Claudio Sapelli

THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE CHILEAN VOUCHER SYSTEM

We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) parameter and treatment on the treated (TT) for those students effectively choosing a private voucher school. With detailed individual data for both the school and the family of the student we are able to con

Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.

We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is no mandate, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The results show self-selection against insurance companies for independent workers, and against public insurance for dependent workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization, but for medical visits, it is quantitatively important.

THE CHILEAN VOUCHER SYSTEM: SOME NEW RESULTS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES

The discussion about voucher systems in general and the evaluation of the Chilean voucher system in particular has centered, among other things, on whether private schools are better than public schools, and on the importance of sorting and the peer effect. In this spirit, this paper presents some results regarding both issues. Regarding the first issue I provide (based on published and ongoing work with Bernardita Vial) evidence that private schools are better than public schools, when they work with similar budgets. On the second issue, I discuss the evidence provided by papers such as McEwan and Carnoy (1998), and Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) (hereafter HU), and provide some new evidence regarding these issues. I conclude that probably the key lesson from the Chilean experience is the importance of the proper design of a voucher system. The paper first discusses the characteristics of the Chilean voucher system, then examines the literature that has evaluated it, and ends with two topics that should be researched further: the regulation of the system by the Ministry of Education, and the peer effect. I provide new results to evaluate the importance of the latter.

The Mandatory Health Insurance System in Chile: Explaining the Choice between Public and Private Insurance

In Chile, dependent workers and retirees are mandated by law to purchase health insurance, and can choose between private and public health insurance. This paper studies the determinants of the choice of health insurance. Earnings are generally considered the key factor in this choice, and we confirm this, but find that other factors are also important. It is particularly interesting to analyze how the individuals characteristics interact with the design of the system to influence choice. Worse health, as signaled by age or sex (e.g., older people or women in reproductive ages), results in adverse selection against the public health insurance system. This is due to the lack of risk adjustment of the public health insurances premium. Hence, Chiles risk selection problem is, at least in part, due to the design of the Chilean public insurance system.

SUBSIDIOS AL ALUMNO O A LA ESCUELA: EFECTOS SOBRE LA ELECCION DE COLEGIOS PUBLICOS

In this paper we study the determinants of the choice between public and private subsidized schools in the Chilean voucher system. Our empirical results confirm the effects of parents income and education: higher income and more education increase the pr

Deserción Escolar y Trabajo Juvenil: ¿Dos Caras de Una Misma Decisión?

En Chile, practicamente no hay desercion en educacion basica; sin embargo, en secundaria la tasa de desercion es de un 10%. Este articulo estudia los determinantes de dicha tasa de desercion. Para ello presenta un modelo microeconometrico de eleccion biva

A cohort analysis of the income distribution in Chile

In this paper we look at the income distribution by cohort in Chile. We construct a synthetic panel from cross section surveys and estimate the income distribution for cohorts born between 1902 and 1978. We then decompose the evolution of these distributions into age, year and cohort effects. The cohort effects show a period where inequality increases, to then decrease. We attempt to explain this evolution. The rise can be explained by variables associated with education, while the fall appears to be the consequence of a flattening of the income-age profile and hence a reduction in the returns to experience.

La economía de la educación y el sistema educativo chileno

El analisis del sistema educativo chileno se integra a una de las discusiones mas apasionantes en la economia de la educacion: respecto a si, en el neto, los sistemas de vouchers son la solucion para la baja eficiencia y pobre calidad de los sistemas estatales centralmente planificados que aun predominan en el mundo. O si, por el contrario, el de la educacion es uno de los pocos sectores productivos en que la competencia y la libre eleccion de los consumidores no es mejor que la planificacion central. En este sentido varios investigadores extranjeros1 y chilenos2 han escrito sobre el sistema de vouchers chileno, y han obtenido de sus estudios conclusiones mezcladas. De hecho, una conclusion en el sentido de que el sistema de vouchers en alguna medida fracaso, llevo a una inflexion en la politica educacional en los noventa (ver, por ejemplo, Cox y Lemaitre (1999)). Sin embargo, esta conclusion es controvertida y no es apoyada por los resultados mas recientes. La literatura nacional sobre la economia de la educacion y en particular sobre la efectividad del sistema de vouchers ha pasado por, podriamos decir, tres generaciones. Una primera (Aedo (1998), Aedo y Larranaga (1995)) concluia que los colegios particulares subvencionados (en adelante, PS) eran mejores que los colegios municipales (en adelante, MUN). Pero trabajaban con muestras parciales. La segunda (el trabajo paradigmatico es Mizala y Romaguera (2000a)) concluia que, con la muestra completa, y una vez que se controlaba por el capital Cuadernos de Economia, Ano 39, No 118, pp.281-296 (Diciembre 2002)

The Political Economy Of The Chilean Transition To Democracy

Chile’s economic performance since the mid 1990s has been outstanding. Several reasons account for this success. The strong initial position of the economy was a crucial asset. Broad consensus on economic matters helped a lot. This paper argues that the i

Some Thoughts on the Evaluation of the Chilean Voucher System.

Many papers describe the Chilean voucher system as the “textbook” voucher case. But this is mistaken and has prevented research to undertake the key question of how the particular design of the Chilean voucher system determines the results obtained in Chile. This also prevents discussion of how a voucher system with a different design could lead to different results. The issue is that the Chilean voucher system is an incentive system that is more complicated to evaluate than is commonly believed. Hence different papers estimate different treatment effects, which answer different questions, as is explained in the paper. Summarizing, the Chilean voucher system has different sets of incentives both on the demand and on the supply side. On the supply side, the system does not necessarily eradicate bad schools, and those schools tend to attract poor students. From the demand side, the poorest students are unable to attract a high quality private school because the value of the voucher is too small (since voucher amounts—prices—are set lower than equilibrium). Hence, both due to problems in the supply and demand side, the system offers low quality to poor students. The incentives faced by municipal schools are different from what they are assumed to be in the “textbook” voucher system. Municipal schools do not face the choice between supplying an adequate quality of education or closing. Recognizing the lack of adequate incentives faced by public schools, the Ministry of Education in Chile has built a parallel system of incentives. This is a second deviation from the “textbook” case. Finally, the Ministry of Education in Chile strongly regulates private subsidized schools. In sum, what some view as the “textbook” voucher system is in reality a patchwork system of incentives and constraints. We discuss how this patchwork makes evaluation of the results harder and how different papers may answer different questions (and sometimes possibly the wrong questions).