Justus Haucap

Die Liberalisierung der Telekommunikationsbranche in Deutschland : Bisherige Erfolge und weiterer Handlungsbedarf

Abstract The liberalization of the German telecommunications sector is widely regarded as a success story, for which the rigorous regulation of essential facilities together with a liberal licensing policy have been responsible. While many telecommunications markets are now highly competitive, this is not the case for local telephone markets and some wholesale services. The lack of competition in these markets is partly also due to inadequate regulation. Since geographical cost differences are not reflected in regulated prices, market entry is not attractive in many regions. Furthermore, recent policy measures such as regulated local preselection and call-by-call services as well as the envisaged local resale obligations reduce the business prospects for investors into alternative local infrastructure. While local competition will seemingly increase, the monopolistic situation of infrastructure markets will be cemented. Accordingly, reduced investment incentives will lead to efficiency losses and also harm consumers’ long term interests.

The Regulatory Framework for European Telecommunications Markets Between Subsidiarity and Centralization

This paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of centralizing regulatory competences in the European telecommunications sector. As is demonstrated, political economy suggests that an over- rather than an underregulation of telecommunications markets has to be expected. This tendency has been strengthened by the allocation of competences under the current regulatory framework which endows the European Commission with far reaching veto rights under the so-called article 7 procedure. In order to delimit the risk of overregulation through institutional safeguards, it should be easier for regulators to deregulate than to regulate a market. Current suggestions and ambitions by the Commission to extend its veto right or to establish a European regulator for telecommunications should be dismissed. Instead, we suggest limiting the Commission’s veto rights to (a) markets, in which regulation creates significant cross-border externalities, and (b) cases where national regulators do not move into the direction of deregulation. If, however, a national regulator decides to deregulate a market, the Commission’s ex ante veto right should be abandoned (but ex post intervention by the Commission still be possible) in order not to hamper deregulation which tends to be the desired result, in principle. In addition, we argue that the “insufficiency of competition law”-criterion of the three-criteria-test needs to be taken more seriously than has been so far by national regulators.

Europäische Regulierung der Telekommunikation zwischen Zentralisierung und Wettbewerb

Mit der Verabschiedung des geltenden Rechtsrahmens fur elektronische Kommunikationsnetze durch die EU im Jahr 20021 und der Umsetzung durch das Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) 2004 in der Bundesrepublik haben sich die Kompetenzen zwischen der EU-Kommission und den Nationalstaaten bei der Ausgestaltung des institutionellen Rahmens fur Telekommunikationsmarkte (TK-Markte) deutlich zugunsten der EU-Kommission verschoben. Mit der sog. „Review 2006“ findet nun bereits eine neuerliche Uberprufung dieses Rechtsrahmens statt.