James T. Moser

Spreads, information flows and transparency across trading systems

This paper analyses the relative merits of an automated versus an open outcry trading system for a derivatives contract which is traded simultaneously at two competing exchanges. The only characterizing difference between these exchanges is the mode of operation. The domestic exchange (listing the underlying asset) operates by automated trading, the foreign exchange uses open outcry. Investigations are made to determine whether this operational competition supports a trading system segmentation hypothesis. First, quote setting is investigated to determine whether or not it is related to the transparency of the trading system. Second, analysis is carried out to determine whether the transparency of the trading system influences the lead/lag relationship in returns and volatility between the two markets. Both hypotheses are empirically tested for the Bund futures contract as it is traded in London (LIFFE) and Frankfurt (DTB).

Contracting Innovations and the Evolution of Clearing and Settlement Methods at Futures Exchanges

Defining futures contracts as substitutes for associated cash transactions enables a discussion of the evolution of controls over contract nonperformance risk. These controls are incorporated into exchange methods for clearing contracts. Three clearing methods are discussed: direct, ringing and complete. The incidence and operation of each are described. Direct-clearing systems feature bilateral contracts with terms specified by the counterparties to the contract. Exchanges relying on direct clearing system chiefly serve as mediators in trade disputes. Ringing is shown to facilitate contract offset by increasing the number of potential counterparties. Ringing settlements reduce counterparty credit risk by reducing the accumulation of dependencies as contracts are offset. Ringing settlements also lower the cost of maintaining open contract positions, chiefly by lowering the amount or required margin deposits. Exchanges employing ringing methods generally adopted a clearinghouse to handle payments. Complete clearing interposes the clearinghouse as counterparty to every contract. This measure ensures that contracts are fungible with respect to both the underlying commodity and counterparty risk.

Physical Markets, Paper Markets and the WTI-Brent Spread

Since the Fall of 2008, the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil has periodically traded at unheard-of discounts to the corresponding Brent benchmark. This discount is not reflected in the price spreads between Brent and other benchmarks that are directly comparable to WTI. Drawing on extant models linking oil inventory conditions to the futures term structure, we test empirically several conjectures about how calendar and commodity spreads (nearby vs. first-deferred WTI; nearby Brent vs. WTI) should move over time and be related to storage conditions at Cushing. We then investigate whether, after controlling for macroeconomic and physical market fundamentals, spread behavior is partly predicted by the aggregate oil futures positions of commodity index traders.

Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications

Certain nonrecurring circumstances associated with the passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act create a unique opportunity for the market to infer bank examination ratings. This natural experiment enables an assessment of the markets views on this, heretofore, private information. We find little evidence that the stock market extracted and/or valued regulatory information from these conversion announcements. Upon implementation of the GLB Act, systematic risk increased for most of our sample—both converting and non-converting BHCs. We find smaller bond spreads for converting BHCs compared to non-converters. While the expanded bank powers from the GLB Act increases systematic risk exposure to shareholders, bondholder exposure to credit-risk appears to decrease.

Opportunity cost and prudentiality: an analysis of collateral decisions in bilateral and multilateral settings

This paper develops a model that explains how the creation of a futures clearinghouse allows traders to reduce default and economize on margin. We contrast the collateral necessary between bilateral partners with that required when multilateral netting occurs. Optimal margin levels balance the deadweight costs of default against the opportunity costs of holding additional margin. Once created, it may be optimal for the clearinghouse to monitor the financial condition of its members. If undertaken, monitoring will reduce the amount of margin required but need not affect the probability of default. Once created, it becomes optimal for the clearinghouse membership to expel defaulting members. This reduces the probability of default. Our empirical tests suggest that the opportunity cost of margin plays an important role in clearinghouse behavior particularly their determination of margin amounts. The relationship between volatility and margins suggests that participants face an upward-sloping opportunity cost of margin. This appears to dominate the effects that monitoring and expulsion might have on margin setting.

Bank-Equity returns and changes in the discount rate

The ex ante value of discount window operations is modelled as an option providing financial institutions with a right to purchase reserves at potentially below market rates of interest. The value of this option varies according to terms specified by the Federal Reserve. Changes in the value of this option are linked to the equity returns of participating banks. An empirical method is proposed to separate the signal impacts of a discountrate change from the firm-specific impacts of changes in the hypothesized option value. Evidence consistent with changes in the value of the option is reported.

Failed Delivery and Daily Treasury Bill Returns

If the seller of a Treasury bill does not provide timely and correct delivery instructions to the clearing bank, the bank does not deliver the security. Furthermore, the seller is not paid until this “failed delivery” is rectified. Since the purchase price is not changed, these “fails” generate interest-free loans from the seller to the buyer. This article studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury bill prices. We find that investors bid prices to a premium to reflect the possibility of obtaining the interest-free loans that fails represent. This premium is a function of the opportunity cost of the fail. We also find that the bid-ask spread varies directly with the length of the fail. We rule out that our results are due to liquidity premiums, or to a general weekly pattern in short-term interest rates or the bid-ask spread.

Reversing the lead, or a series of unfortunate events? NYMEX, ICE and Amaranth

A number of studies compare the efficiency and transparency of floor trading with automated/electronic trading systems in the competition for order flow. Although most of these studies find that electronic systems lead price discovery, a few studies highlight the weaknesses of electronic trading in highly volatile market conditions. A series of unusual events in 2006, sparking extreme volatility in natural gas futures trading, provide an ideal setting to revisit the resilience of trading system price leadership in the face of high volatility. We estimate time‐varying Hasbrouck‐style information shares to investigate the intertemporal and cross‐sectional dynamics in price discovery. The results strongly suggest that the information share is time‐dependent and contract‐dependent. Floor trading dominates price discovery in the less liquid longer‐maturity contracts, whereas electronic trading dominates price discovery in the most liquid spot‐month contract. We find that the floor trading information share increases significantly with realized volatility.

The Immediacy Implications of Exchange Organization

The paper introduces a connection between the needs of exchanges to respond to the immediacy needs of their clientele and the need to manage the credit risks faced by exchange members. Queueing theory is used to represent the opportunity loss suffered by brokers engaging in multiple activities: order-flow origination and its intermediation. The role of market-making locals is depicted as enabling specialization. Brokers focus on originating order flow and locals on fulfilling intermediation needs. The capacity to specialize is constrained by the availability of creditworthy members acting as locals. This results in a tension between pursuit of immediacy and managing inter-member credit exposure. Two exchange rules, tick size and price limits, are evaluated for their effects in resolving this tension.