Christopher Gill

The structured self in Hellenistic and Roman thought

Introduction I. THE STRUCTURED SELF IN STOICISM AND EPICUREANISM 1. Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism 2. Psychological Holism and Socratic Ideals 3. Development and the Structured Self II. THE UNSTRUCTURED SELF: STOIC PASSIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF PLATO 4. Competing Readings of Stoic Passions 5. Competing Readings of Platonic Psychology III. THEORETICAL ISSUES AND LITERARY RECEPTION 6. Issues in Selfhood: Subjectivity and Objectivity 7. Literary Reception: Structured and Unstructured Selves

Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions

My question, more precisely, is whether Galen understood the relationship between Platonic and Stoic thinking on emotions. I discuss this question not in general terms, but in connection with one specific, but very important, topic: the reliability of Galen’s account in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP) 4–5 of Stoic debate about the passions. Galen’s picture is that Posidonius reacted againt Chrysippus’ monistic psychology and reintroduced Plato’s tripartite model, a move which Galen warmly applauds. In general, like John Cooper above, I think that Galen gives a highly partisan and misleading picture of this Stoic debate (although he is also an indispensable source for it). But I also think that Galen fastens on (though misdescribing) one salient feature of Chrysippus’ theory. This is that Chrysippus, in spite of his psychological monism, sees passion as involving a certain kind of inner conflict. Defining the nature of this conflict is crucial for understanding both Chrysippus’ theory and Posidonius’ modification of this. Exploring this point can also help us to gain a better understanding of the relationship between Stoic thinking on the passions (both Chrysippan and Posidonian) and Platonic psychology. I believe that this relationship is very different from that suggested by Galen, and that Platonic psychology (even in the Republic) is closer to Stoic thinking, both Chrysippan and Posidonian, than Galen allows. It is possible, though not certain, that the Stoics recognized this similarity; and that Platonic thinking was an important stimulus to the distinctively Stoic form of thinking on the passions.

The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches

In this essay, I consider the implications of two themes in ancient philosophy as a way of exploring current issues and approaches in the study of the self in antiquity. The first theme is Cicero’s presentation of Cato in On Duties (1.112), considered in the context of his account of the theory of the four roles (personae). The second is Epictetus’ recurrent theme in the Discourses that we should focus our lives on exercising prohairesis (rational agency or will), taken together with his three-topic programme of practical ethics. Both examples fall within the area of HellenisticRoman practical ethics and are based on Stoic thinking. In examining these themes, I draw on the frameworks developed in two books on ancient conceptions of personality or selfhood, one centred on Homer, Greek tragedy, Plato, and Aristotle, and the other on Hellenistic and Roman philosophy. These two themes are also treated by Richard Sorabji in his contribution to this volume and in a recent book on the self, and I consider certain salient differences between our treatments. Sorabji also discusses my interpretation in his essay and so the two chapters constitute a kind of dialogue between our approaches to this topic. I also refer to other recent treatments of Hellenistic and Roman thinking on the self, including those of Michel Foucault and A.A. Long. In a topic as complex and many-layered as study of the ancient self, it would be naive and misguided to suggest that there is a single “right” approach. In presenting my standpoint alongside that of others, my aim is to illustrate certain representative approaches to this fascinating – but rather elusive – topic and to reflect on the conceptual and interpretative issues raised by these approaches.

Philosophical Therapy as Preventive Psychological Medicine

The philosophical essays were intended to function as a psychological analogue for ancient medical regimen, or what we call ‘life-style management’ or ‘preventive medicine’. This chapter begins by developing this suggestion in general terms before relating the idea to the emergence of a distinct genre or body of writings on the therapy of the emotions in the Hellenistic and Roman Imperial periods. Next, it analyses the core strategy of this kind of philosophical therapy, identifying four key recurrent themes. The chapter illustrates this schema, referring to Galen’s Avoiding Distress , taken as representing a Platonic-Aristotelian approach, on the one hand, and to Seneca’s On Peace of Mind , representing the Stoic approach, on the other. It then returns to the idea that such works are designed to function as preventive psychological medicine, and asks whether they embody an approach to psychological health-care that we could find useful under modern conditions. Keywords:Galen; modern practice; philosophical therapy; preventive medicine; psychological medicine; Seneca; therapy of emotions

Demiurge and Emperor in Galen's world of knowledge

The presence of a wise, powerful, skilful and provident creator figure – alternately labelled ‘nature’ (phusis) and ‘demiurge’ (dēmiourgos) – is absolutely key to Galen’s thinking, to the medical and philosophical system he constructs and articulates. This figure has, however, not yet been subject to the intensity of scholarly scrutiny that its structural significance demands. This chapter is an attempt to fill in some of these gaps by investigating, in a more focused manner than hitherto, questions about where Galen’s notion of nature and the demiurge comes from and about the work it does in his world of knowledge. I examine the intellectual resources that Galen drew on in fashioning his creator, what is traditional and what original in his formulation, and the identity of both its past precedents and the contemporary features it shares, as well as the motivations that he may have had in producing the particular package that he did. Two specific, and connected, arguments will be put forward, following on from some more general points about Galen’s demiurge, his notion of nature, as it appears and functions within his medical system and fits into his wider cultural context. First, that the Roman Emperor, in both an abstract and more concrete sense, should be placed alongside the usual suspects when considering the conceptual treasury Galen drew on in formulating his creator. So, as well as the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions which Galen explicitly acknowledges as influential, and his more hidden (but just as wellknown) debts to Stoicism, the configuration of power in the Roman Empire

Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (and Some More General Studies)

Susanna Braund s edition of Senecas De dementia} is both the first full philological edition of the work in English and a full-scale literary and philosophical study of Senecas essay. There is a new text and brief apparatus criticus; this is (explicitly) indebted to a more intensive recent edition (by E. Malaspina, 2001, 2nd edn. 2004). The translation on facing pages aims to combine clear and readable English with consistency in the rendering of key terms. It seems to me highly effective; like Brad Inwood, in his recent translations of the letters, Braund brings out the sinewy force of Senecas prose, while also allowing full visibility to the philosophical underpinnings. A special feature of this book is a very ample introduction (91 pages), covering the full range of historical, literary, political, and philosophical topics relevant to this fascinating text. I found especially illuminating her treatment of the concept of dementia, which underlines the close linkage between this virtue and autocracy, and of the delicate manner in which Seneca pitches the work (addressed to Nero) between flattery and didacticism. Also of special interest is her analysis of the way Seneca handles in a broadly Stoic way a positive treatment of what is, in theoretical terms, not a Stoic virtue. The commentary is on a large, even massive, scale (269 pages, compared with 29 pages of text). Braund combines detailed