Bengt-Arne Wickström

The optimal babel: An economic framework for the analysis of dynamic language rights

We analyze various normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual settings. A general model for the analysis of language rights over time in a model with overlapping generations is set up. This model is then first used to find efficient allocations of rights in the tradition of Wicksell. It is shown that, when rights today influence the status of a language in the future, the “naïve�? static analysis has to be augmented in favor of further-reaching minority rights in order to take into account the dynamic aspect. It is then demonstrated that a traditional welfare-economic analysis generally goes even further in the support of minority rights. If a possible externality on other communities is taken into account, however, these results are reversed in a pure efficiency analysis. If redistribution arguments are taken into account, this provides an effect in the opposite direction again.

Can Bilingualism Be Dynamically Stable? A Simple Model of Language Choice

A model is developed in which parents choose the language or languages in which their children are brought up. Their choice of language community into which children are socialized depends both on the practical value of the language as a means of communication and on the emotional attachment of the parents to the language as a carrier of cultural identity. In the model, two languages are considered, and children can be brought up as monoglots or bilinguals, that is be socialized into both linguistic communities. The dynamic structure of the model is investigated and dynamically stable equilibria are characterized. It is shown that the behavior of bilingual parents is the crucial factor in determining the survival chances of bilingualism in society. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, J10, J15, Z10.A model is developed in which parents choose the language or languages in which their children are brought up. Their choice of language community into which children are socialized depends both on the practical value of the language as a means of communication and on the emotional attachment of the parents to the language as a carrier of cultural identity. In the model, two languages are considered, and children can be brought up as monoglots or bilinguals, that is be socialized into both linguistic communities. The dynamic structure of the model is investigated and dynamically stable equilibria are characterized. It is shown that the behavior of bilingual parents is the crucial factor in determining the survival chances of bilingualism in society. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, J10, J15, Z10.

Equilibrium selection in linguistic games, Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton

Taking our point of departure in an article by Selten and Pool and using the equilibrium selection theory developed by Harsanyi and Selten, we analyze the risk dominant equilibria of a language game. Into a model with two groups of people with different native ethnic languages, we introduce a further interethnic planned language, Esperanto, the learning of which is much easier than that of an ethnic language. Of the four strict and symmetric equilibria of the game — absence of international communication, use of Esperanto or one of the ethnic languages — two or three might coexist, depending on the values of the parameters of the model. Using the concept of risk dominance in order to select from those coexisting equilibria, we show that the introduction of Esperanto for some realistic parameter values is the unique solution. It is also an efficient solution, but all efficient solutions with Esperanto are not realised by such a risk dominant equilibrium. Finally, we explore in a speculative manner the possibility of analyzing the use of language with an evolutionary game.

Fairness, Rights, and Language Rights: On the Fair Treatment of Linguistic Minorities

There exists a considerable literature analyzing “language rights”. The concept, however, is not very well defined and covers everything from the rights of immigrants to keep their language or its opposite, their right to be rapidly integrated into a new culture, over the rights of national minorities to preserve their ancestral language to issues of status planning in nations, region or international bodies.56 In this essay, we limit the scope to a rather narrow issue. We look at the formal rights to use a certain language in a certain domain.

Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability

We characterize and study the relationship between income redistributions that are just and stable. We assume that for a given economy there exists a set of possible income redistributions, the constitution of the economy. The choice of redistribution is in the hands of the agents, who decide by majority vote. A stable redistribution is one that majority vote cannot alter when each agent tries to maximize his income.A just redistribution is defined thus: in the set of all possible redistributions it is the one that leads to an income distribution which, when viewed as a lottery, optimizes the expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the agents of the economy. We assume that all agents have the same utility function, that is, the same attitude toward risk.We postulate a trade-off between efficiency and egalitarianism and derive and analyze conditions for just and stable redistributions. We look for the characteristics of initial income distributions that make just and stable redistributions identical.In an example we show how a certain tax schedule on productive work implies certain income redistributions.This work was completed when I, as a research fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, was a guest of the Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Universität Mannheim. I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Fakultät, and the Sonderforschungsbereich 5, Universität Mannheim, for their support.

Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance

0. AbstractIt is argued that the theory of the optimal majority for public decision making in its standard formulation is insufficient as a tool to analyze the relationship between different optimal majorities for different kinds of decisions. The theory is reformulated and conditions for optimal majorities for different types of decisions are derived.It is demonstrated how different properties of the sets of potential public projects influence the size of the optimal majority. It is shown that the commonly postulated property that important decisions require a larger majority than less important ones, critically depends on assumptions of risk aversion on the individuals choosing the optimal majority.This paper was written while the author, as an Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow, was a guest of the Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Universität Mannheim. The author thanks the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Fakultät, and Sonderforschungsbereich 5, Universität Mannheim, for their support.

Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voters future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.

Precedence, privilege, preferences, plus Pareto principle: Some examples on egalitarian ethics and economic efficiency

It is demonstrated how economic theory of justice as fairness, Pareto improvements on situations involving equity, can be used to analyze the ethics contents of distributions of rights and privileges. The analysis makes use of the concept of a veil of ignorance to define a status quo. A property right to an ability or a privilege is interpreted as a transparency in the veil in respect to this ability or privilege. Three different examples are investigated, focusing on rights as collective goods, non-transferable abilities, and privileges as inherent rights.

The Growth of Government and the Rise of Pressure Groups

Redistributional policy is often seen as an important factor in explaining the growth in the size of government that has been observed in this century.1) Several factors explaining the expansion in redistributional activities, can be thought of. On the one extreme, one has pure altruism in combination with some ideologically motivated concept of justice leading to a redistribution in favor of the poor; on the other extreme, pure self-interest in combination with the prevailing politico-economical system leads to redistribution in favor of the strong and influential2).

Comment on a comment

Gordon Tullocks comment (Tullock, 1986) on my essay on optimal majorities (Wickstr6m, 1986) raises several interesting questions. I will choose to comment on a few of them. One can broadly divide my remarks into two categories: the relationship between normative and positive theory on the one hand and the technical formalizing of the problem of choosing an optimal constitution on the other hand. In his comment Tullock lists three reasons for a reinforced majority in constitutional matters. The first two of these, in my opinion, are mainly technical points which have to do with formalizing the problem, whereas the third one touches upon the relationship between normative and positive analysis. I agree, of course, with Tullock that it is a natural condition that a constitutional change require at least as large a majority as any action regulated by the constitution. This is simply a consistency requirement. But it can also easily be derived from the problem of obtaining an optimal majority. By nested voting rules, one just has to look at the smallest majority necessary in order to make and effectuate a given decision. This effective majority can then be chosen optimally. However, if the decision has to be made through several steps, such as constitutional amendments, this involves unnecessary transaction costs and the procedure will as a rule no longer be optimal. Hence, in a first-best world, the consistency requirement is a consequence of cost minimization and follows as a result of the theory. One could, however, in a world with constraints on the set of possible institutional structures, imagine that a non-consistent nested voting rule could be the best choice among the available alternatives. This, however, goes beyond the theory for optimal majorities, which in essence is a first-best normative theory. Tullocks second reason for a reinforced majority is that certain decisions require considerable discussion and therefore ought to be delayed. The relevant questions here are on the one hand why the constitutional changes should be thoroughly debated and on the other hand whether one sees the optimal majority as a normative or positive concept. If the reason for a