Bo Isenberg

Habermas on Foucault. Critical remarks

The relation between the œuvres of Jurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault constitutes an important reference point to several aspects of contemporary social research and philosophical discussion. In this paper I give an account of Habermass critique of Foucault, a critique which operates on three levels-methodology, empirical descnptions, and political implications. I also make some commentaries on the critique, where I propose that Habermas and Foucault work within different ensembles of theories, concepts and discourses. This means, consequently, that on several occasions Habermass critique is confusing and misses the point.

A modern calamity – Robert Musil on stupidity

The writings of the Austrian novelist and essayist Robert Musil provide sociology with vital problems and reflections. Indeed, Musil introduces discussions that extend conventional understanding of modernity – sociology’s general object of analysis. The article focuses on two major sets of questions in Musil’s work: the shapelessness of man and the relation between reason and sentiments. Both problems are essential in that genuine twentieth-century experience which Musil calls functional stupidity: the functionalisation of the mind to collective demands of the party, the race and the nation. The article discusses Musil’s arguments by relating them to central propositions in classical sociology (Simmel, Weber, Kracauer, Tönnies, Park). Classical sociology, in turn, is defined as a sub-discourse of classical modern reflection.

Shop Class as Soulcraft. An Inquiry into the Value of Work

dilemma’, is defined by Lacey as a situation where ‘it is in everyone’s interest to resist the enormous human and social costs, the damage to democracy and citizenship, attendant on the move towards the kind of mass imprisonment now seen in the USA, yet in which problems of coordination and communication entail a collective action problem such as that we are trapped in a decision-making structure which inexorably produces outcomes we would individually choose to avoid’ (p. 118). The definition of this term also characterizes much of the book, particularly Part 1, in that the writing is sometimes rather dense, with long sentences and unnecessarily convoluted language. Lacey is an eminent penal scholar, the arguments put forward important and highly relevant, so it is a little disappointing that the accessibility of the book is to some extent diminished by an avoidance of parsimonious expressions. Nevertheless, this is a fascinating read, providing a multi-factor analysis in regard to one of the most challenging topics for modern democratic societies – how do we punish in a humane and inclusive manner within a global context where we are led to believe that ‘we’ and ‘our’ way of life are under threat by an increasing number of vaguely defined groups of ‘outsiders’? In such a context, it is refreshing to read a critical analysis that points to the fact that crime levels are lower than they have been for several decades, and that most people are probably safer than they have been at any point in history. Indeed, the ones’ most ‘at risk’ are the groups defined and labelled according to race, ethnicity and ‘criminal characteristics’ who end up serving long sentences in our increasingly inhumane prisons.