Barry Desker

In defence of FTAs: from purity to pragmatism in East Asia

This paper discusses the shift in East Asia from a focus on multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO to a pragmatic approach since 1999 favouring bilateral and regional FTAs while continuing to support the WTO system. It is argued that such FTAs are a second-best option compared to WTO agreements. However, while economists may seek the ideal solution, governments will focus on the politically attainable, especially as new multilateral agreements require lengthy negotiations beyond the life span of governments. As the WTO negotiating process has become bogged down, even once sceptical governments in East Asia are turning to FTAs. It is contended that such FTAs could form a lattice network within and across regions. In this context, the paper discusses the underlying security rationale for the conclusion of FTAs, highlighting the nexus between security interests and international economic policy in East Asia.

Forging an indirect strategy in southeast Asia

The center of gravity of terrorism has shifted to Asia. Instead of using a predominantly military approach in this theater, emphasizing political, economic, and ideological measures are necessary. Three global and four regional policy measures are critical.

Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations

This article addresses three questions. The rise of radical Islamic movements in Southeast Asia, the links between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda, and the challenge to Southeast Asian states from JI. Desker gives an overview of radical Islamic organisations in Southeast Asia resorting to violence, and their reciprocal connections and ties to the global al-Qaeda network. These organisations and their actions draw attention to the interplay between transnational non-state actors, postcolonial states and regional integration processes in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Desker points out the fragility of postcolonial states challenged by religious, ethnic and linguistic groups promoting separatist or transnational agendas. As new states protective of their sovereignty and the primacy of their national identities, the ASEAN members generally have pursued individual national interests in confronting such transnational actors. As such the ASEAN member-states have not relied on their multilateral relationships, highlighting the erosion of the ASEAN security community after the Cold War. The original version of this paper was prepared for the Regional Outlook Forum organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore on 7 January 2003.

Islam and society in South-East Asia after 11 September

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the ensuing war in Afghanistan and the recent revelations of the existence of al-Qaeda networks in South-East Asia have drawn attention to the challenge posed by radical Islamic ideologies to global and regional security. It appears to validate Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations ’ thesis that there is an inevitable conx8f ict between Islam and the West (Huntington 1993). This is a mistaken view. The uncritical acceptance of such a perspective risks the adoption of self-fulx8e lling US policies which undermine US relationships with states having Muslim majorities, increases the likelihood of a crescent of instability from the Middle East to South-East Asia and fosters hostility towards the United States and the West by Muslims around the globe. Since 11 September, Christian fundamentalists in the United States have demonstrated a lack of understanding of Islam. The leading television evangelist Pat Robertson broadcast that Islam ‘is not a peaceful religion that wants to co-exist ... I have taken issue with our esteemed president in regard to his stand in saying that Islam is a peaceful religion. It’s just not’(Cooperman 2002). Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, claimed: ‘The God of Islam is not the same God ... It’s a very different God, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion’ (Graham 2001). The danger is that this simplistic view of Islam will permeate the popular imagination, forming the basis of policy decisions by key government ofx8e cials in the United States and the West. One example to be avoided is a comment by the Chairman of the US House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Rep. C. Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia). He told Georgia state law enforcement ofx8e cials that they should ‘just turn (the sheriff) loose and have him arrest every Muslim that crosses the state line’(Edsall 2001). The reality is that there is a struggle for the soul of Islam within the global Muslim community today. To provide an insight into this struggle within the global Muslim community, this analysis discusses the role of Islam in South-East Asia, focusing on the two major Muslim majority states in the region, Malaysia and Indonesia. With a population of 228 million, of whom 88% identify themselves as Muslims, Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population but remains a secular state. Some 59% of Malaysia’s population of 23 million is Muslim. Malaysia’s success in maintaining a pluralistic political system, a vibrant economy which has grown at 8% per annum over the past two decades and the adoption of

New Security Dimensions in the Asia–Pacific

The rise of China provides a major challenge to the United States, the undisputed hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region since the second world war. This development provides regional states with an opportunity to shape the regional security architecture by adopting an inclusive approach to China. The role of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) tends to be under-estimated by Western scholars who often see the European model as the only approach to regional integration. This paper discusses the significant achievements of ASEAN in serving as a catalyst for the establishment of regional institutions. Such institutions could serve as instruments for the management of Chinas relations with Japan and India. It is contended that the emergence of Asian powers, especially China, will result in a challenge to the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values focusing on individual rights which have governed international institutions. The rise of China is likely to see the application of a Beijing Consensus emphasising the balance between individual rights and social obligations, which would resonate positively in the region. In the twenty-first century, global institutions will need to reflect the norms, values and practices of global society and not just Atlantic perspectives.

