Brandon Valeriano

The dynamics of cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001-11

Much discussion of the concept of cyberwar, cyber conflict, and the changing dynamic of future security interactions is founded upon the study of what could be, conjured through spectacular flights of the imagination. The goal of this research article is to exhaustively collect information on cyber interactions between rival states in the last decade so that we can delineate the patterns of cyber conflict as reflected by evidence at the international level. The field of cyber security needs a clear return to social science in order to be able to definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures, and theory. To that end we provide a dataset of cyber incidents and cyber disputes that spans from 2001 to 2011. Our data include 110 cyber incidents and 45 cyber disputes. Further, we test our theory of cyber conflict which argues that restraint and regionalism should be expected, counter-intuitive to conventional wisdom. We find here that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals does not match with popular perception; 20 of 126 active rivals engaged in cyber conflict. The interactions that are uncovered are limited in terms of magnitude and frequency suggesting cyber restraint. Further, most of the cyber disputes that are uncovered are regional in tone, defying the unbounded nature of cyberpower. The coming era of cyber conflict may continue to exhibit these patterns despite fears mentioned in the discourse by the media and cyber security professionals.

Teaching Introduction to International Politics with Film

This article is an overview of a comprehensive film-based course that covers basic topics appropriate for an introduction to international relations (or world politics) course. Film provides a new and novel perspective by which to view international interactions. I explore how various aspects of international politics are covered by movies with attention focused on how these films can provide important educational lessons to guide course content. The course focuses on the topics of conflict, peace, and theories of international interactions, but others should adapt the content to meet their pedagogical or ideological needs. Emphasis is placed on using film to explain events and theory. The goal is to utilize movies to reach out to students unfamiliar with the processes of global affairs so that they will be motivated to move on to advanced topics and understand the basic issues in the field.

When States Die: geographic and territorial pathways to state death

Abstract State death, understood as the formal loss of control over foreign policy, is an important but neglected issue in the international relations literature. When do states die and why? How do states exit the system? The consequences of state death can be wide-ranging, from forced migration movements, regional instability, to general famine. Despite these severe consequences, political scientists have yet to adequately study the causes of state death. Fazal finds that states are prone to death when they are located as a buffer between two rivals; this suggests that being a buffer state is a cause of state death. Our expansion of current research seeks to add the concept of territorial disputes to the state death literature. We suggest that states are at greater risk of death when they become involved in territorial disputes that raise the stakes of conflict. The resulting research demonstrates that a reliable predictor of state death is engagement in a territorial dispute. Territorial disputes are the most prevalent issue that leads to war and can also be a leading cause of state death.

The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Interactions

Analysts suggest that the rise of the cyber domain of combat has led to a revolution in military affairs and have greatly changed how society interacts with the Internet. The structure and content of interactions on the battlefield have supposedly changed in light of this development. In the rush to note the changing face of conflict, few scholars have actually examined the impact of cyber conflict on foreign policy relationships. Here we use weekly events data to examine exactly what happens between countries when cyber conflict is utilized as a foreign policy choice. Using a previously constructed data set of cyber actions, we measure conflict and cooperation after a cyber operation to understand the true impact of this new way to arm a state and society. We find that only one method of cyber malice, denial of service, and one tactical goal, seeking a change in behavior in the opposing side, impacts conflict–cooperation dynamics between states.

Energy Salience and Situational Coercive Diplomacy: Comparison of Coercive Energy Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia

Uzbekistan is a country of about 26 million people in the Central Asian region of post-Soviet space and is one of the most opaque and authoritarian states of the former Soviet Union.1 When 23 local businessmen in the Uzbek city of Andijon of the Ferghana Valley, a region known for its disdain for the central government in Tashkent, were brought up on charges of Islamic extremism, 4,000 friends and relatives took to the streets beginning on 10 May 2005.2 According to American defense lawyer Melissa Hooper, “This is more about (the businessmen) acquiring economic clout, and perhaps refusing to pay the local authorities, than about any religious beliefs.”3 Beginning on the night of 12 May, these peaceful protests turned violent when some of the protestors attacked and seized weapons from a military post and also stormed a prison, releasing some 4,000 prisoners onto the streets. On 13 May 2005, Uzbek President Islam Karimov ordered troops into the city. Punishment for this outbreak of civil disobedience was swift and harsh; many innocent bystanders were struck by government weapons in the attempt to quell the rebellion, with reported death tolls ranging from 34 to several hundred.4 Known as “Bloody Friday,” this incident brought the eyes of the United States upon the remote country with scorn and accusations of human rights violations.5 In response, in July, Karimov ordered the expulsion of the American military from its airbase in Uzbekistan, which was being leased to the United States as an operations center for the War on Terror in Afghanistan.6

