Bhubhindar Singh

Japan's security policy: from a peace state to an international state

Abstract The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japans security identity from a ‘peace state’ to an ‘international state’. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japans security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted – Japans definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japans security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japans security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japans security discourse.

Peacekeeping in Japanese security policy: International-domestic contexts interaction

This article analyses how peacekeeping became available to Japan as a policy option during the early 1990s and, thereafter, a part of the national security discourse through the international–domestic contexts interaction approach. The international context refers to the nature (culture) of the international environment at a particular period of time defined by the dominant norms that govern inter-state relations. It also highlights the policy options available to states. The domestic context refers to the nature of the leadership within a state that interprets the international norms and incorporates them into the domestic agenda. Japan’s implementation of the peacekeeping policy was a result of the collective security norms that defined the international environment during the early 1990s and the re-emergence of the revisionists within the Japanese political system — a group that embraced the collective security norms and pushed for the peacekeeping policy in the hope of expanding Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War period.

The Evolution of Japan's Security Role in Southeast Asia

Abstract This paper traces the evolution of Japan–Southeast Asia security relations over the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It makes two main points. First, Japans relationship with Southeast Asia is slowly overcoming its traditional aversion of security affairs in defining its relations with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan has moved beyond economics to gradually carve out a more proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas of multilateral security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating piracy, and others. Second, Southeast Asian states have become more amenable to Japan assuming a security role in the region. Not only have the new security roles contributed to enhanced trust and confidence between Japan and Southeast Asia, but Japan has also achieved the status of being a core security actor in Southeast Asian affairs. This role will continue to flourish in the post-Cold War period.

Rising Sino-Japanese competition: perspectives from South-East Asian elites

ABSTRACT One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japans nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam—perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South-East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with major-power dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions.