Bernadette A. Minton

Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of appointments of outsiders — directors previously employed by banks (bank directors) or by other nonfinancial firms (corporate directors) — to the boards of large nonfinancial Japanese corporations. Such appointments increase with poor stock performance; those of bank directors also increase with earnings losses. Turnover of incumbent top executives increases substantially in the year of both types of outside appointments. We perform a similar analysis for outside appointments in large U.S. firms and find different patterns. We conclude that banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring and disciplinary role in Japan.

The impact of cash flow volatility on discretionary investment and the costs of debt and equity financing

We document that cash flow volatility is associated with lower levels of investment in capital expenditures, R&D, and advertising. Thus, firms do not turn to external capital markets to fully cover cash-flow short falls. Consistent with this conclusion, we document that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow volatility is greater for firms with higher costs of capital market access. In addition, cash flow and earnings volatility are associated with these higher costs. Thus, volatility not only increases the likelihood that a firm will need to access capital markets, it also increases the costs of doing so.

How Has CEO Turnover Changed

We study CEO turnover – both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) – from 1992 to 2007 for a sample of large US companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 15.8% from 1992 to 2007, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than 7 years. In the more recent period since 2000, total CEO turnover increases to 16.8%, implying an average tenure of less than 6 years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm stock performance – performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. The relations are stronger in the more recent period since 2000. We find similar patterns for both forced and unforced turnover, suggesting that some, if not most, turnover labeled as unforced is actually not voluntary. The turnover‐performance sensitivity is modestly related to block shareholder ownership and board independence.

An empirical examination of basic valuation models for plain vanilla U.S. interest rate swaps

Abstract This paper examines empirical implications of recently developed models for pricing contracts that swap fixed- for variable-rate interest payment streams. Valuation models based on replicating portfolios of consecutive three-month Eurodollar futures contracts that span the life of the swap perform relatively well, as do pricing models based on replicating portfolios of noncallable corporate par bonds. Neither set of models, however, is completely empirically consistent with the implications of differential counterparty risks. These anomalous results call into question the appropriateness of either the simplifying assumptions of the arbitrage-based models or the proxies used for counter-party default risk.

Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies

Financial expertise among independent directors of U.S. banks is positively associated with balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk in the run-up to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. While financial expertise is weakly associated with better performance before the crisis, it is strongly related to lower performance during the crisis. Overall, the results are consistent with independent directors with financial expertise supporting increased risk taking prior to the crisis. Despite being consistent with shareholder value maximization ex ante, these actions become detrimental during the crisis. These results are not driven by powerful chief executive officers who select independent financial experts to rubber stamp strategies that satisfy their risk appetite.

How Much do Banks use Credit Derivatives to Reduce Risk

This paper examines the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies from 1999 to 2003 with assets in excess of one billion dollars. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2003 only 19 large banks out of 345 use credit derivatives. Though few banks use credit derivatives, the assets of these banks represent on average two thirds of the assets of bank holding companies with assets in excess of

The role of volatility in forecasting

1 billion. Few banks are net buyers of credit protection and disclose using credit derivatives to hedge loans. Banks are more likely to be net protection buyers if they engage in asset securitization, originate foreign loans, and have lower capital ratios. The likelihood of a bank being a net protection buyer is positively related to the percentage of commercial and industrial loans in a banks loan portfolio and negatively or not related to other types of bank loans. The use of credit derivatives by banks is limited because adverse selection and moral hazard problems make the market for credit derivatives illiquid for the typical credit exposures of banks.

Do Independence and Financial Expertise of the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance

Theories of underinvestment propose a link between cash flow volatility and investment and subsequent cash flow and earnings levels. Consistent with these theories, our results indicate that forecasting models that include volatility as an explanatory variable have greater accuracy and lower bias than forecasting models that exclude volatility. The improvement in forecast accuracy and bias is greatest when the firm is most likely to experience underinvestment. The profitable implementation of a trading strategy based on these findings, however, suggests that equity market participants do not incorporate fully the information in historical volatility when forecasting future firm performance.

The Use of Multiple Risk Management Strategies: Evidence from the Natural Gas Industry

During the recent financial crisis, financial expertise among independent directors of commercial banks is negatively related to changes in both firm value and cumulative stock returns. Furthermore, financial expertise is positively associated with risk-taking levels in the run-up to the crisis using both balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk. These results are not driven by powerful CEOs who select independent experts to rubber stamp strategies that satisfy their risk appetite. They are, however, consistent with independent directors with financial expertise recognizing the residual nature of shareholders’ claim and supporting a heightened risk profile for their bank.

Corporate Liquidity, Acquisitions, and Macroeconomic Conditions

Starting in 1978 and continuing throughout the 1980s, natural gas pipelines faced a series of regulatory changes, including price deregulation, which changed their exposures to price and quantity risk. We exploit this unique environment and examine cross-sectional and time-series patterns in the use of multiple risk management strategies by pipeline companies. Natural gas pipelines use a combination of such strategies, including gas storage, cash holdings, line-of-business and geographic diversification, and commodity derivatives to hedge their increasing risks. Gas storage shows a complementary relation to holding cash and using derivatives to mitigate these risks. However, differences in the financial characteristics of derivatives hedgers and storage hedgers suggest that firms use derivatives to manage price risk and store gas to manage volume risk. Derivatives hedgers are similar to firms that diversify. In addition, firms that engage in hedging activities have smaller and less variable sensitivities to price changes than firms that do not, especially post-deregulation.