Brad Inwood

The Cambridge companion to the Stoics

Introduction: Stoicism: an intellectual odyssey Brad Inwood 1. The school, from Zeno to Arius Didymus David Sedley 2. The school in the Roman imperial period Christopher Gill 3. Stoic epistemology R. J. Hankinson 4. Stoic logic Susanne Bobzien 5. Stoic natural philosophy (physics and cosmology) Michael J. White 6. Stoic theology Keimpe Algra 7. Stoic determinism Dorothea Frede 8. Stoic metaphysics Jacques Brunschwig 9. Stoic ethics Malcolm Schofield 10. Stoic moral psychology Tad Brennan 11. Stoicism and medicine R. J. Hankinson 12. The stoic contribution to traditional grammar David Blank and Catherine Atherton 13. The stoics and the astronomical sciences Alexander Jones 14. Stoic naturalism and its critics T. H. Irwin 15. Stoicism in the philosophical tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler A. A. Long.

Stoic Moral Psychology

Moral psychology addresses itself to the interface between ethics and psychology. One of the basic principles of moral psychology is the apparently trivial one, that all ethically correct actions are, to begin with, actions: inasmuch as they are the deliberate or at least intentional actions of human beings, ethical actions will share features with the class to which they belong, and fall under whatever constraints belong to the larger kind. This of course raises an immediate question about the coherence of the topic so described. Psychology is clearly a descriptive field, and ethics is the normative field par excellence; the one tells us how the human mind does function, the other tells us how human agents ought to act. Given this fundamental difference, we may not assume, without further argument, that the first discussion can place any constraints whatsoever on the second. The mere fact that psychology places limits on what is humanly possible does not show, without further argument, that ethics must keep its demands within those limits.

The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus

PHASES The history of the Stoic school is conventionally divided into three phases: Early Stoicism: from Zenos foundation of the school, c. 300, to the late second century b.c. : the period which includes the headship of the greatest Stoic of them all, Chrysippus Middle Stoicism: the era of Panaetius and Posidonius Roman Stoicism: the Roman Imperial period, dominated by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius Although the Stoic tradition’s continuity is at least as important as any resolution into distinct phases, the traditional divisions do reflect key changes which no school history can afford to ignore. The following account will, in fact, assume a rough division into five phases, despite acknowledgment of extensive overlaps between them: the first generation the era of the early Athenian scholarchs the Platonising phase (‘Middle Stoicism’) the first century b.c. decentralisation the Imperial phase The primary ground for separating these is that each represents, to some extent, a different perspective on what it is to be a Stoic – that is, on what allegiances and commitments are entailed by the chosen label.

Seneca in His Philosophical Milieu

T HE philosophical environment in which Seneca wrote was very different from the one which Cicero knew, and I want to present a somewhat exploratory sketch of that environment, one which will show how distinctive Senecas philosophical world was. No doubt many of the differences between them were matters of personal temperament and decision,1 and such factors cannot really be understood in a noncircular way. But many other differences were, I think, the result of social and political evolution at Rome; for during the century separating their careers, Roman society underwent a rapid and indeed revolutionary phase of social change. It would be remarkable if such change did not have some impact on the work of pagan Romes two greatest philosophical writers.2 But we should also recall that there are some more specifically philosophical factors which should be taken into account. For example, in Ciceros youth Athens was still the center of philosophical life in the Mediterranean basin; the traditional schools lived and flourished. By the time the upheavals of the first century were over, not only did Rome rule much more of the Greek east than it had before; but the traditional Athenian schools had been closed,3 philosophical activity there reduced to a shadow of its former self. Alexandria and Rome had become more

Law in Roman Philosophy

Legal philosophy in late antiquity must be understood in relation to Roman law, a system which continued to evolve from the traditional founding of Rome (753 B.C.) until the fall of the Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire (A.D. 1453). Rome was at first ruled by kings about whom little is certain. A set of laws attributed to them (leges regiae) and compiled by Papirius a priest (pontifex) were probably statements of customary and religious norms, concerning marriage, family relations, funeral rites, and so forth (Johnson, Coleman-Norton, and Bourne 1961, 3–6). The Roman Republic (509–27 B.C.) was initially threatened by internecine conflict between the patrician and plebeian orders. This was resolved in part through the Twelve Tables (451–450 B.C.), a written public code composed by officials called decemviri, which could not be arbitrarily changed by patrician magistrates. This collection of statutes, which the Roman historian Livy called “the fount of all law, public and private” (Roman History 3.34.6, trans. Jones), was lost, although many quotations, paraphrases, and descriptions were preserved by later Roman authors (Johnson, Coleman- Norton, and Bourne 1961, 9–18; Warmington 1967; see also A. Watson 1975).

Assent and Argument

These ten essays on Ciceros Academic Books (the Academia and Lucullus) deal with various aspects of Academic scepticism, ancient epistemology, and the history of the Academy. The tradition from Socrates through to Galen is covered, with special emphasis on Carneades, Antiochus and, of course, Cicero himself.

