Beverly Crawford

Progress in postwar international relations

Defining and conceptualizing progress in international relations, by Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, and Jack DonnellyCognitive evolution: a dynamic approach for the study of international relations and their progress, by Emanuel AdlerChange in regime type and progress in international relations, by Philippe C. SchmitterSeasons of peace: progress in postwar international security, by Emanuel AdlerThe ideas of progress and U.S. nonproliferation policy, by Michael BrennerEmbedded liberalism revisited: institutions and progress in international economic relations, by John Gerard RuggieProgress for the rich: the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Robert T. Kudrle and Stefanie Ann LenwayMaking progress in international environmental protection, by Peter M. HaasProgress in human rights, by Jack DonnellyAssisting the Palestinian refugees: progress in human rights?, by Benjamin N. SchiffStructuralism and its critics: recent progress in international relations theory, by Stephen HaggardToward a theory of progress in international relations, by Beverly Crawford

The convergence of civilizations : constructing a Mediterranean region

Acknowledgments PART ONE: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK * Normative Power: The European Practice of Region-Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EMANUEL ADLER and BEVERLY CRAWFORD PART TWO: LOGIC AND MODELS OF REGION-BUILDING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN * Mare Nostrum? The Sources, Logic, and Dilemmas of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ETEL SOLINGEN and SABA KENSES OZYURT* A Political Agenda for Region-Building? The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Democracy Promotion in North Africa RICHARD GILLESPIE* The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Sub-Regionalism: A Case of Region-Building? STEPHEN C. CALLEYA PART THREE: INSTRUMENTS AND PRACTICES OF REGION-BUILDING * The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices FEDERICA BICCHI * Political Securitization and Democratization in the Maghreb: Ambiguous Discourses and Fine-Tuning Practices for a Security Partnership SAID HADDADI * Economic Liberalism between Theory and Practice ALFRED TOVIAS * Practices and Their Failure: Arab-Israeli Relations and the Barcelona Process JOEL PETERS PART FOUR: CULTURE AND IDENTITIES * The Building of Regional Security Partnership and the Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean Region FULVIO ATTINA * Turkey: Between East and West METIN HEPER * Region-Building, European Union Normative Power, and Contested Identities: The Case of Israel RAFFAELLA A. DEL SARTO PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS * The EuroMed beyond Civilizational Paradigms KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS and DIMITRI NICOLAIDIS Contributors Index

Merkel III: From Committed Pragmatist to ‘Conviction Leader’?

For most of her political career Angela Merkel has been perceived as a pragmatic political leader, avoiding tough and divisive decisions wherever possible, and joining decision-making coalitions on contested issues when they emerged. To some extent, this remarkable ability appears to explain her extended hold on the German chancellorship. In the midst of her third term, however, her behaviour changed suddenly and unexpectedly, or so it seemed. When in July 2015 the euro crisis flared up again due to the standoff between Greece and its EU partners on the second bail-out, Merkel let her European convictions prevail and backed another support package against the wishes of many in her party. Moreover, when Germany was hit by a wave of refugees only a few months later, Merkel became the torch-bearer of a ‘culture of welcome’ and defended her ‘open-door’ policies with a measure of conviction that few observers would have considered possible. This paper looks at Merkel’s leadership performance during her third term through the lens of the concept of ‘conviction leadership’, and inquires if, or to what extent, Merkel can be meaningfully considered a ‘conviction leader’.

The Puzzle of Persistence and Power: Explaining Germany’s Normative Foreign Policy

Germany is as powerful today as it was 100 years ago and has again stepped onto the global stage as a ‘Great Power’. The Germany of today, however, is quite unlike most great powers in historical memory. Twenty-five years after unification and the achievement of full sovereignty, Germany is using its growing material power to actively and effectively pursue the normative principles of anti-militarism and multilateralism born and nurtured under weakness and occupation after devastating loss in World War II. But as the guiding norms of foreign and security policy, they did not change or disappear but were strengthened with the achievement of sovereignty and unity after 1989. What changed was Germany’s power to actively pursue a foreign policy based on these norms. The article argues that external factors transformed Germany’s status and power position in Europe and the world, allowing it to act alone and build up its military power. But internal factors – entrenched norms, a foreign policy identity built on those norms – constrained and still constrains its willingness and the ability of successive post-unification governments to act like the ‘great power’ that it had become.

