Benjamin Schnieder

Truth-Making without Truth-Makers

The article is primarily concerned with the notion of a truth-maker. An explication for this notion is offered, which relates it to other notions of making something such-and-such. In particular, it is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general mechanisms of the concepts involved. Thus, a schematic explication of a whole battery of related notions is offered. It is based on an explanatory notion, introduced by the sentential connector “because”, whose function is examined in some detail. Finally, on the basis of the explication proposed, an argument is developed to the effect that the objects usually regarded as truth-makers are not apt to play this role.

Grounding and dependence

The paper deals with the notions of grounding and of existential dependence. It is shown that cases of existential dependence seem to be systematically correlated to cases of grounding and hence the question is raised what sort of tie might hold the two notions together so as to account for the observed correlation. The paper focusses on three possible ties between grounding and existential dependence: identity (as suggested in Jonathan Schaffer’s works), definition (as suggested by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder), and grounding (as suggested by Kathrin Koslicki and Francesco Orilia). A case for the definitional tie is made.

Explanation by induction

Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue.

On what we can ensure

The Conjunction Principle says, roughly, that if the truth of a conjunction can be brought about, then the truth of each conjunct can be brought about. The current essay argues that this principle is not valid. After a clarification of the principle, it is shown how a proper understanding of the involved notions falsify the principle. As a corollary, a recent attack on van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument will be rebutted, because it relies on the invalid conjunction principle.

In defence of a logic for ‘because’

The present author developed a calculus for the logic of ‘because’. In a recent paper in this journal, it has been claimed that the central inference rules for the logic are invalid and that the intuition upon which the rules are based is not accounted for. This note criticises these arguments and presents an independent argument in favour of the rules used in the logic.

Wahrheitswertträger und Wahrmacher

Der Begriff der Wahrheit steht von alters her wie kaum ein anderer im philosophischen Rampenlicht. Um ihn ranken sich hochst kontroverse Debatten, in denen wohl kein Aspekt des Wesens und der Eigenschaften der Wahrheit unumstritten bleibt (s. auch Kap. 48 und 49).

Counting the Colours

The chapter starts with the presentation of a puzzle about how we ordinarily count the colours of an object. Four different solutions are proposed. Two of the proposals actually solve the puzzle, but they differ in what concepts they employ.