Bernhard Kittel

Sense and sensitivity in pooled analysis of political data

In recent years, pooled time-series cross-section data analysis has been advocated as a method for overcoming the ‘small N, many variables’ problem in comparative political economy in order to derive valid inferences from statistical comparisons of nation states. Moreover, the approach seemed promising in handling both comparisons among different countries and developments over time. However, due to the complex structure of pooled data sets, this approach cannot simply be regarded as a convenient way of increasing the number of cases and getting more significant results. This paper exemplifies the fallacies of pooled data sets by reanalyzing a study done by Paul Boreham and Hugh Compston on the effect of labour participation in policy formation on unemployment. Reanalysis of their data set controlling for the panel structure of the data by using ‘panel corrected standard errors’ and a more detailed analysis of the bivariate relationships show that the causal effect is less clear-cut than suggested and becomes considerably weaker during the 1980s. These dynamics are simply averaged out by pooled analysis. This leads to the conclusion that the currently most popular approach to pooled time-series cross-section analysis in comparative political economy – the constant-coefficients model – neither solves the small-N problem nor draws attention to dynamics over time. Thus, the article concludes that a sensitive interpretation of the findings obtained by advanced statistical methodology in comparative political economy is still dependent on small-N comparative analysis.

The bargaining system and performance: a comparison of 18 OECD countries

Theoretical reasoning disagrees about what type of bargaining system performs best. The authors have tested the explanatory power of three competing hypotheses: neoliberalism, corporatism, and the hump-shape hypothesis. All of these hypotheses lack empirical support due to two main shortcomings. First, they ignore that wage restraint raises three distinct types of collective-action problems. Second, they do not consider qualitative differences among the national bargaining systems (particularly the role of the state) that do not allow analysis to construct such ordinal rankings of bargaining coordination as adopted by all previous empirical studies. Proceeding from a revised hypothesis and new measures of national bargaining systems, the authors have found a nonlinear relationship between the bargaining system and economic performance in a way that economy-wide wage coordination is superior only when the bargaining system is able to make local bargaining comply with coordination activities.

A Crazy Methodology? On the Limits of Macro-Quantitative Social Science Research

Despite the great popularity of macro-quantitative comparative research in the social sciences during the past two decades, it has only had a limited lasting impact on the development of our understanding of social macro-phenomena. The lack of robustness appears to be symptomatic of research findings. The cause of this problem is the difficulty in dealing with complex macro-phenomena by means of statistical analysis. If international comparative research relates to independent and identical behaviour of individuals, which can be portrayed at the macro-level by the idea of the representative agent, the analysis is indeed tricky, but not impossible. However, this road is closed for macro-level characteristics of social systems, since the model cannot be based on assumptions about modal behaviour. In this instance, the sole solution seems to be to accept the limits of small numbers and to improve the elaboration of a macro-narrative based on robust micro-correlations.

European Rigidity Versus American Flexibility? The Institutional Adaptability of Collective Bargaining

According to the unified theory, higher unemployment in Europe as compared to the United States is caused by higher wage rigidity, which, in turn, results from more “inflexible” labor market institutions. Focusing on wage coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the variety of bargaining patterns across European countries and during the period1971to 1998contradicts a simple U.S.-Europe juxtaposition. Although some countries have to cope with excessive wage growth, many others do not trigger higher average wage growth and some coordination forms even show better performance than the United States. Secondly, contrary to the contention of rigidity, the labor market actors in most European countries are responsive to the performance of their bargaining system; they tend to adapt their system if wages seem to overshoot. Hence, the rigidity of Europe thesis does not hold in a more detailed cross-national and long-term analysis of institutional changes in wage bargaining.

Experimental Political Science: Principles and Practices

An exploration of core problems in experimental research on voting behaviour and political institutions, ranging from design and data analysis to inferences with respect to constructs, constituencies and causal claims. The focus of is on the implementation of principles in experimental political science and the reflection of actual practices.

Politische Ökonomie der Arbeitsbeziehungen

In der formal-deduktiv vorgehenden „positiven“ Politischen Okonomie bietet die Theorie relativ wenig Platz fur eine aktive Rolle gesellschaftlicher Interessenverbande im politischen System. Ausgehend von der Frage, wie die politische Natur gesellschaftlicher Entscheidungen die Wahl bestimmter policies sowie deren wirtschaftliche Effekte beeinflusst, fokussieren sowohl die Politische Okonomie als auch die public-choice-Literatur im engeren Sinn auf die formale Ausgestaltung des politischen Systems, wie sie insbesondere in der Verfassung niedergelegt ist. Zu Aspekten wie Wahlmodi, parlamentarisches Kammemsystem oder Foderalismus findet sich eine breite und inzwischen gut ausgebaute Literatur (siehe z.B. Drazen 2000; Mueller 1989; Persson/Tabellini 2000). Verbande werden hierbei als Lobby-Organisationen wahrgenommen, denen verschiedene Kanale offen stehen, die im formalen politischen System getatigten Entscheidungen im Sinne ihrer partikularen Interessen zu beeinflussen. Zentrale Einflussmechanismen sind die Information politischer Entscheidungstrager sowie deren finanzielle Unterstutzung (z.B. im Wahlkampf) als Gegenleistung fur Entscheidungen, die die Interessen des Verbandes fordern (siehe z.B. Grossman/Helpman 2001; Potters/van Winden 1996). Aus der Perspektive des US-amerikanischen politischen Systems, das Vorlage fur entscheidende Entwicklungsschritte der Politischen Okonomie war, vermag diese eng an das pluralistische Politikverstandnis gekoppelte Konzeption die Realitat modellhaft adaquat abzubilden. Fur die Funktionsweise europaischer politischer Systeme greift sowohl die Reduktion des Prozesses politischer Entscheidungsfindung auf den formalen Ablauf als auch die Konzeption von Verbanden als reine Lobby-Organisationen aber zu kurz.

Indicators of Social Dialogue: Concepts and Measurements

Identifies four indicators for understanding and measuring social dialogue institutions: associational structure, wage setting arrangements, participation in public policy, and firm-level representation.

Deaustrification? : the policy-area-specific evolution of Austrian social partnership.

Recently, the functioning of Austrian Social Partnership has been increasingly called into question. The strains on the system, often traced to the internationalisation of the economy and the related shift to neoliberally inspired policies, might make Austria prone to disorganising pressures. However, case studies infields of social and economic policy‐making crucial for international competitiveness (working time, vocational training, industrial policy) suggest that many elements of interest intermediation, concertation, and conflict resolution have remained constant over the last 30 years, entailing both elements of concertation and of conflict as well as different trends across policy areas.

Who Shall Not Be Treated: Public Attitudes on Setting Health Care Priorities by Person-Based Criteria in 28 Nations.

The principle of distributing health care according to medical need is being challenged by increasing costs. As a result, many countries have initiated a debate on the introduction of explicit priority regulations based on medical, economic and person-based criteria, or have already established such regulations. Previous research on individual attitudes towards setting health care priorities based on medical and economic criteria has revealed consistent results, whereas studies on the use of person-based criteria have generated controversial findings. This paper examines citizens’ attitudes towards three person-based priority criteria, patients’ smoking habits, age and being the parent of a young child. Using data from the ISSP Health Module (2011) in 28 countries, logistic regression analysis demonstrates that self-interest as well as socio-demographic predictors significantly influence respondents’ attitudes towards the use of person-based criteria for health care prioritization. This study contributes to resolving the controversial findings on person-based criteria by using a larger country sample and by controlling for country-level differences with fixed effects models.

The Competing State: Transformations of the Public/Private Sector Earnings Gap in Four Countries

In the ‘Golden Age’ of the modern state, working for the state was a special kind of employment that came with exceptional rights, obligations and remuneration schemes. Employment conditions of public employees, associated with the Weberian bureaucratic ideal, entailed guaranteed lifetime employment, defined pay scales based on formal education and seniority, and standardized, often fairly predictable, career trajectories.