Brad Lockerbie

Party Contacting and Political Participation, 1952-90

Although the role of political parties in structuring vote choice has become considerably weaker in the last 30 years, we find that parties continue to be active organizations and contact one-fifth to one-quarter of the electorate, an activity that has important consequences. Specifically, when contacted by the parties, individuals have a greater propensity to vote and to engage in other political activities. We also find that each of the two major parties has the capability of mobilizing the electorate even when it is not the incumbent party. Even when placed alongside a plethora of control variables, these findings hold up. We conclude that citizen contacting is a method by which party organizations effectively reduce the transaction costs associated with political participation and that it is an important and largely neglected element in most analyses of political behavior.

Economics, Votes, Protests: Western European Cases

In Western European studies, general investigations of mass political participation are an established tradition. However, these efforts have not drawn from the vigorous current of research on economics and politics. Specifically for Western Europe, there exists no systematic work on economic conditions and political participation (conventional or unconventional). Here we integrate these economic arguments into general explanations of both participation modes. First voting turnout is examined, then protest activity, both as measured in recent survey data from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The findings uncover support for a general model of political participation within these nations, as well as pointing to provocative between-nation differences. The economic results are especially stimulating. Pocketbook effects are absent, but collective evaluations of economic performance make an impact, and do so in intriguing ways. First, it is prospective, not retrospective, evaluations that count. Second, they operate asymmetrically, with the prospect of good times heightening turnout, and the prospect of bad times heightening protest. Such findings suggest noteworthy revisions regarding the theory of economics and participation.

Prospective Voting in Presidential Elections, 1956-1988

The research presented in this article concerns the time frame of the electorate. Do voters look to the past, the future, or both when deciding how to vote in presidential elections? An analysis of the American National Election Studies of 1956 through 1988 supports the argument that voters look both backward and forward when deciding for whom to vote. Although both retrospective and prospective economic evaluations are important, and the level of importance of each varies somewhat over time, it is clear that evaluations of future performance are an important influence on vote choice. Even when placed in a causal model with both party identification and retrospective evaluations prior to them, the prospective evaluations remain a forceful influence on vote choice.

Change in Party Identification The Role of Prospective Economic Evaluations

In the past few years, a new direction has been taken in the study of economics and politics. Researchers have begun to focus on the role of prospective economic evaluations. The research presented here applies the prospective model to changes in partisanship. Regardless of the time period examined, these prospective economic evaluations exert an important influence on party identification. Individuals change their partisanship in response to their expectations concerning the ability of the parties to provide financial prosperity. These findings indicate that previous examinations of the electorate have understated the rationality of the populace, and, accordingly, previous theories of political behavior are in need of revision.

The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare War

The conventional wisdom of national elections suggests that there are electoral costs associated with opposing declarations of war. However, an alternative literature contends that the negative electoral consequences of waging war may be borne by legislators who supported war, especially those members of the majority party. The authors test this assumption by examining the electoral consequences of supporting or opposing the declarations of war for the Mexican-American War, World War I, and the 1991 resolution to use force in the Persian Gulf. The results of their analysis of House elections indicate that although electoral costs were borne for opposing World War I, legislators who dissented often preselected themselves out of Congress through retirement or pursuit of other office. No evidence of electoral costs is evident in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, due in part to the influence of intervening events during the long period between the end of the war and the 1992 election.

The temporal pattern of economic evaluations and vote choice in Senate elections

Economics has long been thought to influence vote choice. Unfortunately, the temporal pattern of economic evaluations is little studied. Using the Senate elections of 1956 through 1988, this research presents an assessment of the role of retrospective and prospective evaluations on vote choice. The findings of this research support the argument that people look to the future when making the vote decision. Consequently, this research also argues that the simple reward/punishment view of voting does not reflect the richness of economic voting. Finally, a causal model is constructed to demonstrate that these prospective evaluations exert an influence on vote choice independent of both party identification and retrospective evaluations.

A Look to the Future: Forecasting the 2004 Presidential Election

Forecasting provides the opportunity to put ones self to the test. Are our models of voting behavior accurate? It is easy to retrofit an explanation for what has happened in the past. Taking a chance on a forecast that can go wrong does not afford us that luxury. Forecasting can also teach a lesson in humility. Over the last decade, political scientists have been willing to gamble on their models. We have had some success. Everyone on the forecasting panel at the 1996 APSA Annual Meeting correctly forecast a Clinton victory. The forecasting of the 2000 presidential election was clearly a lesson in humility (at least for this author). None of the authors of this symposium forecast a Bush victory. Moreover, many forecast a rather substantial victory for Al Gore.

Party Identification: Constancy and Change

Party identification has long been thought to be the unmoved mover of political evaluations. The research presented here shows that party identification is changeable. In fact, over a 2-year period (1990-1992), we can see that there is a substantively important amount of movement. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson argue that expectations, not retrospections, lie at the core of political economy. This work takes that logic and shows that the individual-level changes in party identification are explained by both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations. A novel finding in this article is that egocentric economic evaluations are more important than sociotropic evaluations. People are looking at what the government has done to them rather than at what the government has done to the national economy when making political decisions.

The Sophomore Surge: Conversion, Mobilization, or Abstention

The incumbency advantage and its cause(s) is a question that political scientists have addressed for several years. This article looks at one piece of the puzzle: the sophomore surge. Using the American National Election Panel Studies of 1956-1960 and 1972-1976, I examine three possible scenarios for the sophomore surge: conversion, mobilization, and absten tion. The evidence presented herein supports the argument that first-term incumbents are able to win the votes of those who had supported the losing candidate in the previous election. It would appear that the source of the incumbency advantage is what the incumbents do in office, not the actions of their potential opponents.

Getting Inside the Beltway: Perceptions of Presidential Skill and Success in Congress

Different methodological approaches sometimes lead to different substantive conclusions. Nowhere is this more evident than in studies relating assessments of presidential skill to legislative success. Scholars of the historical, traditionalist school of presidency research argue that presidents who are perceived to be adept at getting what they want are more likely to achieve their legislative goals than are those perceived as less adept. Neustadt identifies perceived skill, or what he calls ‘professional reputation’, as one of the three resources that are the essence of presidential power. Yet students of the presidency who employ quantitative methods have found little or no systematic relationship between variations in skill evaluations and variations in success. George Edwards reports thai similarly situated Congressmen are not especially more likely to support highly esteemed presidents than lowly esteemed presidents. Fleisher and Bond similarly find that once contextual variables have been controlled for, there is no pattern suggesting that presidents thought to be highly skilled do better with Congress.