Purnendra Jain

The Catch-up State: E-government in Japan

Technology is foremost a source of change, and harnessing it effectively is a source of power. This was true when technology was applied to science and industry, and it is true at present with the application of technology to information. By transforming modes of communication, information technology (IT) is shifting dramatically how public, private and commercial relations are conducted. However, in government, this quiet transformation has often been overlooked. Today, many people across the world participate in the evolution of e-government, by which the traditional functions of governments are carried out and extended through electronic communications between those who govern and those who are governed, and the potential for ‘democratic process’ is reconx8e gured. Since technology is an enabling force for e-government, where does this place Japan, a modern industrialised nation with immense technological power? In the second half of the twentieth century, Japan used technology to become a world leader in x8e elds such as computer chips, robotics and civil engineering. Yet in information technology, Japan has been surprisingly slow. Sakaiya Taichi, Director of the Economic Planning Agency in 2001, bemoaned the fact that with the nation’s dilatory approach to IT, Japan was ‘turning from an advanced into a mediocre country’. As with other technologies developed since the nineteenth century, Japan has become a catch-up state again in IT. It is perhaps not surprising to learn that, vis-á-vis other economically and technologically strong nations, Japan has also become a ‘catch-up state’ in e-government. IT inertia, coupled with the lack of political and public will that is crucial for developing e-government, forestalled serious attention to e-government in Japan for several years, while other nations strong in both IT and the necessary political will made substantial progress. Serious Japanese government responses to this tardy development have emerged only from the late 1990s—another attempt at technological catch-up, and one that has been hindered by political and social impediments. This article seeks to identify the current state of e-government in Japan at the national and sub-national levels. It explores the role of the Internet as the primary form of electronic communication in government and public administration, considering both denshi seifu (e-government) and denshi jichitai (e-local government). Very little has been reported on this topic inside Japan, and almost nothing outside Japan. The article focuses on what has been done, with some contrast with e-government in nations where e-government has been taken much further than in Japan. These nations provide the precedents that Japan is largely following and aims to at least ‘catch-up’ to, if not overtake. Given the limited purpose and scope of this paper and its seminal contribu-

Japan–Australia security ties and the United States: the evolution of the trilateral dialogue process and its challenges

This article considers recent developments in Australia–Japan security and defence ties and their trilateral dimension with the United States. I argue that the security links bilaterally and through their main ally the US have scope for development while the three nations share perceptions of security and strategic matters. However, there are elements of inherent unpredictability that may come into play to hinder the move towards a further strengthening of the current trilateral security arrangement. Possible impediments come from both external and internal sources making it difficult for the three nations to transform their trilateral security relations into an institution, alliance or treaty that formally links the three partners strategically.1

Beyond Cricket: Australia–India Evolving Relations

Australias relationship with India stands in apparent contrast with its relations elsewhere in Asia. Most accounts of Australias links to India liken them to recurrent bouts of amnesia, arguing that Australia has not put the same efforts into engaging with India that it has into fostering ties with Japan, China and Indonesia and that, like a patient with injury to the hippocampus who has lost the ability to lay down long-term memories, Australia appears to approach each episodic moment of contact without recollection of the past. Australias relationship with India has passed through distinct phases, from a brief moment of warmth in the years immediately after India achieved independence, through frosty decades of the Cold War. In contrast to many other accounts, the paper argues that since the 1980s Australia has sought with considerable consistency to engage with India and that the tenuousness of the relationship is primarily due to Indian indifference. Recent bilateral issues, including the supply of uranium to India and attacks on Indian students, have led to an enlargement of contacts which may signify that the engagement is at last becoming a mutual one.

Local Political Leadership in Japan: A Harbinger of Systemic Change in Japanese Politics?

Abstract Observers of Japanese politics have generally assumed that because Japan is a unitary state, local government and its political chief executives have very little political and policy autonomy. Yet the assumption that a high degree of centralization in the political structure prevents leadership at the local level is misguided. Three case studies demonstrate that local chief executives from the peripheries are now more than ever demonstrating leadership at the local level. Local chief executives are increasingly challenging central government plans and policy priorities for local areas by setting policy agendas to follow their own vision and local needs, rather than accepting the centers fiat. Using the typology of transactional and transformational styles of leadership, this article argues that trends observed in some localities may be the harbinger of transformational leadership from the local level, as local government takes a more salient place in Japans political system.

Japan's foreign aid: old and new contests

Abstract Domestic and international contests explain the transformation of Japans foreign aid programme begun in the early 1950s. Through contests between domestic players, Japan has streamlined its aid processes by introducing institutional innovations, accommodating new actors in aid policy and delivery, and responding more sensitively to public opinion and independent advice. At the international level, contests have come from the Development Assistance Committee/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the USA, and China. Through these contests, Japan has emerged as a more rounded aid donor. Its new aid model blends Western principles with concepts of ‘self-help’, favouring large infrastructure projects that serve both Japans and recipient countries’ interests.

Japan–India Relations: Peaks and Troughs

Abstract Despite the absence of ill-will between Japan and India for most of the period since the end of World War II, bilateral relations have not reached their full potential in any field—political, economic or socio-cultural. This article identifies peaks and troughs across the six decades of post-war relations, first in the early post-war period and again in the mid-1980s. More recently, the nadir following Indias nuclear testing in 1998 was followed by significantly improved relations in the early 2000s, with the relationship reaching its post-war best in most areas when Abe Shinzo (2006–07) was Japans prime minister. This article considers both domestic and external factors that have caused these peaks and troughs. The final section considers the near future of the bilateral relationship as a new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in September 2009, replacing the long-term political monopoly of the Liberal Democratic Party.

Japan's subnational governments in China: emerging bilateral relations

One of the many areas of growing engagement between Japan and China is at the subnational government (SNG) level. Yet this development has received scant attention from analysts and scholars who study Japans local government and international relations. This article opens the window on the bilateral relationship at the SNG level, focusing on the actions of Japanese SNGs and their incipient role as international actors. The case of the Japan–China relationship at the SNG level is analysed in comparative context by considering the worldwide trend among SNGs to pursue international activities. The analysis focuses on three major types of linkages that Japanese SNGs have developed in China: (1) formalized sister relationships between SNGs; (2) trade promotion; (3) technical and economic cooperation. This development has important implications both for local–national relations in Japan and the way foreign relations are now managedOne of the many areas of growing engagement between Japan and China is at the subnational government (SNG) level. Yet this development has received scant attention from analysts and scholars who study Japans local government and international relations. This article opens the window on the bilateral relationship at the SNG level, focusing on the actions of Japanese SNGs and their incipient role as international actors. The case of the Japan–China relationship at the SNG level is analysed in comparative context by considering the worldwide trend among SNGs to pursue international activities. The analysis focuses on three major types of linkages that Japanese SNGs have developed in China: (1) formalized sister relationships between SNGs; (2) trade promotion; (3) technical and economic cooperation. This development has important implications both for local–national relations in Japan and the way foreign relations are now managed

Japan's vision of an East Asian Community: Responses from Asia

An East Asian Community (EAC) is, for now, an evolving and contested concept. As a grand possibility for beneficial interdependence in and around East Asia, in recent years the concept has inspired great interest, some suspicion and loads of political and strategic jockeying. For roughly half a century after World War II, historical rivalries and constraints on Japan assuming leadership, given regional sensitivity to its wartime actions, retarded regionalism in Asia. The region is also marked by great diversity—of historical and cultural background, levels of economic development and political systems— alongside weak politico-strategic ties. But formation of the European Union (EU) in 1992 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 have compelled development of a third ‘bloc’ within this economically dynamic but geostrategically contentious region of Asia between Europe and North America. In the 1990s Malaysia’s then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) or Group (EAEG) comprising exclusively East Asian nations. Resistance from some members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that would have been excluded from an exclusive East Asian regional group, especially the US, prevented progress. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 provided a new trigger, as some Asian nations felt abandoned by the international community. Japan presented an initiative for a regional financial mechanism, an Asian Monetary Fund, to rescue the afflicted Asian economies and prevent a repeat of the crisis. But again powerful opposition from Washington, this time through the IMF, ensured that the initiative collapsed. A move at that time to revive the EAEC/ EAEG idea did not produce a Group or a Caucus, but culminated in 1998 in the ASEANPlus Three (APT) dialogue process. The APTaims at greater regional economic coordination among China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN and is today the hinge around which a more formal EAC is being framed—or at least contested. In recent years the Japan–China regional leadership contest has built momentum for regional community building. In 2002 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro officially raised the idea of forming an EAC while visiting five ASEAN nations. This initiative re-triggered discussion and vigorous debate, and inevitably intensified regional power politics, rivalry and competition for leadership and influence. Vigorous trade and investment has already deepened intra-regional economic integration and interdependence between East Asian nations and it strengthens economic compulsions to pull together. But these compulsions must contend with powerful forces that divide: the strategic struggles, particularly between the region’s two great powers, Japan and China, with another rising power, India, in the wings. Membership of this community is hotly contested; while China pushes for East Asian nations exclusively, Japan pulls for a more

Japan’s Foreign Aid: Institutional Change and Shifting Policy Directions

Japan’s aid program has operated for 60 years, its origins tracing back to the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 that obliged Japan to pay war reparations. Although some Asian countries like India waived reparations, others entered into bilateral agreements with Japan in order to receive reparations: Burma in 1954, the Philippines in 1956, and Indonesia in 1958. Japan also provided some form of reparations to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, all through its official aid program. In October 1954, Tokyo began its modest foreign aid program by joining the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, while itself still a recipient of World Bank aid.

Between centrality and anxiety China in Australia

China’s centrality to Australia’s economy, migration, tourism, and student population is obvious today and likely to continue. And yet there appears to be anxiety among some in Australia about China’s ‘rise’, especially its growing military power, seemingly aggressive behaviour in disputed maritime space, global economic influence, and apparent quest for global leadership. This article analyses the two parallel realities (centrality and anxiety) of Australia’s relationship with China.