Carl-Göran Heidegren

Recognition and Social Theory

Recognition denotes a basic medium of social integration. It provides an answer to the question: What holds a society together? Recognition is also crucial to the process of socialization and identity formation. In order to develop a personal identity an individual is dependent upon recognition from different concrete and generalized others. This review essay focuses on the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, published recently under the title Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003). Then the theme of recognition is discussed in relation to the sociology of work, taking as a point of departure a collection of articles published under the title Anerkennung und Arbeit (2000). Finally, attention is drawn to some recent contributions from Nordic scholars, mainly within the disciplines of social philosophy and sociology, to the theme of recognition.

Towards a Sociology of Philosophy

The article presents and discusses the sociology of philosophy as a theory-based empirically practised sociological subdivision that came to the fore in the 1980s. In the first part, the type of empirical material and the forms of data presentation that are available to the sociology of philosophy are discussed. In the second part, the focus is on two important attempts, those of Randall Collins and Pierre Bourdieu, to develop general sociological theories about the relationship between social being and thought. The main lesson to be drawn from them is that in normal circumstances philosophical thought cannot be reduced to socio-political conditions outside the attention space (Collins) or the philosophical field (Bourdieu). In the concluding part, we tentatively sketch a programme for a future sociology of philosophy. All in all, the sociology of philosophy is seen as an emerging new subdivision within sociology, the potential of which is far from exhausted with respect to theoretical development as well as empirical approaches.

Recognition, social invisibility, and disrespect

This is the horror of being socially invisible. If you can’t love me, then at least detest and despise me! To make people disappear by refusing to take notice of them, by demonstratively seeing through them, is a form of disrespect to be distinguished from outright disrespect in the form of being the object of stigmatizing and devaluating attitudes, gestures, or actions. This distinction was clear already to Adam Smith when he wrote: ‘To be overlooked, and to be disapproved, are things entirely different’ (quoted in Todorov [1995] 2001, 82). Thus, we have two distinct forms of disrespect. The positive counterpart to disrespect is the kind of affirmation that a person receives by being recognized by someone as someone, in the form of being loved or cared about, as being granted equal rights and being treated as an equal, or as being approved of and appreciated for whom one is or what one does. The contemporary discussion of recognition and disrespect, with important forerunners, took off in the early 1990s. Key discussants were at the time Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor. There were also other important contributors to these debates, such as Nancy Fraser and Tzvetan Todorov. Within a decade the topic had entered and become prominent generally in the social sciences, and now discussions of recognition and disrespect are to be found within a broad spectrum of disciplines. From a social science perspective there are at least five dimensions from which issues of recognition, social invisibility, and disrespect can be addressed. Firstly, the topic of recognition has an action-theoretical dimension. To recognize someone is to behave in a certain way towards him or her, by way of attitudes, gestures, or actions. The question is: What exactly does ego do when recognizing an alter? What are the genus and species of recognition (and of disrespect)? Furthermore, in what sense can we recognize specific groups or categories of people? Secondly, there is a dimension that can be described as interaction-theoretical. Here the focus is on interpersonal relationships, comprising two or more individuals, stretching out over time. In this case recognition and disrespect are qualities of unfolding interpersonal relationships. How is it possible to theorize the dynamics, the ups and downs, of such relationships? Thirdly, we have a dimension relating to figurations of recognition. Here the actors are not only individuals, but also different forms of collectives: groups, organizations, and social movements. The more complex a figuration of recognition Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory Vol. 13, No. 1, April 2012, 1–3

Review Essay : Transcendental Theory of Society, Anthropology and the Sociology of Law: Helmut Schelsky - An Almost Forgotten Sociologist

Helmut Schelsky (1912-1984) began his academic career as a philosopher in the tradition of German Idealism in Leipzig in the interwar-period. He eventually became one of the leading German sociologists of the postwarperiod. Finally, towards the end of his life, he came to look upon himself as an ’anti-sociologist’. Today Schelsky is probably not very widely read even in Germany, at least not among the younger generation, and almost unknown in Scandinavia. This, there is reason to believe, also holds true for the English-speaking world. Finding a reference to Schelsky in an English language book or journal of sociology is almost as difficult as finding a fourleaf clover. After presenting a biographical sketch that situates Schelsky in the context of postwar-German sociology (section 2), I’ll give an introduction to his work by first posing the question of the relation between anthropology and social theory (3). After that, I’ll present his general theoretical project under the heading of a ’transcendental theory of society’ (4). Then I’ll go somewhat into his specific approach to the sociology of law the personfunctional approach (5). Finally, I’ll make a tentative attempt to situate Schelsky’s position within the present sociological discourse (6).

