more likely to make syntactic errors in finite complement-clause constructions than she does in her simple sentences of the same length or with the same verb. This suggests that the errors are more likely to arise from the syntactic and semantic coordination of the two clauses rather than limitations in performance or lexical knowledge.

Turkish Children's Conversational Oppositions: Usage of Two Discourse Markers

This study examined how Turkish-speaking preschoolers displayed oppositions in their peer interactions through two adversative discourse markers, ya and ki. These two markers differ in their syntactic mobility. The data came from seminaturalistic peer interactions of 78 preschoolers. The discursive properties of childrens utterances with ya and ki were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. The analyses suggested that due to the differences in their syntactic mobility, these two discourse markers flagged alternative types of oppositions. Ki, the less mobile marker, was more tightly linked to the propositional content and challenged the relevance of the prior utterance, rather than directly disagreeing with it. Such uses minimized opposition. On the other hand, ya, the more mobile marker, was semantically more independent of the proposition to which it was attached and marked opposition at a more global level. Ya-utterances were mostly in the form of counters, such as ‘Ya stop!’ – ‘Ya stop!’, which escalated conflicts.

Children's meta-talk in their collaborative decision making with peers.

In collaborative decision making, children must evaluate the evidence behind their respective claims and the rationality of their respective proposals with their partners. In the main study, 5- and 7-year-old peer dyads (N = 196) were presented with a novel animal. In the key condition, children in a dyad individually received conflicting information about what the animal needs (e.g., rocks vs. sand for food) from sources that differ in reliability (with first-hand vs. indirect evidence). Dyads in both age groups were able to reliably settle on the option with the best supporting evidence. Moreover, in making their decision, children, especially 7-year-olds, engaged in various kinds of meta-talk about the evidence and its validity. In a modified version of the key condition in Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 120) interacted with a puppet who tried to convince children to change their minds by producing meta-talk. When the puppet insisted and produced meta-talk, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to change their minds if their information was unreliable. These results suggest that even preschoolers can engage in collaborative reasoning successfully, but the ability to reflect on the process by stepping back to jointly examine the evidence emerges only during the early school years.

The reasons young children give to peers when explaining their judgments of moral and conventional rules

Moral justifications work, when they do, by invoking values that are shared in the common ground of the interlocutors. We asked 3- and 5-year-old peer dyads (N = 144) to identify and punish norm transgressors. In the moral condition, the transgressor violated a moral norm (e.g., by stealing); in the social rules condition, she/he violated a context-specific rule (e.g., by placing a yellow toy in a green box, instead of a yellow box). Children in both age groups justified their punishment in the social rules condition mostly by referring to the rule (e.g., “He must put yellow toys in the yellow box”). In contrast, in the moral condition they mostly justified their punishment by simply referring to the observed fact (e.g., “He stole”), seeing no need to state the norm involved (e.g., “He must not steal”), presumably because they assumed this as part of their moral common ground with their partner. These results suggest that preschoolers assume certain common ground moral values with their peers and use these in formulating explicit moral judgments and justifications.