Björn A. Kuchinke

Vertikale Integration von Fluglinien und Flughäfen: Eine wettbewerbsökonomische Analyse

Abstract Over the course of the last few years privatization of commercial airports has been called for by economists internationally and it is already pushed by politicians. Furthermore, in some cases privatization is taking place in combination with vertical integration. Consequently, private airlines hold entire or partial stakes in an airport or, vice versa, an airport becomes a stakeholder in a private airline. This paper shows that privatization of commercial airports, alongside its many economic benefits, may result in economic problems or create risks if vertical integration is observed simultaneously. The risk of discriminatory access to airport infrastructure is specifically discussed. Furthermore, vertical integration is shown to create problems only in some areas of airports. The supposed problem of discriminatory access lies exclusively in the area of aeronautical facilities. Additionally, we establish that vertical integration of airlines and airports is considerably more problematic if the airport does not have a hub function. As far as competition policy is concerned prohibiting vertical integration of aeronautical facilities would be the first best solution. Alternatively, access to the facilities might be regulated with regard to price and other anti-competitive practices. This conclusion holds true especially for non-hub airports.

Wissenschaftsfreiheit vor Wettbewerb

Freedom of science versus competition? Competition policy comments on the monopolies commission’s positions concerning a ministerial permit in the Greifswald/Wolgast case After the German Federal Cartel Office inspected the intended merger of the university clinic Greifswald and the district hospital Wolgast in December 2006, ministerial approval was applied for. The Monopoly Commission’s special report no. 53 of 2008 suggested to grant permission. This suggestion was justified by referring to the “peculiarities’’ of this case. This article reviews the case’s explanation in regard of competition aspects. Parts of the argumentation and of the conclusion turn out to be debatable. 58) Monopolkommission (Fußn. 1), Rz. 145. 59) Monopolkommission (Fußn. 1), Rz. 152. 60) Vgl. Monopolkommission (Fußn.1), Rz.155.

Vertical Integration of Airlines and Airports: Impacts on Competition

In spite of the many economic benefits, the international effort to privatize commercial airports might lead to discrimination regarding the access to airport infrastructure. This occurs when airlines have a full or partial share in the airports or, alternatively, when airports become shareholders in airlines. As a consequence, competition at the level of flight services can be endangered. The following paper shows that this sort of vertical integration is not problematic in all areas of an airport, but rather only in aeronautical sites. Furthermore, it is shown that vertical integration of airlines and non-hub airports can be considered as much more problematic than vertical integration of airlines and hub-airports.

Standortwahl – Was signalisiert kommunale Wirtschaftsförderung?

Kommunen und Standorte stehen heute im globalen Wettbewerb umnUnternehmensan siedlungen. Wie können sie ihre Standortqualität potentiellennInteressenten signalisieren? Welche Instrumente des Standortmarketing stehen ihnennzur Verfügung? Wie sind diese Maßnahmen aus finanzwissenschaftlicher undnwohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht zu beurteilen?