Benedict Wilkinson

The Curious Incident of Mr Cameron and the United Kingdom Defence Budget: A New Legacy?

During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and international pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deficit reduction targets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target level. This u-turn is one of the more curious episodes in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of continuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UKs defence policy. In doing so, we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic and international factors that explain the governments apparent u-turn and what this revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Contingent choices: the future of United Kingdom defence procurement and defence industries in the post-Brexit era

Prime Minister May’s recent announcements strongly suggest that the Government will seek a “hard” Brexit in negotiations with the EU. For the UK government, this is likely to mean that the UK will seek to leave the Single European Market (SEM) as well as the European Customs Union. Although this provides clarity as to the UK’s government’s position, it fails to recognize that the choices available to the Government are inherently linked to the choices made by others in the Brexit negotiations, the EU and the member states in particular. In this article, we explore what Brexit means for the UK’s future defence procurement options and its defence trading relationships with the remaining 27 European Union member states. We explore two Brexit scenarios: in the first (and now less likely but still feasible) scenario, the UK remains within the EU Single European Market provisions for defence procurement and trade. In the second (and now more likely) scenario, the UK leaves the SEM and operates outside EU rules, regulations and directives. Within this scenario, we see two options. In the first place, the UK could successfully negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU which allows for tariff- and barrier-free access to the SEM. Second, the EU could insist on particular trade-offs (e.g. tariffs on key sectors or particular forms of free movement of people and goods) that are unacceptable, causing the FTA to collapse and forcing the UK to follow World Trade Organisation rules. We argue that in both scenarios, old tensions and logics will play out in the new post-Brexit system and will have deep ramifications for defence procurement and industries. We also argue that the post-Brexit choices available to the UK government will not be “hermetically sealed” from other players in the negotiations; rather they are contingent on the extent to which the remaining EU states pursue further defence procurement integration and the potential responses of major UK-based defence contractors.

Navigating the Unknown: Barriers to Evidence-Based Defence and Security Policy in the European Union

Abstract At a time when Europe faces numerous crises, there is a real need for rigorous evidence to underpin effective policymaking. However, a gap between academia and policy creates clear obstacles in the use of evidence in policymaking. Many of these enduring obstacles are manifest in the inherent differences between separate communities: academics have difficulty communicating research in an applicable manner, and policymakers, in turn, tend to focus on operational motivations. The gap widens considerably when foreign, security and defence policy within the complex institutional structures of the European Union is considered. In addition to these well known barriers to evidence-based policy, there are two more obstacles in the defence and security space: sovereignty and dispersed decision-making. A dialogue of best practices must be opened up to broker knowledge in the EU context.

Navigating the Unknown

Abstract At a time when Europe faces numerous crises, there is a real need for rigorous evidence to underpin effective policymaking. However, a gap between academia and policy creates clear obstacles in the use of evidence in policymaking. Many of these enduring obstacles are manifest in the inherent differences between separate communities: academics have difficulty communicating research in an applicable manner, and policymakers, in turn, tend to focus on operational motivations. The gap widens considerably when foreign, security and defence policy within the complex institutional structures of the European Union is considered. In addition to these well known barriers to evidence-based policy, there are two more obstacles in the defence and security space: sovereignty and dispersed decision-making. A dialogue of best practices must be opened up to broker knowledge in the EU context.

Autocracy rising: the internet in a multipolar world

TWO DEVELOPMENTS HAVE already begun to transform political affairs and are likely to continue to do so over the coming years. The first is the rise of the so-called emerging economies or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as a series of middle-tier countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria. The second is the rise of the internet. Because it is still thought of as an American invention and is in many respects still dominated by US companies, the internet is often seen as a means of transmitting American or, more broadly, western values. At issue is whether the BRICS – despite their citizens’ increasing use of the internet – has the potential to challenge these values. In one scenario, US hegemony will gradually fade while the BRICS will increasingly take up the slack; the US will remain first among equals, but progressively unable to exert its authority. In another scenario, the BRICS will be increasingly subverted by the internet. The educated middle classes, which are bound to expand in both numbers and influence in the BRICS, will become progressively attracted to the liberating openness and freedom offered by the internet. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that ‘information has never been so free’. In a speech at Washington DC’s ‘Newseum’, she said, ‘there are more ways to spread more ideas to more people than at any moment in history’. ‘And even in authoritarian countries, information networks are helping people discover new facts and making governments more accountable.’ This potential, according to optimists, was demonstrated by the role of social networking sites during the Arab Spring. It might be noted that things have not yet turned out as optimists hoped in the Arab world, but these are countries suffering from weak economies and divided societies. In countries that have reached a higher stage of development and can meet basic economic needs, might not optimism be more justified?