Locke's Offices

There is a curious moment in Lockes Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) when he turns to the question of what discourses on ethics a young English gentleman in the making should be encouraged to read. This is a question of some importance, one would have thought, in a treatise whose stated goal is an education to virtue and service to ones country, especially given Lockes claim that education “is that which makes the great difference in mankind.” “... of all the men we meet with,” hesays, “nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education” (&1). But the brevity of his treatment here – earlier in the treatise he has spent at least ten times as long on proper methods of toilet training and five times as long on the question of whether children should beallowed to eat melons and plums or apples and pears – as well as the brevity of his actual reading list, occasion some surprise. Indeed, Locke explicitly recommends reading just two books in the sphere of morality:Theknowledge of virtue, all along from the beginning, in all the instances he is capable of, being taught him, moreby practice than rules; and the love of reputation, instead of satisfying his appetite, being madehabitual in him; I know not whether he should read any other discourses of morality, but what he finds in the Bible; or have any system of ethics put into his hand, till he can read Tullys Offices, not as a school-boy to learn Latin, but as one who would be informed in the principles and precepts of virtue, for the conduct of his life

History and Human Nature

Abstract This contribution is part of a special issue on History and Human Nature, comprising an essay by G.E.R. Lloyd and fifteen invited responses.

The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (review)

Readers of this journal are familiar with the Cambridge Companions. What is striking about this one is its broad sweep. A Companion to all of ancient philosophy will necessarily present the reader with a somewhat shallow overview. Is this really such a good idea? What is its role, when there are already Companions to Early Greek Philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, The Stoics, and Plotinus? The editor answers this by aiming also to provide a “book to accompany survey courses on the history of ancient philosophy.” It is challenging to provide an overview of the first millennium and more of Western philosophy, but this pedagogical goal is tougher. David Sedley has managed both tasks well. Although some chapters are not suitable hors d’oeuvres for beginners, all will nourish the hungry and whet the appetite for more. Even those chapters which amount to substantial entrées too rich for novices are excellent meat. There are no reheated leftovers. From beginning to end this is a feast of reason. The book makes abundant use of tables to present large amounts of complex material economically—lists of Plato’s dialogues indicate topics, speakers and lengths; Roman philosophers are displayed with biographical notes, school affiliations, and major works; philosophical commentators are given with date and the author and work commented on; nineteen Presocratics are adorned with birthplace, date, key ideas and thumbnail comments. Many of the chapters cultivate an elegant but economical style which must be due in part to editorial encouragement and example. Though it is bound to skip over much, it avoids even the appearance of superficiality. Jill Kraye’s chapter on “The legacy of ancient philosophy” to the medieval and modern world is a masterpiece of clarity and compression as well as a superb piece of intellectual history. Kraye’s survey concludes the volume. Sedley’s substantial introduction begins it by motivating the study of ancient philosophy through two characteristic questions, “What is a good human life?” and “Why isn’t the earth falling?” and culminates in a highly informative guide to our various textual sources and a compact demonstration of how they become the editions and translations we use. Jonathan Barnes opens (ch. 1) with a homily on “Argument in ancient philosophy”; splendid stuff, but for all its lucidity, not an ideal appetizer for the survey course students I teach—it’s a dessert better served later in the volume. Similarly thematic chapters on “Philosophy and literature” (ch. 8, Martha Nussbaum), “Philosophy and science” (ch. 10, R.J. Hankinson) and “Philosophy and religion” (ch. 11, Glenn Most) set ancient philosophy in broader context. Hankinson splendidly communicates the scientific agenda of the ancient world, perhaps over-emphasizing the mathematical sciences, Galen and scientific epistemology at the cost of “scientific” writers like Strabo, Pliny, and Vitruvius. Nussbaum concentrates on the fourth century B.C. at the expense of later centuries, but gives excellent value on the canonical texts, the Republic and the Poetics. Most’s essay explores the interpenetration of religious themes with the philosophical (emphasizing how differently pagan religion interacted with philosophy than does any modern faith) and adds an acute though exaggerated set of observations on the religious quality of the ancient philosophical way of life. It would be hard to locate the saintly sages Most presents as typical in the logical landscape evoked by Barnes. The remaining chapters cover periods and major figures. Malcolm Schofield on the Presocratics (ch. 2), Sarah Broadie on the Sophists and Socrates (ch. 3), Christopher Rowe on Plato (ch. 4), John Cooper on Aristotle (ch. 5), Jacques Brunschwig and David Sedley on Hellenistic philosophy, A.A. Long on Roman (ch. 7), and Frans de Haas on Late ancient philosophy. The authors are all eloquent authorities and it’s a menu with no bad choices—though I’m sure my undergraduates will find Cooper’s treatment of the figures of Aristotle’s syllogisms indigestible. I found Rowe’s careful balance of old and new in his introduction to Plato particularly fine; de Haas’s brilliant exposition of the commentary tradition that dominated later ancient philosophy and shaped the medieval tradition taught me more than any chapter except Kraye’s. Long’s sweeping survey of Roman philosophy

Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism.

This book reconstructs in detail the older Stoic theory of the psychology of action, discussing it in relation to Aristotelian, Epicurean, Platonic, and some of the more influential modern theories. Important Greek terms are transliterated and explained; no knowledge of Greek is required.