Beth Watts

Homelessness, Empowerment and Self-reliance in Scotland and Ireland: The Impact of Legal Rights to Housing for Homeless People

This paper explores the impact of legal rights to housing for homeless people, focusing on the capacity of such rights to ‘empower’ those experiencing homelessness. Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional view of power, complemented by Bourdieus (1972) concept of ‘habitus’, is used to distinguish between conceptualisations of empowerment. A distinction is drawn between ‘traditional’ understandings of empowerment, which focus on peoples capacity to realise their ‘subjective interests’, and on understandings that foreground ‘real interests’. These latter ‘radical’ perspectives direct attention to peoples ‘habitus’ – their internalised dispositions to perceive situations and act in particular ways. Empirically, the paper draws on a qualitative comparison of approaches to homelessness in Scotland and Ireland. Whereas in Scotland virtually all those who are homeless now have a legal right to settled accommodation, Ireland has rejected such a ‘legalistic’ approach, pursuing a consensus driven ‘social partnership’ model. Based on primary research with national experts, service providers and homeless single men in both countries, it is argued that legal rights can effectively empower homeless people. These findings call into question popular and political understandings of the relationship between legal welfare rights and self-reliance.

Rights to Housing: Reviewing the Terrain and Exploring a Way Forward

Abstract Exacerbated by the specificity of housing as a welfare good, debates on housing, citizenship and rights are complex and often confusing. This article attempts to clarify the debate on rights-based approaches in the field of housing, shelter and homelessness. It focuses on the philosophical distinction between “natural” and “socially constructed” rights, and suggests that a plausible “third way” may be found by using Martha Nussbaum’s “central human capabilities” approach as a foundation for universal human rights. “Citizenship” is proposed as a conceptual bridge between the philosophical discourse on rights and its practical application in specific political contexts. For this purpose, T.H. Marshall’s classic division between “civil” and “social” citizenship rights is translated into a distinction between “legal” and “programmatic” rights to housing. The article demonstrates that it is possible to object to the notion of natural and/or human rights in the housing field, and still be in favour of clearly delimited legal rights to housing for homeless people and others in acute need. Conversely, one may be in sympathy with the discourse of universal moral rights, but be sceptical about the allegedly “atomizing” implications of individually enforceable legal rights.

Controlling Homeless People? Power, Interventionism and Legitimacy

There is intense debate over the legitimacy of interventions which seek behavioural change on the part of street homeless people. ‘Hard’ measures, such as arresting people for begging, are particularly controversial, but ‘softer’ interventions such as motivational interviewing have also prompted objections on grounds that they are paternalistic. At the same time, the ‘non-interventionist’ stance of some service providers has been accused of perpetuating harmful street lifestyles. Inspired by Ruth Grants philosophically informed interrogation of the ethics of incentives, we propose a normative framework for application in this field. Via systematic exploration of Grants three ‘legitimacy standards’ (legitimate purpose, voluntary response, effects on character), and an additional outcome-focussed fourth (effectiveness, proportionality and balance), we attempt to unsettle any intuitive assumption that non-interventionist approaches are necessarily more morally defensible than interventionist ones. We also, however, explicate the high ethical and empirical bar required to justify social control measures.

Competing visions: security of tenure and the welfarisation of English social housing

Abstract Recent legislation ending security of tenure for new council tenants in England may be considered emblematic of a US-style vision of social housing as a temporary welfare service, reserved only for the very poorest. But there is resistance amongst social landlords, many of whom remain committed to providing ‘homes for life’. Moreover, austerity-driven cuts mean that benefit-dependent households are increasingly refused social tenancies on grounds of affordability. The stage is therefore set for a battle over who and what English social housing is for. Drawing on large-scale qualitative research, this paper interrogates the implications of the mandatory extension of fixed-term tenancies (FTTs) by considering landlord and tenant experiences of the discretionary FTT regime in place since 2012. We conclude that the meagre likely benefits of FTTs, in terms of marginally increased tenancy turnover, are heavily outweighed by the detrimental impacts on tenants’ ontological security and landlords’ administrative burden.

Taking Values Seriously in Housing Studies

It was a great pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on these two fascinating, and highly complementary, Focus articles by David Clapham and Hannu Ruonavaaran (this issue). Their common concern – can there be a “universal theory of housing?” – is a perennial debate in our field but one which, to be frank, we have hitherto paid little attention. The clarity of Ruonavaara’s contribution brought to the surface the intuition underlying this disengagement: such a venture is neither possible nor desirable, in our view. Moreover, this is the case for precisely the reasons Ruonavaara so carefully explicates. “Housing” is not a “coherent theoretical object” or, in critical realist terms, a “realistic category” (Pawson and Tilley 1997). Instead, it relates to a multi-faceted set of interconnected issues ranging from construction and supply, to wealth, financialization and asset-based welfare, to neighbourhood relations, to homelessness and acute disadvantage, to take just a few possible examples derived from the authors’ papers. So as Ruonavaara argues:

Homelessness and social control: a typology

Abstract The use of ‘social control’ interventions in housing and welfare policy often courts intense controversy, and never more so than when attempts are made to bring about change in the conduct of street homeless people. To date, academic scrutiny has focused on the so-called ‘regulation’ or ‘criminalisation’ of rough sleepers occupying public space, but a range of ‘softer’ control mechanisms are also now in evidence within homelessness support services. This paper explicates the relationship between the distinct forms of social control that have been used in this field – force, coercion, bargaining, influence and tolerance – and compares the perspectives of policy makers, frontline practitioners and homeless people regarding the appropriateness of their deployment in England. It emphasizes that the use of every one of these modes of social control, and indeed the absence of such controls, raises moral and practical dilemmas, the nuance of which is often unacknowledged in academic accounts.

Rights, citzenship, and shelter

This article discusses the complexity of the concept of ‘rights’ as applied to the field of shelter, housing, and homelessness. It focuses on the philosophical division between ‘natural’ and ‘socially constructed’ rights and suggests that a ‘third way’ can be found by using Martha Nussbaum’s ‘central human capabilities’ approach as a foundation for universal human rights. It proposes ‘citizenship’ as a conceptual bridge between the philosophical discourse on rights and its practical application at national or international level. We translate T.H. Marshall’s classic division between ‘civil’ and ‘social’ citizenship rights into a distinction between ‘legal rights’ to housing (individuals’ formal rights to a dwelling of a certain standard) and ‘programmatic rights to housing’ (what general housing standard members of certain society can legitimately expect). The article demonstrates that it is logically possible to object to natural and/or human rights in the housing field and be in favour of clearly delimited ‘positive’ legal rights to housing for homeless people. Conversely, one may be in sympathy with the discourse of universal moral rights, but be sceptical about individually enforceable legal rights, particularly with respect to the potential for such selective rights to stigmatise their ‘beneficiaries’. The importance of maintaining a critical perspective on rights discourses in the housing field is emphasised throughout.