Betty Glad

Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and Absolute Power

This article explores the puzzling behavior of tyrants who undermine themselves once in power. Therealpolitik perspective and a variety of psychological frameworks are used to try to resolve this puzzle in the cases of several ancient and three contemporary tyrants. Although all the frameworks used have explanatory power, the one that most closely fits the tyrants studied here is that of the narcissist with severe superego deficiencies. An individual with such psychological characteristics may have some advantages in rising to power, and his behavior may be an effective response to some real-life factors, but once he has consolidated his position his reality-testing capacities diminish. Fantasies held in check when his power is limited are apt to become his guides to action. As a consequence, his behavior becomes more erratic, he runs into difficulties in meeting his goals, and his paranoid defenses become more exaggerated. The finale of a tyrant’s career depends on the particulars of his political and social situation.

Passing the Baton: Transformational Political Leadership from Gorbachev to Yeltsin; from de Klerk to Mandela

The leaders of the Soviet Union and South Africa have both attempted the rare feat of bringing about what Zygmunt Bauman calls a peaceful, systematic revolution (Bauman, 1994, p. 15). Each attempted to bring about fundamental changes in the political constitution, social institutions, the distribution of public goods, and the way people relate to each other at work and play. The transformational task in such situations poses extraordinarily difficult problems for those who are trying to bring it about. Change unleashes not only hopes of a better future for many, but the fears and hatred of large groups of individuals whose interests and values are being challenged. Totalitarian or tyrannical leaders can deal with that backlash through the use of terror, intimidation, and a relatively unconstrained use of state power to buy up support from strategically placed individuals and communities. The leader committed to a democratic and peaceful change must constrain these emotions without the use of such devices (Bauman, 1994)1. My thesis is that the relationship between the leaders of the old and the new orders can play a critical role in the success or failure of attempts at transformation. If the effort is to remain peaceful and move toward democratic forms, both sides must understand that they are in a cooperative enterprise. The leaders coming out

Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis

Models of the decision-making process assuming the rationality of the major actors are not apt to explain actual decision making between states when major values are at stake. Situational, domestic political and bureaucratic constraints, as suggested by this case study of the US response to Irans taking of American hostages, constrain choices. Beyond these factors, the chief executives own personality is apt to have an impact on policy, especially when he has considerable authority to act independently in the foreign policy arena. His responses may to some extent show good reality testing, as evident in Jimmy Carters rejections of military sanctions and his initial search for a diplomatic resolution of the hostage issue. But threats to major values can bring out more ego-defensive traits, as evident in Carters inflation of the hostage issue, his avoidance of questions about the viability of the rescue operation and his difficulties in confronting incompatible policy goals. The result in this instance was a failure to fully consider policy options, otherwise feasible, that might have entailed fewer risks for the American national interest.

Exploring the Psychopolitical Dynamics of Advisory Relations: The Carter Administration's "Crisis of Confidence"

A presidents personality is an important variable which affects the selection of individuals from whom he seeks counsel and influences both the advice he is given as well as the extent to which this advice is followed. Using personality theory as a tool and the Carter presidency as a case study, this research delineates five advisory relation types: reality testing, bolstering, reality testingbolstering (mixed), compensatory, and proxy. The data show that advisory types differ in the ways in which they respond to a presidents political and psychological needs. We conclude that Carters personality permitted him, under normal circumstances, to maintain close relationships with reality testing aides who gave him information that would question his own modus vivendi. But under conditions of threat to his personal prestige and power, those advisers who bolstered his own view of himself would have the most impact.

Reagan's Midlife Crisis and the Turn to the Right

and ego defensive needs for him at a time when his personal andprofessional life had bottomed out. A movie career which had started out auspiciously never did take off, and a marriage portrayed as idyllic ended in divorce. Drawing upon psychological adaptations that had served him since boyhood- the energetic attack on obstacles in his path and the avoidance of emotional and intellectual ambiguities- he was able to find new routes to professional and personal success. His turn to anti-communism and more gradual embrace of a conservative political philosophy facilitated his rise to the presidency of the Screen Actors Guild and provided him with new opportunities for work and influence. The targeting of the communists and the federal government in Washington as the sources of all that had gone wrong in Hollywood provided him with safe outlets for the anger he felt as a result of his blocked career and an explanation of what had happened to him. The avoidance of ambiguity kept him from any troubling doubts about either the motives of some of the leaders of the anti-communist impulse or its effects on the careers of those who resisted it. An interactionist life-history model is used in the analysis and hypotheses suggested for further research. Individual shifts on the political spectrum, as this case history suggests, may not be accompanied by cognitive and psychological transformations. Threats to fundamental values may well intensify cognitive and emotional rigidities as a way of avoiding anxiety.

Jimmy Carter and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Political scientists, when analyzing decision making at the highest levels of government in the area of foreign policy, usually emphasize rationally perceived national interests and domestic politics as the primary motivations. Obscured in such scholarship are the idiosyncratic personality traits of the decision makers themselves. A comprehensive explanation of high-level decision making, however, requires that scholars look below the surface to discern the particular world-views and the psychological factors that interact with broader concerns of national interests and domestic politics to form governmental policies. These factors are most important for top decision makers in situations where they are facing crises (see Greenstein, 1967; Holsti, 1971). When major national and personal value are at stake, the ego defensive characteristic of those with the most responsibility for the national response are apt to be triggered and relevant to the policy response.

Multidisciplinary Studies and the Relationship of Scientific Research to Public Policymaking

Multidisciplinary approaches to peace research and national security may provide new guides for rational policies. The nature of the phenomenon studied, however, suggests that these approaches will not result in new, highly institutionalized disciplinary structures. Nor will research in how to influence government to act in accord with scientific findings have much positive impact. The assumption that research can provide a substitute for political action raises serious philosophic, historical, and practical questions. The decision-making process in the area of publicpolicy differs substantially from decision making within scientific circles. Moreover, as the historical record of British and American decision making in weapons and several other policy areas suggests, acceptance of scientific data will depend on the extent to which the scientists have access to key decision makers and the extent to which their findings fit their policy predispositions. If social scientists wish to influence public policy they must participate in the political process. The choice of a strategy will depend on the extent to which they have access to top decision makers and the extent to which their policy recommendations support or run contrary to prevailing policy choices.