Werner Güth

Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study

In repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior.

Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better

Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than the rest of us? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound rational choice answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation the complex interactions between moral intrinsic motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic formal controls of opportunism are analysed. Under the assumption that judges are no better than ordinary citizens it is shown that introducing a court system can nevertheless prevent that the more trustworthy are driven out. It cannot be excluded, though, that courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances.

To Weigh or Not to Weigh that is the Question: Advice on Weighing Goods in a Boundedly Rational Way

This new and original collection of papers focuses on the intersection of three strands of research: evolutionary economics, behavioral economics, and management studies. Combining theoretical and empirical contributions, the expert contributors demonstrate that the intersection of these fields provides a rich source of opportunities enabling researchers to find more satisfactory answers to questions that (not only evolutionary) economists have long been tackling. Topics discussed include individual agents and their interactions; the behavior and development of firm organizations; and evolving firms and their broader implications for the development of regions and entire economies.

Einflüsse, Verbindungen, Auswirkungen

Die Wirkung der Evolutionstheorie auf die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der biologischen und kulturellen Geschichte der Menschheit und ihrer Varietaten muss vor dem Hintergrund vorevolutionarer Konzepte betrachtet werden. Dabei sind insbesondere die Gegentheorien des Monogenismus und Polygenismus sowie das Bild der Kette der Lebewesen relevant. Sie reichen in der Geschichte weit zuruck. Die Genealogie der Menschheit wurde im Mittelalter gemas der Genesis von den Sohnen Noahs abgeleitet. Im Zuge der fruhneuzeitlichen Begegnungen mit dem nicht-christlichen Westafrika und den Heiden der Neuen Welt wurden die Stamme Japhets, Shems und Hams konsequent mit den Bewohnern der Erdteile Europa, Asien und Afrika identifiziert. Die »Entdeckung« der Amerinder fugte eine weitere Menschenvarietat hinzu. Sie fuhrte zu einer polygenetischen Theorie, die der dominanten Annahme einer einheitlichen Schopfung des Menschen widersprach. Isaac La Peyrere wagte namlich die Hypothese, dass es sich bei den Amerindern um die Abkommlinge einer ersten Schopfung Gottes handle — um Praadamiten (Praeadamitae, 1655).