Lisa L. Martin

Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions

Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently appeared in the pages of International Organization. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political science, but lacking an overarching analytical framework they failed to produce a coherent body of scholarship. Current efforts to reinvigorate the study of international institutions draw on a new body of theory about domestic institutions. We argue that the assumptions of this new approach to institutions are more appropriate to international studies than those of earlier attempts to transfer theories across levels of analysis. We suggest that the most productive questions for future research will focus on specifying alternative mechanisms by which institutions can influence outcomes and identify particular sets of questions within this agenda that are especially promising.

Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation

Preface vii CHAPTER 1 Introduction 3 CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Framework: Legislatures, Executives, and Commitment 21 CHAPTER 3 Institutions and Influence: Executive Agreements and Treaties 53 CHAPTER 4 Economic Sanctions: Domestic Conflict of Interest and International Cooperation 81 CHAPTER 5 U.S. Food-Aid Policy: The Politics of Delegation and Linkage 112 CHAPTER 6 National Parliaments and European Integration: Institutional Choice in EU Member States 147 CHAPTER 7 Implementing the EUs Internal Market: The Influence of National Parliaments 164 CHAPTER 8 Conclusion 190 References 203 Index 221

Interests, power, and multilateralism

Multilateralism characterizes, to varying degrees, patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct. The utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront. Thus, the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution, as in coordination problems, and those under which it will not, as in collaboration problems. Within these constraints, powerful states choose institutions that will serve their interests, with multilateral arrangements becoming more attractive as the future is valued more highly. Multilateral institutions should be stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power, relative to more hierarchical institutions. The vulnerability of patterns of international cooperation to various exogenous changes depends on the type of strategic interaction underlying state behavior.

Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note

If the purpose of legalization is to enhance international cooperation, more may not always be better. Achieving the optimal level of legalization requires finding a balance between reducing the risks of opportunism and reducing the potential negative effects of legalization on domestic political processes. The global trade regime, which aims to liberalize trade, has become increasingly legalized over time. Increased legalization has changed the information environment and the nature of government obligations, which in turn have affected the pattern of mobilization of domestic interest groups on trade. From the perspective of encouraging the future expansion of liberal trade, we suggest some possible negative consequences of legalization, arguing that these consequences must be weighed against the positive effects of legalization on increasing national compliance. Since the weakly legalized GATT institution proved sufficient to sustain widespread liberalization, the case for further legalization must be strong to justify far-reaching change in the global trade regime.

Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading senders” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.

The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism

In “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” Stephen Walt warns of the dangers to the aeld of security studies that are in store “if formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science.”1 He backs up these warnings by evaluating published formal work in the aeld according to seemingly reasonable criteria, anding that the gain in rigor inherent in formal work is not sufacient to offset its empirical, creative, and policy-relevance weaknesses. Although Walt ends with a plea for diversity (p. 48), the overall structure of his argument puts rational choice on trial, ands it lacking yet threatening to become dominant, and does little to serve the purpose of encouraging pluralism. As a consumer rather than producer of sophisticated formal theory, I and Walt’s critique of formal work off target and his worries about its imminent hegemony unfounded. My own work, as well as that of many other scholars, has beneated enormously from the theorizing of those who have better technical skills and the ability to work through complex mathematical models. The aeld of security studies would be severely impoverished if formal work were discouraged. In this response, I make three arguments. The arst is to highlight a signal strength of formal work that Walt neglects: its ability to generate linked, coherent sets of propositions and insights. Walt’s analysis focuses entirely on individual, isolated hypotheses, anding them lacking in originality, empirical support, or policy relevance. This approach misses the importance of theory in providing insights that are logically connected to one another in an integrated analytical framework, a necessary condition for progress in social science. Second, I address the beneats of formalizing the insights of informal

The Influence of National Parliaments on European Integration

International cooperation in general, and European integration in particular, requires that states translate their international commitments into domestic policy changes. Implementation of international agreements is vital. I find that the involvement of national parliaments in Europe an integration does not hinder the integration process because it improves implementation records even while potentially slowing down negotiations. This process appears most clearly in the case of Denmark, where parliamentary involvement is intense and constant. Similarly, regional authorities can plague implementation efforts unless they are integrated into negotiations at an early stage. Thus, democratic accountability supports, rather than obstructs, effective integration.

Gender, Teaching Evaluations, and Professional Success in Political Science

Evaluations of teaching effectiveness rely heavily on student evaluations of teaching. However, an accumulating body of evidence shows that these evaluations are subject to gender bias. Theories of leadership and role incongruity suggest that this bias should be especially prominent in large courses. This article examines publicly available data from two large political science departments and finds that female instructors receive substantively and significantly lower ratings than male instructors in large courses. The author discusses the implications of apparent gender bias in teaching evaluations for the professional success of female faculty. Findings of gender bias in evaluations in other fields also hold in political science and are particularly problematic in the evaluation of large courses.

Theories of International Regimes. By Hasenclever Andreas, Mayer Peter, and Rittberger Volker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 248p.

important empirical issues. For example, he argues that he French Revolution generated a national collective identity (pp. 134-51) but neglects the counterrevolution that occurred throughout the period. Large portions of the French population continued to identify themselves in strongly local and particularly Catholic terms, and the aristocracy continued to put forth alternative conceptions of French identity, conceptions which saw a revival under Napoleon (who sought dynastic legitimacy by marrying an Austrian archduchess) and under the Restoration. Thus, collective identity can be contested (a fact that Hall acknowledges but does not pursue far enough), and it is an open question as to how one form as opposed to another becomes the dominant explanatory factor required by Halls model. In short, the book makes a strong theoretical contribution to the conceptualization of the institutional and systemic consequences of collective identity, but it is less informative about how collective identities are determined or change. The latter issue is treated in a richly descriptive but not theoretically precise manner.