Bodo Sturm

The role of the government in adaptation to climate change

Given the scarcity of resources, an economic approach is necessary in order to determine an optimal strategy of adaptation to climate change. In this paper we develop an economic framework for the study of adaptation which allows distinguishing between decentralised adaptation by private agents, on the one hand, and centralised adaptation measures by the government, on the other hand. The paper is in two parts: in the first we present the neoclassical view of adaptation policy, which is based on the paradigm of market failure. In the second part we deal with challenges and complements of the neoclassical view arising from the introduction of equity principles, security of supply concerns, and a polycentric approach to the provision of public goods. The analysis is illustrated with examples of adaptation measures in Germany.

Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives

It is not only the great number of papers written on environment economics that make it worth dealing with this special branch of experimental research, but the environmental problem in all its facets seems to serve as a catalyst for identifying some methodological problems of the experimental method. For this reason, we will not only try to give an overview of recent experiments in environmental economics but also add some thoughts on the methodological implications of this work. We identify three direct connecting factors for the experimental method and environmental economics. First, social dilemmas are, in many cases, at the core of environmental problems. Experiments are able to test theoretical hypotheses for individual behavior in such social dilemma situations. The second connecting factor comes from the field of applied experimental work and can be characterized as the testbedding of institutional arrangements for the solution of environmental problems. The last direct application of experimental methods to environmental economics concerns the individual evaluation of environmental resources. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006.

Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options

Since January 1st the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS may be linked at some time to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.

On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods – Experimental Evidence from the Lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the freeriding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached.

Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The revised Directive published in June 2009 suggests auctioning as a basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that runs from 2013 to 2020. The article emphasizes the importance of a properly chosen auction design. Compared with the past and current trading phases, the significantly higher auction share is expected to yield a thin secondary market for CO 2 allowances. The main criteria for a viable auction design (price signalling, efficient allocation, and simplicity combined with transparency and credibility) are used to assess different options for an auction design. A specific auction design for the third trading phase-the simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction-is recommended.

Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator. Subsequently, this group investment is allocated according to a specific rule to individual minimum contributions. The game is implemented either as a Single- or a Multi-Phase Game. In the Single-Phase Game, the contribution schemes are exogenously implemented. In the Multi-Phase Game, we let subjects vote on the rule-based contribution schemes. If a scheme obtains a sufficient majority it is implemented. In case no sufficient majority is reached, subjects have to make their contributions to the public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Our results suggest that the endogenous choice of a contribution scheme has an impact on the level of contributions. In case of a rule-based contribution scheme which equalizes payoffs, contributions are higher if subjects choose the scheme than in case the scheme is implemented exogenously. In contrast, contributions are higher if the VCM is implemented exogenously than in case a sufficient majority cannot be obtained and, therefore, subjects have to play the VCM.

The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change - The Case of Germany

Given the ubiquitous scarcity of resources an economic approach is necessary in order to determine an optimal strategy of adaptation to climate change. In this paper we develop an economic framework for the study of adaptation which allows us to distinguish between decentralized adaptation by private agents on the one hand and centralized adaptation measures by public authorities on the other. The approach is based on the paradigm of market failure and is complemented by two further grounds of government action, equity concerns and security of supply. We identify open research questions in the nascent field of adaptation to climate change requiring further empirical investigation. The economic framework is applied to adaptation in Germany by analyzing impacts and adaptation options for climate-sensitive fields such as agriculture, energy, water, and public health.

A European Perspective on Recent Trends in U.S. Climate Policy

Without participation of the United States, the world?s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, mitigation of global climate change seems hardly conceivable. Despite the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the reluctance of the Bush administration to engage in Post-Kyoto negotiations, recent developments suggest that the U.S. position towards climate policy might change in the medium run. This study provides an overview on current trends in U.S. climate policy. Besides the main elements of national climate policy proposals and state-level initiatives the climate contents in the U.S. presidential candidates? agendas are outlined. Based on this overview recent trends in U.S. climate policy are related to the European approach to combat climate change. Furthermore, we elaborate on the aspects which may be important for Europe to design its own domestic and international climate policy in order to achieve the long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations.

Does Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Modified Food Grant Consumers the Right to Know? Evidence from an Economic Experiment

Opponents of the voluntary labeling scheme for genetically modified (GM) food products often argue that consumers have the ?right to know? and therefore advocate mandatory labeling. In this paper we argue against this line of reasoning. Using experimental auctions conducted with a sample of the resident population of Mannheim, Germany, we show that the quality of the informational signal generated by a mandatory labeling scheme is affected by the number of labels in the market. If there are two labels, one for GM products and one for non-GM products, mandatory and voluntary labeling schemes generate a similar degree of uncertainty about the quality of products that do not carry a label.

On the Performance of Rule-Based Contribution Schemes Under Endowment Heterogeneity

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the efficiency gains from minimum contribution rules under random allocation. Under effort-based allocations, substantial efficiency gains relative to a VCM occur, though being largely driven by significant reductions of contributions in VCM. By apparently influencing the perception of fair burden sharing, the endowment allocation procedure crucially impacts voluntary contributions under VCM, while the rule-based mechanisms generate stable efficiency levels, even though endowment heterogeneity substantially limits the ability of rule-based mechanisms to achieve the potential efficiency gains.