Andrew Dorman

Blair's successful war : British military intervention in Sierra Leone

Contents: Introduction Blair and the use of military force Background history: from the creation of Sierra Leone to the end of civil war Lome peace agreement and UNAMSIL - the UN peacekeeping mission Evacuation, May 2000 Saving UNAMSIL and confronting the RUF Operation Barras - the hostage rescue The defeat of the RUF Impact of the operation Select bibliography Index.

Defence Under Thatcher

Foreword Acknowledgements Glossary of Terms Introduction Context Defence under Pym Defence under Nott Defence under Heseltine Defence under Younger Conclusions Notes Select Bibliography Index

The Curious Incident of Mr Cameron and the United Kingdom Defence Budget: A New Legacy?

During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and international pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deficit reduction targets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target level. This u-turn is one of the more curious episodes in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of continuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UKs defence policy. In doing so, we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic and international factors that explain the governments apparent u-turn and what this revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Complex security and strategic latency: The UK strategic defence and security review 2015

Whichever party or parties form the next UK government, a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is expected to begin soon after the general election in May. The review might be a ‘light touch’ exercise—little more than a reaffirmation of the SDSR produced by the coalition government in 2010. It seems more likely, however, that the review will be a lengthier, more deliberate exercise and one which might even last into 2016. For those most closely engaged in the process the challenge is more complex than that confronted by their predecessors in 2010. The international security context is more confused and contradictory; the UKs financial predicament is still grave; security threats and challenges will emerge that cannot be ignored; the populations appetite for foreign military engagement appears nevertheless to be restricted; and prevailing conditions suggest that the risk-based approach to national strategy might be proving difficult to sustain. Two key questions should be asked of the review. First, in the light of recent military experiences, what is the purpose of the United Kingdoms armed forces? Second, will SDSR 2015–16 sustain the risk-based approach to national strategy set out in 2010, and if so how convincingly? Beginning with a review of the background against which SDSR 2015–16 will be prepared, this article examines both enduring and immediate challenges to the national strategic process in the United Kingdom and concludes by arguing for strategic latency as a conceptual device which can complement, if not reinvigorate, the risk-based approach to national strategy and defence.

More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence

In September 2014 the people of Scotland will vote on whether to become an independent nation, with the defence and security of Scotland proving to be one of the more vociferous areas of debate. This article argues that defence and security implications of this referendum are far more fundamental than either the �yes� or �no� campaigns have admitted. It makes four points. First, it suggests that the Scottish governments plans for defence and security in NATO and the EU are at odds with its proposed armed forces and that Scotland may well find itself having to make far greater commitments to defence to assure its allies. Second, it argues that a vote for independence will represent a game-changing event for the remainder of the United Kingdoms defence and security, which will have significant consequences for the United Kingdoms partners and allies in NATO, the European Union and elsewhere. Third, the article contends that even a vote against independence will have a long-term impact, in that the �West Lothian question� and Scottish support for nuclear disarmament influence the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Finally, the article highlights how this issue has revealed weaknesses in the think-tank and academic communities, particularly in Scotland. The independence vote does, therefore, represent �more than a storm in a tea cup� and thus there needs to be far greater engagement with these issues within the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

Britain and Defence Transformation: A Model of Success or a Warning of its Dangers?

Constant change seems set to stay with us and will be a major element of defence policy for the foreseeable future. 1 This experience is not new. A century ago Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher attempted to transform the Royal Navy. While he is mainly remembered for HMS Dreadnought , the first of the all-large calibre gun battleships, which typifies the emphasis on technology that can be seen in the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)/defence transformation debates, 2 he actually began with educational and personnel reform to meet the changing requirements of naval warfare. 3

Making 2+2=5: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review

In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010, there was much criticism of the conclusions drawn. On the day of publication, the PrimeMinister,DavidCameron,was publicly berated by a naval Harrier pilot who had flown more than 100 missions over Afghanistan and now faced the prospect of redundancy. In its initial evaluation of the Review, the think-tank ChathamHousewasmost scathing over themismatch between ends,ways, andmeans. A subsequent leak of aMinistry of Defence (MoD) study of the Review and reaction to it was equally damning. Possibly the most outraged piece was contained in a letter to TheTimes newspaper from a group of retired Admirals and Generals (including the previous government’s Security Minister), who postulated that the Argentinean government had once again been encouraged to resort tomilitary action to retake the Falkland Islands.They argued that the government should immediately reconsider its decision to axe theHarrier force and HMS Ark Royal.The response of the government was initially in the form of the Minister for theArmed Forces, the Liberal Democrat NickHarvey, appearing on Radio 4, and subsequently a letter produced by the Service chiefs. Neither response looked credible with the Service chiefs apparently writing under the direction of the Defence Secretary Liam Fox. It is worth noting, however, that the letter’s analysis was evenmore flawed, and showed a lack of understanding of the Navy’s current capabilities and the decisions taken by one of the signatories. This article will examine the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review. It will, first, consider the context in which the SDSR was undertaken. Second, it will analyze the decisions taken as part of the SDSR process.Third, it will reflect on the unanswered questions contained within the SDSR. Finally, it will draw a series of conclusions. Defense & Security AnalysisVol. 27, No. 1, pp. 77–87,March 2011

British Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: History Comes Full Circle?

Since 1989 Europe has witnessed significant change, the Soviet Union has collapsed and the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, while NATO has found itself involved for the first time in the actual application of force in Yugoslavia. Further afield the end of the Cold War has brought little respite with forces from various European states involved in activities ranging from war in the Gulf against Iraq through to peace support operations in a range of activities ranging from humanitarian operations to full-scale limited war.

John Nott and the Royal Navy: the 1981 defence review revisited

Even 20 years on many myths surround the 1981 Nott defence review and it remains a subject of some sensitivity within naval circles. This article establishes how the various polices were formulated, highlighting the role of the different groups within the Ministry of Defence and elsewhere, and the degree to which the various policies were actually implemented. It suggests that the review was the outcome of various hands competing for scarce resources within the MOD and that the belief that the navy would have been destroyed if the Falklands War had not occurred is false.

A Peculiarly British Revolution: Missing the Point or Just Avoiding Change?

Over the last two decades or so the literature on innovation has emerged, building initially on the idea of Revolutions in Military Affairs and then moving to a much broader agenda on the idea of defense transformation.1 While there are divisions over who can lead transformation there is a general acceptance that defense transformation, particularly for the West, is the right direction of travel. Yet, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised question marks about this assumption and a refocusing, particularly by the US, on more traditional inter-state warfare. Within the transformation literature, the United Kingdom has been used by a number of authors as an example of innovation and cited as the leading transformational European power. In general, the first wave of literature tended to argue that the United Kingdom has successfully embraced innovation albeit based on far more financially constrained circumstances and this has become the accepted truth.2 This is frequently cited in various defense publications, in particular the “2002 Strategic Defence Review: a New Chapter,” which incorporated much of the transformational language in stark contrast to its predecessor.3