Beth A. Simmons

Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism

Political scientists, sociologists, and economists have all sought to ana- lyze the spread of economic and political liberalism across countries in recent decades+ This article documents this diffusion of liberal policies and politics and proposes four distinct theories to explain how the prior choices of some countries and inter- national actors affect the subsequent behavior of others: coercion, competition, learn- ing, and emulation+ These theories are explored empirically in the symposium articles that follow+ The goal of the symposium is to bring quite different and often isolated schools of thought into contact and communication with one another, and to define common metrics by which we can judge the utility of the contending approaches to diffusion across different policy domains+

Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions

Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently appeared in the pages of International Organization. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political science, but lacking an overarching analytical framework they failed to produce a coherent body of scholarship. Current efforts to reinvigorate the study of international institutions draw on a new body of theory about domestic institutions. We argue that the assumptions of this new approach to institutions are more appropriate to international studies than those of earlier attempts to transfer theories across levels of analysis. We suggest that the most productive questions for future research will focus on specifying alternative mechanisms by which institutions can influence outcomes and identify particular sets of questions within this agenda that are especially promising.

Theories of International Regimes

Over the last decade, international regimes have become a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. This article provides a critical review of this literature. We survey contending definitions of regimes and suggest dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions might be used to operationalize “regime change.” We then examine four approaches to regime analysis: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. We conclude that the major shortcoming of the regimes literature is its failure to incorporate domestic politics adequately. We suggest a research program that begins with the central insights of the interdependence literature which have been ignored in the effort to construct “systemic” theory.

International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely “enforcement” mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.

On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework

This article makes a conceptual and theoretical contribution to the study of diffusion. The authors suggest that the concept of diffusion be reserved for processes (not outcomes) characterized by a certain uncoordinated interdependence. Theoretically, the authors identify the principal sources of clustered policy reforms. They then clarify the characteristics specific to diffusion mechanisms and introduce a categorization of such processes. In particular, they make a distinction between two types of diffusion: adaptation and learning. They argue that this categorization adds conceptual clarity and distinguishes mechanisms with distinct substantive consequences.

The International Politics of Harmonization: the Case of Capital Market Regulation

The internationalization and globalization of capital markets greatly complicates the tasks of national financial regulators. It is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to regulate the activities of banking and securities firms and the broad range of transactions in which they engage on a national level. In this article I explore the process of international regulatory harmonization in capital markets, focusing especially on the mechanisms (political pressure, market pressure, and institutional arrangements) that facilitate this process. I argue that the United States and the United Kingdom are dominant players in the capital market and that the factors most relevant for understanding harmonization processes are (1) whether other jurisdictions have incentives to emulate the regulatory innovations of the dominant financial centers, and (2) whether the dominant centers experience negative externalities in the process. These two factors shed considerable light on whether harmonization will be spurred primarily by market forces or by politics; they also suggest the likely role of international institutions in the process of regulatory harmonization. The argument is illustrated using four issue areas: capital adequacy requirements for banks, anti-money laundering rules, accounting standards, and information sharing among securities regulators.

The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy

1. Introduction: the diffusion of liberalization Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett 2. Tax policy in an era of internationalization: an assessment of a conditional diffusion model of the spread of neoliberalism Duane Swank 3. The decision to privatize: economists and the construction of ideas and policies Bruce Kogut and J. Muir Macpherson 4. The international diffusion of public sector downsizing: network emulation and theory-driven learning Chang Kil Lee and David Strang 5. Global ideology and voter sentiment as determinants of international financial liberalization Dennis P. Quinn and A. Maria Toyoda 6. Competing for capital: the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons 7. Diffusion and the spread of democratic institutions Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward 8. World society and human rights: an event history analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Christine Min Wotipka and Francisco O. Ramirez 9. Conclusion Geoffrey Garrett, Frank Dobbin and Beth Simmons.

The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods

We acknowledge the contribution of von Stein (2005) in calling attention to the very real problem of selection bias in estimating treaty effects. Nonetheless, we dispute both von Steins theoretical and empirical conclusions. Theoretically, we contend that treaties can both screen and constrain simultaneously, meaning that findings of screening do nothing to undermine the claim that treaties constrain state behavior as well. Empirically, we question von Steins estimator on several grounds, including its strong distributional assumptions and its statistical inconsistency. We then illustrate that selection bias does not account for much of the difference between Simmonss (2000) and von Steins (2005) estimated treaty effects, and instead reframe the problem as one of model dependency. Using a preprocessing matching step to reduce that dependency, we then illustrate treaty effects that are both substantively and statistically significant—and that are quite close in magnitude to those reported by Simmons.

Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court

The creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute war crimes poses a real puzzle. Why was it created, and more importantly, why do states agree to join this institution? The ICC represents a serious intrusion into a traditional arena of state sovereignty: the right to administer justice to ones one nationals. Yet more than one hundred states have joined. Social scientists are hardly of one mind about this institution, arguing that it is (alternately) dangerous or irrelevant to achieving its main purposes: justice, peace, and stability. By contrast, we theorize that the ICC is a mechanism to assist states in self-binding, and draw on credible commitments theory to understand who commits to the ICC, and the early consequences of such commitments. This approach explains a counterintuitive finding: the states that are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do not. Similarly, ratification of the ICC is associated with tentative steps toward violence reduction and peace in those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to foreswear atrocities. These findings support the potential usefulness of the ICC as a mechanism for some governments to commit to ratchet down violence and get on the road to peaceful negotiations.

Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes

This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organizations system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low‐income states will tend to complain about behavior by high‐income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute resolution system.