James G. Blight

Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Graham T. Allison, Jr., Jorge Dominguez, Alexander L. George, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Scott D. Sagan, Georgy Shakhnazarov, and the staffs of the Center for the Study of the Americas (Havana), the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow), and the National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.). The authors also thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, George Keros, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and Carl Sloane.

Risking “The Destruction of Nations”: Lessons of The Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States

The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Peter Feaver, Nancy Gallagher, Thomas Graham, Richard Ned Lebow, Scott Sagan, and Melissa Williams, as well as the generous support of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?

Bruce Allyn, James Blight, and David Welch should be congratulated for a splendid review of some of the most important findings from their joint research on the Cuban missile crisis, including the conferences they helped organize in Hawks Cay, Cambridge, and MOSCOW.’ They have performed an invaluable service for both historians and political scientists. Nevertheless, the research methodology that Allyn, Blight, and Welch (henceforth AB&W) have used is not without its drawbacks. Although their work has given us a much better understanding of the American side of the Cuban missile crisis, I am not sure we yet have a better understanding of the Soviet side. Indeed, our “knowledge” of certain aspects of the Soviet role may, if anything, be more confused than before. The reservations I express below, though applied to the AB&W article, are intended as general notes of caution.

Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined

This critical oral history is based on a series of meetings which brought together former CIA officials, former anti-Castro Cuban operatives, a former high-ranking Soviet official and others involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Transcripts of the sessions are presented and placed in context.

Triangular Mutual Security: Why the Cuban Missile Crisis Matters in a World Beyond the Cold War

We argue that as the superpowers move closer together, they need to ensure that security concerns of Third World states are taken into account. Otherwise, Moscow and Washington may face risks to their own security. This imperative applies especially to times of crisis, when deals struck at the superpower level may exacerbate fears of states who see their security being bargained away, thus leading to dangerous reactions. We illustrate our argument by retelling the classic tale of the Cuban missile crisis. Our account, however, is triangular, because in addition to American and Soviet perceptions, the Cuban perspective is a focus of our analysis. Finally, we derive triangular lessons of the missile crisis using the theory of mutual security.