Bernardita Vial

THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE CHILEAN VOUCHER SYSTEM

We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) parameter and treatment on the treated (TT) for those students effectively choosing a private voucher school. With detailed individual data for both the school and the family of the student we are able to con

Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.

We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is no mandate, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The results show self-selection against insurance companies for independent workers, and against public insurance for dependent workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization, but for medical visits, it is quantitatively important.

DESEMPLEO E INACTIVIDAD JUVENIL EN CHILE

This article analyzes the occupational and educational choices among males in the 18-24 age group in Chile. The decision to work, for those who do not study, is analyzed jointly with the decision to study, in order to avoid selection bias. Results confirm

Intermediation, Self Selection, and Willingness to Pay for Firm and Product Attributes

Lifetime annuities are insurance policies designed to protect the annuitant from longevity risk. However, the evidence suggests that annuitants also consider other risks involved. We analyze the choices of Chilean annuitants over ten years. A significant proportion of retirees select firms with better risk-ratings which offer lower payouts, suggesting a concern about the providers default-risk. In addition, most retirees are willing to reduce their payouts by contracting guaranteed periods, protecting their heirs in case of early death. Moreover, the evidence suggests that willingness to pay for guaranteed periods was even greater when mandated survivor benefits were absent. We show that these findings can be explained by the effect of individual characteristics on the expected lifetime utility of the annuity. Our results support the claim that bequest motives play a crucial role in the demand for annuities and indicate that replacement rates are an incomplete assessment of pension systems performances.

Implicit Trade-off in Replacement Rates: Consumer Preferences for Firms, Intermediaries, and Annuity Attributes

Lifetime annuities are insurance policies designed to protect the annuitant from longevity risk. However, the evidence suggests that annuitants also consider other risks involved. We analyze the choices of Chilean annuitants over ten years. A significant proportion of retirees select firms with better risk-ratings which offer lower payouts, suggesting a concern about the providers default-risk. In addition, most retirees are willing to reduce their payouts by contracting guaranteed periods, protecting their heirs in case of early death. Moreover, the evidence suggests that willingness to pay for guaranteed periods was even greater when mandated survivor benefits were absent. We show that these findings can be explained by the effect of individual characteristics on the expected lifetime utility of the annuity. Our results support the claim that bequest motives play a crucial role in the demand for annuities and indicate that replacement rates are an incomplete assessment of pension systems performances.

Willingness to Pay for Firm Reputation: Paying for Risk Rating in the Annuity Market

Lifetime annuities are insurance policies designed to protect the annuitant from longevity risk. However, the evidence suggests that annuitants also consider other risks involved. We analyze the choices of Chilean annuitants over ten years. A significant proportion of retirees select firms with better risk-ratings which offer lower payouts, suggesting a concern about the providers default-risk. In addition, most retirees are willing to reduce their payouts by contracting guaranteed periods, protecting their heirs in case of early death. Moreover, the evidence suggests that willingness to pay for guaranteed periods was even greater when mandated survivor benefits were absent. We show that these findings can be explained by the effect of individual characteristics on the expected lifetime utility of the annuity. Our results support the claim that bequest motives play a crucial role in the demand for annuities and indicate that replacement rates are an incomplete assessment of pension systems performances.