Wann ist konsensuelle Wissenschaft „Politische Wissenschaft“? Drei Paradoxien autoritativen Assessments

Die grose Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Assessment-Prozesse fur die globale Umweltpolitik ist bekannt. In Fragen der Luftverschmutzung, der anthropogenen Ozonzerstorung und des Klimawandels scheinen wissenschaftliche Assessments der beste Weg, den Einfluss menschlicher Aktivitaten auf die Umwelt abzuschatzen, deren politische Regulierung einen immensen Effekt auf die Atmosphare, das Klima und das Leben auf der Erde haben kann. Wird ein wissenschaftliches Assessment als „autoritativ“ betrachtet, stellt es einen wichtigen Schritt bei der Ubersetzung wissenschaftlichen Wissens in eine politische Entscheidungsgrundlage dar, z. B. um die Luftqualitat zu verbessern, die Ozonschicht wieder herzustellen oder auch den Klimawandel zu verzogern. Dies gilt sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf internationaler Ebene. Der US-amerikanische Kongress beauftragte 1975 die NASA mit der Einschatzung der Gefahrdung der Ozonschicht durch Fluorchlorkohlenwasserstoffe (FCKW) und die NASAAssessments uberzeugten letztlich den Kongress, bereits 1978 ozonzerstorende Substanzen als Treibmittel in Spraydosen zu verbieten. Auch bei der Ausgestaltung der UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC,) spielten wissenschaftliche Assessments eine entscheidende Rolle. Der Second Assessment Report des Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fuhrte 1997 schlieslich zur Verabschiedung des Koyoto-Protokolls, in dem erstmals international verbindliche Masnahmen zur Reduktion von Treibhausgas-Emissionen festgelegt wurden. Wissenschaftliche Assessments haben ohne Zweifel die Macht, politische Prozesse anzutreiben. Dagegen wurde die Rolle wissenschaftlicher Assessments im harten Wettbewerb um Forschungsgelder, der zwischen den beteiligten Organisationen

Stabilizing Factors in International Conflict Resolution

Why are international agreements so fragile? Why do they often seem less stable and effective than domestic agreements? The prolonged stalemate in NorthSouth negotiations, the disintegration of SALT, the disappointing results of the Law of the Sea negotiations all attest to the fragility of international agreements. The security and welfare of the worlds population now rests on the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Yet, because animosities among states can be so intense, the prospects for success and stability of agreements seem much dimmer in the international arena than in the domestic realm. Can anything be done to make international negotiations more effective, robust and stable? My purpose here is to address this question by analyzing NATO negotiations over trade with the Soviet Union that preceded and followed the Trans-Siberian pipeline dispute between the United States and its European allies in 1982. European firms agreed to build the Soviet pipeline with U.S. technology and equipment, in exchange for supplies of natural gas from the Soviets. The United States opposed both the technology exports and the gas imports, and therefore attempted to halt the pipelines construction. European states refused to comply, and a crisis erupted in the alliance. Initially the dispute tested the stability of a previously negotiated relationship among NATO countries with regard to East-West trade. It then led to further negotiations which in fact strengthened that earlier relationship. It thus illustrates both the conditions under which international agreements are ineffective in preventing a crisis and the conditions under which more stable agreements can be negotiated. By stable agreements, I mean those to which all parties are committed, those which are resilient in crisis, and those which prevent conflict and promote cooperation among negotiating parties. The case highlights three conditions of the dispute settlement process required for stable agreements: