Brad Williams

Parties of Power and Russian Politics: A Victory of the State over Civil Society?

State-controlled political parties are able to dominate Russian governance because grass-roots parties are weak and personality oriented.

Explaining Divergent Responses to the North Korean Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea

This article examines the divergent approaches pursued by Japan and South Korea in their attempts to resolve an issue that is related to a fundamental responsibility of sovereign states: the protection of citizens. The case considered here is North Koreas abduction of Japanese and South Korean nationals. In Japan, the abduction issue has taken center stage in the countrys North Korea policy, whereas in South Korea, recent administrations have downplayed the issue—despite the fact that nearly 500 South Korean citizens remain detained in North Korea, compared to fewer than 20 known Japanese abductions. The authors find that the key to understanding the divergent responses lies in the politicization of specific, ostensibly apolitical demands for the state to fulfill its duty to protect citizens. In particular, the proximity of the abductions issue to key nationalist themes, which politicians in each country use to mobilize support, prevents the matter from being addressed in a neutral way.

The Criminalisation of Russo-Japanese Border Trade: Causes and Consequences

BORDER (OR COASTAL) TRADE is conducted outside the framework of state-controlled structures. In the case of Russo–Japanese border trade, it is conducted mainly by Hokkaido and other Japanese prefectures along Japan’s west coast and Pacific Russian (PR) sub-regions. It constitutes a small percentage of Russia–Japan trade but a relatively large proportion of PR–Japan trade. PR accounts for barely 10% of Russia’s imports from Japan, but supplies almost 30% of Russia’s exports to Japan. More than half of the exports to Japan from PR were fish and marine products. Most of this is directed through ports in eastern and northern Hokkaido. Japan imported fish and marine products from Russia worth

Why give? Japan's response to the Asian tsunami crisis

1.3 billion in 1995 and

Federal–regional relations in Russia and the Northern Territories dispute: the rise and demise of the ‘Sakhalin factor’

1.2 billion in 1996, and a large share of this trade is coastal trade conducted outside official state import–export channels. The trade in seafood and related products constitutes a large share of Hokkaido’s trade with PR. In 1999 about 80% of Hokkaido’s imports from PR were fish and marine products (60% of which were crabs). Fishing nets and packing materials for fish and marine products comprised about 40% of Hokkaido’s exports. An increasing number of Russian fishing vessels dock in Japanese ports to sell their catch. In 1989 only 262 Russian trawlers docked in Hokkaido’s five main ports (none in Nemuro, Monbetsu or Ishikari). This number increased, reaching a peak of 8,980 in 1997, before dropping slightly to 8,525 in 1999—a 34-fold increase in 10 years. The number of Russian sailors disembarking at these ports mirrors this trend, peaking at 175,390 in 1997, before dipping to 154,393 in 1999. While ashore, most Russian sailors purchase large quantities of consumer goods to take back home and have become a highly visible presence in these port cities. For instance, in 1999 61,987 Russian sailors disembarked at Wakkanai, which is over 10,000 more the town’s total population. Under normal circumstances such a flurry of interregional economic activity would be seen as a welcome development in an otherwise stagnant Russo–Japanese economic relationship. Indeed, one Russian correspondent considers the trade in fish and marine products to be the most effective achievement in economic relations between Japan and Russia. What a pity, he laments, ‘... that it is absolutely illegal and of a criminal nature’. One scholar has even described the criminal nature of local trade as ‘a cancer threatening the very health of Russo–Japanese relations.’ This article examines the issue of the criminalisation of local trade and argues that, in addition to

Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency: Alliance Politics, Sectionalism, and Antimilitarism

Abstract This article analyses the various motives behind Japans response to the December 2004 Asian earthquake and tsunami. There was no mono-causal explanation for Japans tsunami aid policy. The various state, non-state and private actors involved in the policy-making and implementation process each had their own motives but were united by a genuine spirit of humanitarian goodwill. Nevertheless, the tragedy did provide the Japanese government with an opportunity to promote a security agenda by enhancing the legitimacy of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and strengthening military relations with the US. Tokyo also took advantage of the tsunami to pursue politico-diplomatic objectives. Prominent among these were two interrelated goals: the bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a desire to diplomatically outshine China.

THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

Abstract This paper examines a relatively unexplored aspect of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: the involvement of subnational actors. It focuses in particular on the sustained campaign of domestic lobbying and paradiplomacy by elites from the Far East region of Sakhalin aimed at preventing the Russian central government from transferring the South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories to Japan during the 1990s. It explores the various responses to the ‘Sakhalin factor’ from federal authorities in Russia, as well as private and public bodies in Japan, highlighting the subsequent localization and pluralization of diplomatic channels. The paper also considers why the ‘Sakhalin factor’ became so prominent, pointing to a synergy of factors that include the high-profile anti-concessionary campaigns of the Sakhalin political elite, the fallout from Russias troubled attempts at state building and a possible convergence of interests between Boris Yeltsin and regional authorities. The paper concludes with an analysis of how Vladimir Putins federal reforms, launched in 2000, have diminished Sakhalins authority over the South Kuril Islands.

Taiwan’s Sub-national Government Relations with Japan: Post-1979 Developments

Abstract I examine a relatively underexplored aspect of Japans early postwar history and seek to explain why attempts to establish a Japanese-style central intelligence agency (JCIA) in the 1950s were unsuccessful. I evaluate three competing explanations drawn from the level of international politics, focusing on US power resources and influence as well as liberal and constructivist styles of analysis—alliance politics, sectionalism, and the norm of antimilitarism—in order to shed light on the historical origins of Japans intelligence apparatus, which is relatively underdeveloped and underfunded compared to other middle powers. It highlights the primacy of domestic factors over structural causes in explaining the decision not to establish a JCIA. In particular, I argue that the JCIA proposal failed primarily because of attacks on important proponents that, while sometimes driven by seemingly rational organizational interests, were nevertheless legitimated by growing antimilitaristic sentiments shared by...

Japan, Australia and Asia-Pacific security

The Asia-Pacific is emerging as a critical region in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an aggressive global strategy designed to interdict the transport of these weapons and associated technologies. However, some observers have suggested that the Asia-Pacific has given the PSI a less than enthusiastic reception. The authors posit a more sanguine view. They caution against taking such a holistic approach to the region. Asia does not speak with one voice when it comes to security, and opposition to the PSI is not as widespread nor deep-rooted as may have been anticipated. In addition, the PSIs informal structure encourages flexibility, enabling states to participate in certain activities while eschewing others that may be technically or politically untenable.

Dissent on Japan's Northern Periphery: Nemuro, the Northern Territories and the Limits of Change in a ‘Bureaucrat's Movement’

ABSTRACT In 1972 the Japanese government ended its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. And yet it did not. In the aftermath of that decision, colonial legacy ties between Taiwan and Japan were drawn upon to create a new form of relationship, with ties that were official in all but name. Taiwanese cities and counties were also encouraged to develop formal ties with their Japanese counterparts. These sub-national ties are a critical – but little researched – component of the enduring bilateral relationship between these two countries. This article – based on extensive fieldwork in both countries – is an initial effort in understanding how these ties have developed and function, and how they support bilateral relations between Taiwan and Japan. Drawing on additional fieldwork in China, this article also considers what formal limitations exist on the para-diplomatic relations between these countries.