Birol Başkan

Religion in Politics How Does Inequality Affect Public Secularization

This study investigates the factors that affect variations in secular attitudes toward politics. The literature suggests that modernization may weaken traditional bonds with religious adherence and the state can assume an important role in this endeavor through mass education, industrialization, and other factors. However, this explanation is incomplete in light of the resurgence of religious movements. This study argues that economic inequality increases the positive evaluation of the role of religion in politics through its effect on religiosity and participation in religious organizations. Employing a multilevel analysis on 40 countries, this study demonstrates that inequality decreases attitudes toward support for two dimensions of public secularization: the secularization of public office holders and the influence of religious leaders in politics. Simultaneously, the effect of modernization on these attitudes varies. The results also suggest that although inequality diminishes secular attitudes of all socioeconomic groups, its effect is nonlinear, with a greater effect on the poor.

State Secularization and Religious Resurgence: Diverging Fates of Secularism in Turkey and Iran

The recent Arab revolutions/rebellions/protests have raised once again an old question: what features should the Arab political systems ideally have? Inescapably, perhaps, the case of Turkey frequently appears as a model to be emulated in the Arab world. A variety of actors, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, from Rashid Ganouchi to Hillary Clinton has in fact viewed Turkey in that role. Even though, many intellectuals and academics usually raise doubts about the suitability of Turkish model for the Arab world (see, for example, Mamedov and Makarov 2011), it may still prove fruitful to consider the case of Turkey more seriously.

Discourse and oppositionality in the Arab Spring: The case of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE:

Theorizing the nature and possibility of political opposition in the Arab Gulf states after the ‘Arab Spring’ has largely focused on the state’s capacity to dispense economic patronage to defuse any oppositional formation. Citing the lack of critical popular and public mobilization, many opted to focus only on the ‘resilience’ of the state, re-emphasizing the often-touted view of ‘Gulf exceptionalism’ under the rentier state social contract. Within this conceptual framework, the risk of political opposition only arises when the state is unable to expand economic entitlement to its populations. The aim of this article is to examine the forms and formations of religious-based oppositional discourse that can arise in a rentier state. More specifically, the goal of this article is to examine the dynamic oppositional narratives engendered by the Muslim Brotherhood against the government of the UAE after the ‘Arab Spring.’ One of the main assertions in this article is that this oppositional discourse transcended simple demands for political and economic participation and evolved into a broader form of de-legitimation discourse grounded in notions of social justice, identity rights, and civic entitlements.

Islamism and Turkey’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring

ABSTRACT The Arab Spring truly caught Turkey by surprise. In interpreting what was happening in the region, Turkey’s foreign policy-makers relied on a particular view, which helped steer Turkey’s foreign policy in the ensuing regional earthquake. This article seeks to dissect that view and deconstructs its main components mainly through the speeches of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the heyday of the Arab Spring. The paper also illustrates how Davutoğlu’s interpretation heavily borrows from the Islamist interpretive frame of modern Turkish history. That frame, this article claims, originated in the late Ottoman period and has since evolved in contestation with alternative readings, both official and non-official. The article suggests that Davutoğlu’s view of the Arab Spring helps explain why Turkey welcomed the Arab Spring and advised Arab regimes to implement political reforms.

The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks and the US Response

Turkey and Qatar have begun to align their foreign policies in the post-9/11 regional context, a context that had been deeply shaken by the USA. To see how the USA had shaken the Middle East, this chapter discusses how the USA responded to the 9/11 attacks. The chapter argues that the USA in fact pursued two-pronged strategy: on the one hand, it sought ways to punish the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq it held responsible for the 9/11 attacks; on the other hand, it promoted democracy in the Middle East.

Enter Turkey and Qatar

This chapter discusses how the post-9/11 regional context paved the way for Turkey and Qatar to play more active roles. The chapter details how Turkey and Qatar pursued similar policies and employed similar tools in the 2000s and expanded their influences in the region. The chapter also discusses how Turkey and Qatar had developed stronger relations with the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its offshoot in the Palestine, Hamas, during the same period. The chapter shows that by the time the Arab Spring erupted, Turkey and Qatar had become the most active regional players in the Middle East.

Unsettling the Middle East: The Implications of the US Rhetoric and Action

This chapter discusses how the US response to the 9/11 attacks has shaken the regional context in the Middle East. By overthrowing the regime in Iraq, the USA destroyed a Sunni Arab bulwark regime that balanced Iran in the region. As the Shia groups came to political prominence in Iraq, Iraq has become, or is perceived to be, an ally of Iran. The US efforts to isolate Iran further aggravated the problem as Iran began to speed up its nuclear program. It was in this context that the traditional leaders of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were in retreat, opening more space for new actors to expand their activism and dynamism.

The Arab Spring Erupts, Turkey and Qatar Respond

This chapter discusses how the Arab Spring threw the region into another turmoil. It then details how Turkey and Qatar repositioned themselves and reacted to the unfolding developments in the Arab World. This chapter argues that by the time the Arab Spring erupted, Turkey and Qatar had become too confident of their own achievements in the 2000s and sought to expand their influence even further in the region. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political parties and figures rose to prominence boosted their ambitions as both countries had extremely close relations with the movement. Building upon these former ties, the chapter discusses how Turkey and Qatar developed much stronger relations with Egypt under the presidency of the Brotherhood-backed Muhammed Mursi.

The Future Place of Turkey in the Middle East

This chapter briefly assesses the future of Turkey’s place in the Middle East and by implication the future of Turkey–Qatar relations. It argues that Turkey’s place in the region will ultimately depend on its willingness and capability to balance Iran in the region. The chapter questions whether Turkey has such a capacity and willingness. Yet, the chapter also prophesizes that Turkey will continue to seek ways to keep, even strengthen, relations with the Arab Gulf states. The rise of new challenges in the region might make Turkey indispensable to improve Arab Gulf security.

The Coup and Its Aftermath

The military coup staged in Egypt in the summer of 2013 cut short the life of the Muslim Brotherhood crescent. This chapter discusses why the rise of the Brotherhood-affiliated political parties and figures was a troublesome development for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The chapter discusses how these two countries waged an anti-Brotherhood campaign and supported the military coup in Egypt. The chapter also discusses how and why Turkey and Qatar reacted to the coup in Egypt differently. Yet, the impact of the coup for both countries has been the same: Turkey and Qatar found themselves increasingly isolated in the region. The chapter claims that to break this isolation, Turkey and Qatar have developed even stronger relations.