Targeting islamist terrorism in asia pacific: an unending war

Three years into the US-led “War on Terror,” the international coalition against terrorism remains fragmented. Despite the killings of many key al Qaeda leaders as well as worldwide disruption of its bases, financial infrastructures and networks, al Qaeda has demonstrated remarkable regenerative and adoptive capabilities. Al Qaeda remains resilient enough—mutating into new forms and adapting to the changing operational environment—to continue with its campaign of terror, targeting not only the interests of the United States, but its allies and supporters worldwide. At the strategic level, the spirit of cooperation has been undermined by some of the policies of the United States. At a tactical level, the failure can be attributed to two major factors. One is the failure to understand the nature of the threat, especially the “al Qaeda phenomenon” in its entirety, including the vision, sense of mission, capabilities, acumen and the organizational skills of Osama bin Laden. Second, and most important, is the failure to address the core issues and the ideology that underlie the militant Islamist threat. With Iraq emerging as the new epicenter of global terrorism, the center of gravity of terrorism seems to have shifted back to the Middle East. However, this does not make the threat less salient in the Asia Pacific region. In the region, the threat lies in the ideological challenge posed by an alternative vision of the state represented by a pan-Islamic caliphate or by the ideal of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. It is therefore incumbent upon Asia Pacific countries to manage the threat of radical Islamic terrorism by preventing transnational groups such as al Qaeda from utilizing separatist and ethnic or religious conflicts in the region for their broader global revolutionary agenda.

Countering the Global Islamist Terrorist Threat

Abstract Worldwide terrorist attacks since September 11 suggest that the threat from Islamist terrorism is far from being over. This is despite the arrests and elimination of a significant number of leaders, both of Al Qaeda and its associated groups. With the loss of its leadership, Al Qaeda has become more dispersed and more difficult to predict and preempt. More significantly, Osama Bin Laden has become a beacon for jihadi insurgents everywhere. On the other hand, the use of overwhelming force in the global war on terror is counterproductive. A militaristic approach has further radicalized the Islamic world, increasing the ranks of the jihadis. Similarly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq exacerbated Muslim resentment and nourished those forces, which the world community wishes to undermine and destroy. Terrorists have a powerful advantage: they need to succeed only occasionally; but as defenders, the global community needs to be successful always. This article argues that failure to understand the Islamist te...

Creating a dialogue: are scholars from Mars and policy makers from Venus?

In their stimulating article, ‘On Bridging the Gap: The Relevance of Theory to the Practice of Conflict Resolution’ (Australian Journal of International Affairs , 59:2 2005), Jacob Bercovitch, Kevin Clements and Daniel Druckman have addressed an important issue in the study of international relations*/the perceived gap between scholars and policy makers*/or to put it in another way (in by now well-known terms used in a different context): ‘scholars are from Mars and policy makers are from Venus’. They challenge the view that ‘policy makers and scholars inhabit different worlds and have little [time] for each other’. They further contend that ‘there is a strong symbiotic relationship between the two’, especially in the field of conflict resolution ‘where policy makers may be in desperate need for guidelines, advice and analysis on how to transform complex situations into more peaceful ones’. They argue that ‘[i]f we truly want to understand conflicts, and facilitate their resolution, we must, we suggest, discuss such efforts only within a set of theoretical ideas’. While Bercovitch et al. note that neither scholars nor policy makers can exist without the other, they emphasise that ‘knowledge or theory. . .is the only possible guide to action, and policy makers ignore scholarly theories and knowledge at their peril’. Bercovitch, Clements and Druckman provide useful insights into why policy makers should be aware of IR theory. They are especially acute when they suggest that policy makers make decisions based on unstated theoretical perspectives or implicit conceptual visions. The problem is that they seem unaware that claiming exclusive authority over the provision of possible solutions to extant problems ensures that they will remain voices ignored by policy makers. I would argue that there is merit in scholars and policy makers learning from one another and that the study of international relations needs to return to its intellectual roots as a subject geared to helping to understand and resolve real world problems. On this score, I concur with Bercovitch and his colleagues. However, the emphasis in the academic world on the intellectual challenge of the academic question posed and the need to win the recognition and