Monika Mühlböck

Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament

Legislative politics scholars rely heavily on roll call vote (RCV) data. However, it has been claimed that strategic motives behind RCV requests lead to overestimating party group cohesion and, thus, biased findings on legislative behaviour. To explore this claim, we distinguish between two types of bias, a ‘behavioural bias’ and a ‘selection bias’. A recent rule change in the European Parliament, making RCVs mandatory on all final legislative votes, presents the unique opportunity to evaluate the latter. We compare party group cohesion in requested and mandatory RCVs by examining final legislative votes before and after the rule adoption using amendment RCVs (which still need to be requested) as a benchmark. The analysis shows that group cohesion is higher whenever RCVs are not just requested on some but mandatory on all votes. Hence, there is indeed a ‘selection bias’ in RCV data. Yet, somewhat contrary to former claims, relying on requested RCVs leads to underestimation of the cohesion party groups would have had were all votes automatically roll called. We argue that this is mainly because requests occur on more contentious votes.

When legislators choose not to decide: Abstentions in the European Parliament:

Why do legislators choose to vote ‘Abstain’ instead of ‘Yea’ or ‘Nay’? Is it because they shy away from taking sides when facing competing demands? We address this question by studying roll-call vote data on the sixth European Parliament. In line with our principal–agent approach, we find that Members of the European Parliament are prone to strategically abstain when torn between different positions of their national party, their transnational party group, and their country’s minister. Abstentions are thus not random but strategic and ignoring them may bias the findings of legislative studies.

The Council, the European Parliament, and the Paradox of Inter-Institutional Cooperation

Decision-making between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament is characterized by a paradox. On the one hand, there is a high potential for inter-institutional conflict. Historically, the EP and the Council have been opponents in the struggle for power. In addition, both institutions can be said to fulfill different representational roles within the political system of the EU, with the Council representing the member states and the Parliament representing the citizens. Furthermore, agreement between the two is complicated by decision rules posing high thresholds for agreement and actors with often diverging preferences. On the other hand, in day-to-day policy-making, the Council and the European Parliament display a high level of consensus and decision-making efficiency. Most legislation is decided in first reading, and early agreements provide a shortcut for cumbersome inter-institutional negotiations. To shed light on this paradox, we conceptualize the mechanisms and dynamics underlying inter-institutional cooperation and conflict by taking recourse to factors derived from historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalisms. We argue that the same logics which account for conflict also contain the explanation for cooperation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that each of the theoretical approaches is particularly well suited to highlight a certain aspect of the paradox.

‘Scarred’ young entrepreneurs. Exploring young adults’ transition from former unemployment to self-employment

ABSTRACT The recent increase in youth unemployment has major implications for the current and future development of European labour markets. Previous studies reveal the long lasting ‘scarring effects’ of early unemployment experience on later career prospects, including a higher probability of future unemployment or social exclusion. Self-employment is often advocated as a potential remedy for unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular. In this study, we investigate the individual-level factors that lead young people with the ‘scar’ of previous unemployment to engage in self-employment. Based on a recent survey among young adults in eleven European countries, we show that previous unemployment has a significant moderating effect on other individual-level characteristics usually associated with a higher likelihood of being self-employed. While the overall propensity of self-employment is not affected by unemployment experience, the reasons for becoming one’s own boss differ considerably between those young adults who have and those who have not experienced unemployment in the past.

Less Supervision, More Satisficing? Comparing Completely Self-Administered Web-Surveys and Interviews Under Controlled Conditions

Abstract Although online surveys are becoming more and more prominent, the quality of the resulting data is still contested. One potential caveat of web surveys is the absence of an interviewer who controls the interview situation, can motivate respondents and prevent them from satisficing, i.e. answering questions with minimal cognitive effort. While there is evidence for differences between data gathered in interviewer-administered surveys and data from self-administered questionnaires, it has not yet been studied whether the sheer presence of an interviewer affects data quality. The present article addresses this research gap. Based on a recent panel study of young unemployed adults, we compare the results from a completely self-administered web survey with those from interviews which were self-administered but conducted in the presence of an interviewer. In particular, we look for differences concerning drop-out, speed, item-non-response, and item-non-differentiation. While we do find significant differences in drop-out rates, we do not find any evidence for interviewer-absence leading to less diligence in filling in the questionnaire. We thus conclude that the presence of an interviewer does not enhance data quality for self-administered questionnaires, but positively affects completion rates.

Voting Unity Between Ministers and Members of the European Parliament

This chapter is concerned with the question to what extent representatives of the same national party vote the same way in the Council and the EP. The analysis demonstrates that voting unity of national parties is in general very high and varies only slightly between different member states, between different EP groups (EPGs), or different policy areas. However, the analysis also reveals that voting unity between ministers and MEPs diminishes even for highly salient proposals as soon as divergent institutional constraints (i.e. differences between Council consensus and EPG, differences between national party position and EPG, or differences between national party position and Council consensus) are present.

The Influence of National Parties

The chapter explores the mechanisms by which national parties might control the voting behavior of their representatives at the EU level, in order to enhance the chance that their ministers and MEPs vote united. First, potential control mechanisms in a principal–agent relationship are outlined. Subsequently, the applications of these strategies are exemplified and compared, building on information gained through personal interviews and on a secondary analysis of survey data. The analysis shows that control mechanisms vary between countries and even between parties within the same country. While some parties rely on ex ante control through candidate selection, others concentrate more on ex post control through reporting requirements. While some combine different mechanisms, others use only very little control.

Voting in EU Decision-Making

The chapter describes how voting in EU decision-making works in practice in order to clarify how the voting data to be analyzed is produced and which kind of shortcomings of the data need to be taken into account. First, the decision-making process of the EU’s bicameral legislature is sketched. Then, the voting procedure in the European Parliament (EP) is described in detail, followed by a discussion of a potential bias in EP roll-call voting data. Concerning the Council, it is recounted how the term “voting” is used in the literature and what it shall mean in this study. Finally, a potential bias in Council voting data and its effects on the present study are discussed.

National Parties versus Institutional Constraints

In this chapter, the influence of national parties is directly compared with the influence of institutional constraints. To this end, instances where representatives have to decide between following their party and following the constraints in their institution are analyzed. The analysis demonstrates that if ministers have to decide between voting with their MEPs and voting with the Council consensus, they almost always opt for the Council consensus. Likewise, if MEPs are torn between the position of their party’s minister and their EP group, they choose the latter in the overwhelming majority of the cases. These findings indicate that institutional constraints are more important in influencing voting behavior of ministers and MEPs than national parties.