Bent Flyvbjerg

Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. This article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies.

Megaprojects and risk: An anatomy of ambition

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multibillion-dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be essential reading in its field for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians, journalists and interested citizens.

How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects

Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars being spent on infrastructure development -- from roads, rail and airports to energy extraction and power networks to the Internet -- surprisingly little reliable knowledge exists about the performance of these investments in terms of actual costs, benefits and risks. This paper presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost performance in transport infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 258 projects in 20 nations worth approximately US

What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects

90 billion (constant 1995 prices). The paper shows with overwhelming statistical significance that in terms of costs transport infrastructure projects do not perform as promised. The conclusion is tested for different project types, different geographical regions and different historical periods. Substantial cost escalation is the rule rather than the exception. For rail, average cost escalation is 45% (SD=38), for fixed links (tunnels and bridges) it is 34% (62) and for roads 20% (30). Cost escalation appears a global phenomenon, existing across 20 nations on five continents. Cost estimates have not improved and cost escalation not decreased over the past 70 years. Cost estimates used in decision-making for transport infrastructure development are highly, systematically and significantly misleading. Large cost escalations combined with large standard deviations translate into large financial risks. However, such risks are typically ignored or underplayed in decision-making, to the detriment of social and economic welfare.

Phronetic planning research: theoretical and methodological reflections

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US

What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: An Overview

90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership—private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership—it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

Should We Build More Large Dams? The Actual Costs of Hydropower Megaproject Development

This article presents the theoretical and methodological considerations behind a research method which the author calls ‘phronetic planning research’. Such research sets out to answer four questions of power and values for specific instances of planning: (1) Where are we going with planning? (2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What, if anything, should we do about it? A central task of phronetic planning research is to provide concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which power and values work in planning and with what consequences to whom, and to suggest how relations of power and values could be changed to work with other consequences. Insofar as planning situations become clear, they are clarified by detailed stories of who is doing what to whom. Clarifications of that kind are a principal concern for phronetic planning research and provide the main link to praxis.

From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right

This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study, by first answering the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units of mega, giga, and tera, and concluding with how we are presently entering a new “tera era” of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at US

Policy and Planning for Large-Infrastructure Projects: Problems, Causes, Cures

6 to US

Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice

9 trillion annually, or 8% of the total global gross domestic product (GDP), which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four “sublimes”—political, technological, economic, and aesthetic—are identified and used to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the “iron law of megaprojects” is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the “break–fix model” of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschmans theory of the “Hiding Hand” is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to “survival of the unfittest,” which explains why the worst projects get built rather than the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a “tension point,” in which tradition is being challenged and reform is emerging.