Recognition: A Theory of the Middle

This chapter discusses to what extent and in what sense a theory of recognition might also be aptly characterised as a theory of the middle. Such an argument presupposes that due recognition is opposed not only to overt disrespect, but also to forms of excess and deficiency. The chapter first discusses Axel Honneths theoretical project as it has developed since the publication of The Struggle for Recognition . Then, the author of the chapter distinguishes between three levels of analysis, including an intermediate level at which the theme of recognition can and should be conceptualised as the quality of an unfolding interpersonal relationship. It is at this intermediate level of analysis that a theory of recognition takes the form of a theory of the middle. The chapter ends with a short summary and concluding remarks. Keywords: Axel Honneth; The Struggle for Recognition ; Theory of Recognition; Theory of the Middle

Positivism before Logical Positivism in Nordic Philosophy

The concept of “style of thought” or Denkstil is today probably primarily associated with the Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck and his writings from the 1930s. It was however used quite extensively already by Karl Mannheim in his writings on the sociology of knowledge from the 1920s. Quite interestingly, the concept of style of thought was also used twice by Rudolf Carnap in the preface to Der logische Aufbau der Welt from 1928. No doubt, the concept must have been in the air during the interwar period. In what follows I will characterize the early positivism in Nordic philosophy in terms of a certain style of thought or as a certain habitus of thought. I will single out six basic convictions about philosophy and how to do philosophy that make up a more or less common ground and starting point for the early philosophical positivists in the Nordic countries. However, to begin with I will motivate why I prefer to use the designation “the positive spirit” rather than “positivism”. In the latter part of the article I will then dwell on some more specifi c topics and fi gures relating to the positive spirit or positivism before Logical positivism in Nordic philosophy. (Less)

Philosophical anthropology. A school of thought of the 20th century.

Vignoles et al. (p. 125) deserve attention, with their work being discussed in a much more balanced way than simply by the statement: ‘In recent years . . . discussions of social mobility have been dominated by the fact that in Britain, social mobility is actually in decline’ (p. 125). This is simply not true. I have other critical remarks. First, the book reflects a British bias (although the work of Bourdieu is covered). Class research has had, and probably still has, a strong position in Britain, but interesting research is also done in the United States, the rest of Europe and other places in the world. The best solution here would have been to include more references from other countries. Another solution would have been to acknowledge this bias by including ‘in Britain’ in the title of the book. Second, focusing once again on Chapter 7, I found that the section on class differences in educational attainment warranted a discussion of primary and secondary class origin effects. It is a well-established fact that class differentials in educational attainment are due to differing performance in school as well as to different choices made about school transitions. In turn, there are several possible reasons why working-class children generally perform less well in school than do middle-class children, and are less likely to choose academic programmes in upper secondary school (even at equal levels of achievement). There is certainly more to add here in terms of both empirical results and theoretical reasoning than is included in the book. Third, in my opinion, some parts of the book are too abstract, especially the early chapters. One relevant question concerns the book’s target readership. In my view, it is ambitious in trying to summarize the field of class analysis and hence suited me when I started my graduate studies. However, its strength is the historical background it provides, although it is less reliable as an overview of current research. Owing to the occasionally very high level of abstractness, I would not recommend it as a textbook below graduate level. I have actually used earlier editions as a textbook at the undergraduate level, and my experience is that many of the arguments in the book are too complex or abstract for undergraduate students. Despite my critical comments, I would still recommend Crompton’s book as an introduction to class research for students at graduate level.

Social Characterology. From the Protestant Ethic, via the Social Ethic, to the Hacker Ethic

Starting out from Max Webers The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the article traces some waystations in the reception history of Webers text. It focuses on a number of authors—David Riesman, William H. Whyte, Daniel Bell and Pekka Himanen—who have used The Protestant Ethic as a reference point in their own endeavours to capture the spirit of their time. Key themes in the article are ways of life, the formation of social character and characterological struggle. The aim of the article is to highlight The Protestant Ethic as a living classic in sociology.