Bertram Gawronski
Northwestern University
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Featured researches published by Bertram Gawronski.
Archive | 2008
Bertram Gawronski; Kurt R. Peters; Fritz Strack
This chapter discusses cognitive dissonance theory by providing a conceptual reanalysis of inconsistency processes that aims at specifying different sources of cross-cultural differences in dissonance-related phenomena. The central claim of the reanalysis is that the general processes associated with cognitive inconsistency are universal, even though cross-cultural differences pertaining to the contents of belief systems may function as important moderators of the outcomes of these processes. This assumption echoes theoretical considerations, claiming that the motivating force in the resolution of cognitive inconsistency is the dysfunctional effect of inconsistent cognitions on effective action. In line with this notion, inconsistency may function as a cue to inaccurate components in ones system of beliefs. Thus, to the extent that inaccurate belief systems can undermine effective action, inconsistency acquires an important function from a pragmatic point of view. Cognitive consistency plays a significant role in this regard by facilitating context-appropriate action, a requirement that is deemed universal.Publisher Summary This chapter discusses cognitive dissonance theory by providing a conceptual reanalysis of inconsistency processes that aims at specifying different sources of cross-cultural differences in dissonance-related phenomena. The central claim of the reanalysis is that the general processes associated with cognitive inconsistency are universal, even though cross-cultural differences pertaining to the contents of belief systems may function as important moderators of the outcomes of these processes. This assumption echoes theoretical considerations, claiming that the motivating force in the resolution of cognitive inconsistency is the dysfunctional effect of inconsistent cognitions on effective action. In line with this notion, inconsistency may function as a cue to inaccurate components in ones system of beliefs. Thus, to the extent that inaccurate belief systems can undermine effective action, inconsistency acquires an important function from a pragmatic point of view. Cognitive consistency plays a significant role in this regard by facilitating context-appropriate action, a requirement that is deemed universal.
Archive | 2008
Bertram Gawronski; Kurt R. Peters; Fritz Strack
This chapter discusses cognitive dissonance theory by providing a conceptual reanalysis of inconsistency processes that aims at specifying different sources of cross-cultural differences in dissonance-related phenomena. The central claim of the reanalysis is that the general processes associated with cognitive inconsistency are universal, even though cross-cultural differences pertaining to the contents of belief systems may function as important moderators of the outcomes of these processes. This assumption echoes theoretical considerations, claiming that the motivating force in the resolution of cognitive inconsistency is the dysfunctional effect of inconsistent cognitions on effective action. In line with this notion, inconsistency may function as a cue to inaccurate components in ones system of beliefs. Thus, to the extent that inaccurate belief systems can undermine effective action, inconsistency acquires an important function from a pragmatic point of view. Cognitive consistency plays a significant role in this regard by facilitating context-appropriate action, a requirement that is deemed universal.Publisher Summary This chapter discusses cognitive dissonance theory by providing a conceptual reanalysis of inconsistency processes that aims at specifying different sources of cross-cultural differences in dissonance-related phenomena. The central claim of the reanalysis is that the general processes associated with cognitive inconsistency are universal, even though cross-cultural differences pertaining to the contents of belief systems may function as important moderators of the outcomes of these processes. This assumption echoes theoretical considerations, claiming that the motivating force in the resolution of cognitive inconsistency is the dysfunctional effect of inconsistent cognitions on effective action. In line with this notion, inconsistency may function as a cue to inaccurate components in ones system of beliefs. Thus, to the extent that inaccurate belief systems can undermine effective action, inconsistency acquires an important function from a pragmatic point of view. Cognitive consistency plays a significant role in this regard by facilitating context-appropriate action, a requirement that is deemed universal.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology | 2004
Bertram Gawronski; Fritz Strack
European Journal of Social Psychology | 2003
Bertram Gawronski; Daniel Geschke; Rainer Banse
European Review of Social Psychology | 2004
Bertram Gawronski
Cognitive consistency: a fundamental principle in social cognition, 2012, ISBN 978-1-60918-946-4, págs. 369-389 | 2012
Bertram Gawronski; Paula M. Brochu; Rajees Sritharan; Fritz Strack
Cognitive consistency: a fundamental principle in social cognition, 2012, ISBN 978-1-60918-946-4, págs. 1-18 | 2012
Bertram Gawronski; Fritz Strack
Cognitive methods in social psychology, 2011, ISBN 978-1-4625-0913-3, págs. 78-123 | 2011
Bertram Gawronski; Roland Deutsch; Rainer Banse
Archive | 2009
Paula M. Brochu; Bertram Gawronski; Kurt R. Peters; Fritz Strack; Victoria M. Esses
Archive | 2008
Paula M. Brochu; Victoria M. Esses; Bertram Gawronski
