Baruch Eitam

Motivation from control

Human motivation is sensitive to value—to the outcomes of actions. People invest mental and physical resources for obtaining desired results or for stopping and reversing undesired ones. Accordingly, people’s motivation is sensitive to information about their standing in relation to outcome attainment (‘outcome feedback’). In this paper, we argue and present the first evidence for the existence of another motivational sensitivity in humans—a sensitivity to our degree of control on the environment and hence to information about that control (‘control feedback’). We show that when actions have even trivial and constant perceptual effects, participants’ motivation to perform is enhanced. We then show that increased motivation is not because more information about task performance is available and that motivation is increased only in conditions in which control over the effects can be firmly established by the mind. We speculate on the implications for understanding motivation, and potentially, physical and mental health.

Goal relevance and artificial grammar learning

This investigation used a newly developed artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm in which participants were exposed to sequences of stimuli that varied in two dimensions (colours and letters) that were superimposed on each other. Variation within each dimension was determined by a different grammar. The results of two studies strongly suggest that implicit learning in AGL depends on the goal relevance of the to-be-learned dimension. Specifically, when only one of the two stimulus dimensions was relevant for their task (Experiment 1) participants learned the structure underlying the relevant, but not that of the irrelevant dimension. However, when both dimensions were relevant, both structures were learned (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that implicit learning occurs only in dimensions to which we are attuned. Based on the present results and on those of Eitam, Hassin, and Schul (2008) we suggest that focusing on goal relevance may provide new insights into the mechanisms underlying implicit learning.

Seeing without knowing: task relevance dissociates between visual awareness and recognition

We demonstrate that task relevance dissociates between visual awareness and knowledge activation to create a state of seeing without knowing—visual awareness of familiar stimuli without recognizing them. We rely on the fact that in order to experience a Kanizsa illusion, participants must be aware of its inducers. While people can indicate the orientation of the illusory rectangle with great ease (signifying that they have consciously experienced the illusions inducers), almost 30% of them could not report the inducers’ color. Thus, people can see, in the sense of phenomenally experiencing, but not know, in the sense of recognizing what the object is or activating appropriate knowledge about it. Experiment 2 tests whether relevance‐based selection operates within objects and shows that, contrary to the pattern of results found with features of different objects in our previous studies and replicated in Experiment 1, selection does not occur when both relevant and irrelevant features belong to the same object. We discuss these findings in relation to the existing theories of consciousness and to attention and inattentional blindness, and the role of cognitive load, object‐based attention, and the use of self‐reports as measures of awareness.

The Sense of Agency Scale: A Measure of Consciously Perceived Control over One's Mind, Body, and the Immediate Environment

The sense of agency (SoA) is defined as “the registration that I am the initiator of my actions.” Both “direct” and “indirect” measurement of SoA has focused on specific contextualized perceptual events, however it has also been demonstrated that “higher level” cognitions seemingly affect the SoA. We designed a measure of persons general, context-free beliefs about having core agency—the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS). An exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses on samples of 236 (Study 1) and 408 (Study 2) participants yielded two correlated factors we labeled Sense of Positive Agency (SoPA) and Sense of Negative Agency (SoNA). The construct validity of SoAS is demonstrated by its low-to-moderate correlations with conceptually relevant tools and by the moderate-strong relationship between the SoNA subscale and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms (r = 0.35). We conclude that the SoAS seems to isolate peoples general beliefs in their agency from their perceived success in obtaining outcomes.

Relevance-Based Selectivity: The Case of Implicit Learning

Learning the structure of the environment (e.g., what usually follows what) enables animals to behave in an effective manner and prepare for future events. Unintentional learning is capable of efficiently producing such knowledge as has been demonstrated with the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm (AGL), among others. It has been argued that selective attention is a necessary and sufficient condition for visual implicit learning. Experiment 1 shows that spatial attention is not sufficient for implicit learning. Learning does not occur if the stimuli instantiating the structure are task irrelevant. In a second experiment, we demonstrate that this holds even with abundance of available attentional resources. Together, these results challenge the current view of the relations between attention, resources, and implicit learning.

Consciousness without report: insights from summary statistics and inattention ‘blindness’

We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of ‘inattention blindness’ and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, ‘task relevance’, which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual elements. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

Thoughts as Unexpected Intruders: Context, Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms, and the Sense of Agency Over Thoughts

Obsessions are commonly described as intrusive, ego-dystonic, and coming out of nowhere. This might reflect an experience of a low sense of agency (SoA; i.e., the experience of being the source of one’s own thoughts). In this study, we investigated the relationship between obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms and the SoA over thoughts. Participants were told that subliminal auditory primes (actually sham) can insert thoughts into their minds, and their experiences of inserted thoughts were collected online. The results of three experiments showed reduced SoA over thoughts in individuals with subclinical OC symptoms, regardless of the valence of the thoughts. Several potential confounding factors (e.g., suppression, vigilance, general anxiety) were ruled out. The experience of inserted thoughts was related to experiencing thoughts as “out of context,” which partially explained reduced SoA in participants with high levels of OC symptoms. These experiments highlight the importance of focusing on the low-level, contextual, and phenomenological characteristics of intrusive thoughts in addition to their content and appraisals.

Temporal integration of bodies and faces: united we stand, divided we fall?

ABSTRACT Although most research in the field of emotion perception has focused on the isolated face, recent studies have highlighted the integration of emotional faces and bodies. Regardless of instructions to ignore it, incongruent emotional body context can automatically alter the categorization of distinct and prototypical facial expressions. Previous work suggested that face–body integration is rapid, automatic, and persists even after spatial misalignment of the two. However, the temporal dynamics of face–body integration were never explored. Using a novel measure of temporal visual integration, the current report examines the effect of introducing a temporal gap between the body and face. When presented simultaneously, faces and bodies showed robust integration: the face was strongly influenced by the information conveyed by the task-irrelevant body. By contrast, when faces and bodies were presented with even the briefest temporal lag, we failed to find evidence for integration of bodily and facial emotion cues. These main findings were replicated across three experiments, and suggest that the integration between emotional faces and bodies may be more fragile than previously assumed.