Chantal C. Cantarelli

Different Cost Performance: Different Determinants? The Case of Cost Overruns in Dutch Transport Infrastructure Projects

This paper examines three independent explanatory variables and their relation with cost overrun in order to decide whether this is different for Dutch infrastructure projects compared to worldwide findings. The three independent variables are project type (road, rail, and fixed link projects), project size (measured in terms of estimated costs) and the length of the project implementation phase. For Dutch projects, average cost overrun is 10.6% for rail, 18.6% for roads and 21.7% for fixed links. For project size, small Dutch projects have the largest average percentage cost overruns but in terms of total overrun, large projects have a larger share. The length of the implementation phase and especially the length of the pre-construction phase are important determinants of cost overruns in the Netherlands. With each additional year of pre-construction, percentage cost overrun increases by five percentage points. In contrast, the length of the construction phase has hardly any influence on cost overruns. This is an important contribution to current knowledge about cost overruns, because the period in which projects are most prone to cost overruns is narrowed down considerably, at least in the Netherlands. This means that to determine the causes and cures of overruns one should focus on the period.

Characteristics of Cost Overruns for Dutch Transport Infrastructure Projects and the Importance of the Decision to Build and Project Phases

Using a methodology similar to that used the in the worldwide research, the cost performance of Dutch large-scale transport infrastructure projects is determined. In the Netherlands, cost overruns are as common as cost underruns but because cost overruns are larger than cost underruns projects on average have a cost overrun of 16.5%. The focus on one country further enabled to consider cost overruns during different project development phases. It turned out that in the Netherlands the majority of the cost overrun occurs in the pre-construction phase (the period between the formal decision to build and the start of construction). The frequency as well as the magnitude of pre-construction cost overrun is significantly higher than in the construction phase. The used methodology of calculating cost overruns does however not take lock-in into account. This phenomenon shows that the real decision to build was taken much earlier in the decision-making process. Since estimated costs are usually lower during these earlier stages, the cost overruns based on this real decision to build are likely to be much higher. Cost overruns presented in studies are therefore often underestimated and the problem of cost overruns is much larger than we think.

Geographical variation in project cost performance: The Netherlands versus worldwide

Cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects know no geographical limits; overruns are a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the size of cost overruns varies with location. In the Netherlands, cost overruns appear to be smaller compared to the rest of the world. This paper tests whether Dutch projects perform significantly better in terms of cost overruns than other geographical areas. It is concluded that for road and tunnel projects, the Netherlands performs similarly to the rest of the world. For rail projects, Dutch projects perform considerably better, with projects having significantly lower percentage cost overruns in real terms (11%) compared to projects in other North West European countries (27%) and in other geographical areas (44%). Bridge projects also have considerably smaller cost overruns – 7% in the Netherlands compared with 45% in other NW European countries and 27% in other geographical areas. In explaining cost overruns, geography should therefore clearly be taken into consideration.

Lock-In and Its Influence on the Project Performance of Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Investigating the Way in Which Lock-In Can Emerge and Affect Cost Overruns

Lock-in, the escalating commitment of decision makers to an ineffective course of action, has the potential to explain the large cost overruns in large-scale transportation infrastructure projects. Lock-in can occur both at the decision-making level (before the decision to build) and at the project level (after the decision to build) and can influence the extent of overruns in two ways. The first involves the ‘methodology’ of calculating cost overruns according to the ‘formal decision to build’. Due to lock-in, however, the ‘real decision to build’ is made much earlier in the decision-making process and the costs estimated at that stage are often much lower than those that are estimated at a later stage in the decision-making process, thus increasing cost overruns. The second way that lock-in can affect cost overruns is through ‘practice’. Although decisions about the project (design and implementation) need to be made, lock-in can lead to inefficient decisions that involve higher costs. Sunk costs (in terms of both time and money), the need for justification, escalating commitment, and inflexibility and the closure of alternatives are indicators of lock-in. Two case studies, of the Betuweroute and the High Speed Link-South projects in the Netherlands, demonstrate the presence of lock-in and its influence on the extent of cost overruns at both the decision-making and project levels. This suggests that recognition of lock-in as an explanation for cost overruns contributes significantly to the understanding of the inadequate planning process of projects and allows development of more appropriate means.

Cost overruns in large-scale transportation infrastructure projects: Which explanations can be given?

Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent misinformation about the costs and benefits, which results in large cost overruns and benefit shortfalls that often threaten the project viability. This paper explores the explanations for cost overruns that have been presented in previous studies, and whether these explanations are theoretically embedded. Two categories of explanations for cost overruns are distinguished: political explanations and non-political explanations. This paper also investigates whether there are theories that have not yet been included in the literature on cost overruns that can contribute to the understanding of cost overruns. For political explanations agency theory is considered the most interesting and an eclectic theory is considered possible as well. Non-political explanations are diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and prospect theory), dependent on the kind of explanation is considered more appropriate than one all-embracing theory.

Explaining cost overruns of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects using a signalling game

Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can be theoretically supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This article gives a formal account of this relation by a signalling game. This is a game with incomplete information which considers the way in which parties anticipate upon other parties’ behaviour in choosing a course of action. The game shows how cost overruns are the result of an inappropriate signal. This makes it impossible for the principal to distinguish between the types of agents, and hence, allows for strategic behaviour. It is illustrated how cost overruns can be avoided by means of two policy measures, e.g. an accountability structure and benchmarking.

Decision Making and Major Transport Infrastructure Projects: The Role of Project Ownership

A main problem in the decision-making of major infrastructure projects is the high level of misinformation about costs decision-makers face in deciding whether to build the project. Reduced public funds and misallocation thereof were the main reasons for the revival of private financing in infrastructure planning. A first systematic study into the relation between project ownership and cost performance of transport infrastructure projects showed that the problem may not be the difference between private and public projects but a certain type of public ownership, i.e. state-owned enterprises. This study concluded that it is not ownership in itself that matters in project performance. Ownership does not reveal which parties are responsible for construction, operation, or maintenance. Consequently, we cannot draw any conclusions on whether private parties’ involvement results in better project performance. Based on a case study of the HSL-South, a high-speed railway line in the Netherlands, we found that the contracting strategy and the amount of private financing are better determinants for project performance.

Mega-Projects' Cost Performance and Lock-In: Problems and Solutions

A major problem in the planning of mega-projects is the high level of misinformation about costs (and benefits) that decision-makers face in deciding whether to build and the high risks such misinformation generates. The inaccuracy of construction cost estimates is typically measured as the size of cost overrun. There are many well-known mega-projects with major cost overruns. One of the most famous ‘project disasters’ in this respect is the Channel Tunnel. This undersea rail tunnel linking the United Kingdom and France is the longest of its kind in Europe with a length of about 50 km. Construction costs increased from £2600 million to £4650 million (1985 prices), which is 80 per cent higher than the forecasted costs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). Another well-known mega-project failure is the Central Artery/Tunnel project in Boston, USA, also known as the ‘Big Dig’ or Big Dug’ due to persistent tunnel leaks. This large and complex underground highway project suffered a cost overrun of US

Cost Overruns in Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness

11 billion or 275 per cent (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Bangkok’s underground subway was 67per cent over budget. Many other examples of projects with cost overruns exist, for example, the Great Belt link in Denmark (54 per cent overrun),the Humber Bridge in the UK (175 per cent overrun) and the Paris Nord TGV in France (25 per cent overrun) (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). Cost overruns appear to be a global phenomenon, existing across 20 nations on five continents (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b).