Barry S. Levitt

Minority Group Strategies for Endogenous Institutional Change: Kurdish Parties and Voters in Turkey's 2007 Referendum

Political institutions are socially constructed rules manifesting the preferences and strategic interactions of key actors at decisive moments. We investigate a contentious episode of institutional change in a divided society: the adoption of direct presidential elections in Turkey, approved by referendum in October 2007. Process tracing and regression analyses demonstrate that Kurdish politicians and voters in Turkey supported this reform. However, direct elections are unlikely to increase Kurds’ leverage over choosing Turkeys presidents and may even diminish it. Kurdish support for direct elections is better explained by the reforms broader anticipated impacts on the structuring of state power.

Political Culture and the Science of Politics

TION. By Howard J. Wiarda. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. 417.

Toward a Theory of Personalist Parties: Concept Formation and Theory Building

35.00 cloth.) LATIN AMERICA AT THE END OF POLITICS. By Forrest D. Colburn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp 152.

Institutional Trust and Congressional Autonomy in Latin America: Expectations, Performance, and Confidence in Peru’s Legislature

35.00 cloth,

Power in the Balance: Presidents, Parties, and Legislatures in Peru and Beyond

14.95 paper.) THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES. By Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. 352.

Discrimination and the distrust of democratic institutions in Latin America

50.00 cloth,

Introduction to the Symposium: New Research on Personalist Leadership

20.00 paper.) CITIZEN VIEWS OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Roderic Ai Camp. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. Pp. 304.

Power in the Balance

45.00 cloth, 22.95 paper.)