Introduction: New Forms of Coercive Power in the Putin Era

Russian power and its projection has been a key concern for international interactions since the birth of the modern state system. The downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 over Eastern Ukrainian territory on 17 July 2014 brought the ire of the international community upon President Vladimir Putin’s Russian government.1 British Prime Minister David Cameron likened Russia’s actions, which include supplying the ethnic Russian separatists fighting the Ukrainian government as well as annexing the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in March 2014, with the early warning signs that sparked both world wars of the 20th century. “In a way, this is what we see today in Europe. Ukraine is a country recognized by the United Nations, a country which has and should have every right to determine its own future…it has the right not to have its territorial integrity impugned by Russia.”2 United States President Barack Obama, referring to the separatists whom he acknowledged were being supported by Russia, called the tragedy “an outrage of unspeakable proportions.”3

Russia’s Foreign Policy Choices and the Application of Situational Coercive Diplomacy

Russian foreign policy in the modern era is based on traditional notions of strength and power determining actions and motives in the international realm. Even in an age when Russian power projection capabilities have been degraded, the goal remains to utilize coercive foreign policy means to achieve objectives with new forms of power.1 Nevertheless, Russian foreign policy dynamics are more complicated than simple power-maximizing behavior. Russian foreign policy is based on coercive diplomacy in a regional sphere of influence, according to certain contexts that motivate action or perceptions. Russia’s use of power politics tactics is limited to instances where it has a long-standing rivalry, the public supports such action, and when there are salient foreign policy issues at stake. The location or region where a foreign policy challenge arises is also an important context. Much like the American (Monroe) doctrine of regional control in the Western Hemisphere, Russia operates similarly in the Near Abroad region.2 In this chapter, we unpack these processes and suggest a framework to examine Russian security interests after the end of the Cold War. Russian power is on the rise, but this is a different power in that international constraints and the current security environment will hinder Russia’s ability to have a global influence on the actions of other states. This pushes Russia to utilize new forms of power such as cyber, energy, and maritime claims and legal power where they have not in the past.

Conclusion: Russian Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War

Russia is reemerging with new forms of power. It has seen a renaissance in its status due to a consistent political regime run by Putin and an explosion in energy revenues that coincided with Russia’s state takeover of its energy conglomerates, its burgeoning cyber power, and its preparation for the future with its growing Arctic maritime power. Thus it once again has the power and capabilities to be a strong political actor, but its international reach mostly applies to its immediate regional environment. Countries of the former Soviet Union have been subjected to the coercive diplomatic tactics that many states around the globe experienced during Soviet times. Russia is attempting to reclaim political control of its former empire through coercion. Any outside state that attempts to undermine Russian influence in the region is similarly met with coercive diplomacy of some form. It seems that former Soviet states that attempt to align with other power centers, such as the American-dominated West, are the ones who bear the brunt of Russia’s coercion for diplomatic subversion. Unfortunately for Russia, these tactics have not achieved the political ends it desires. Its more nuanced policy in the Arctic is paying off; however, the use of power politics in post-Soviet space only moves these states closer to the West.

Rivalry Persistence and the Case of the United States and Russia: From Global Rivalry to Regional Conflict

Researchers have noted that a certain group of states account for a disproportionate amount of conflict in the international system.1 These states are rivals, or long-standing enemies, addicted to reducing gains for the other side and apt to challenge the goals of their rival. We now know that rivals are highly dispute prone, experience frequent territorial disputes, and can disrupt international and regional power systems. Despite progress, current theories regarding the termination of rivalries appear incomplete because they ignore domestic factors and the “principal” rivalry concept. Our central premise in this chapter argues that theories of rivalry termination are underdeveloped and fail to account for the settlement of outstanding issues and sources of rivalry persistence at the domestic level of analysis. If both the issues at stake in a rivalry remain unsettled and perceptions continue to be adversarial, the rivalry situation will persist. If the rivalry situation persists, an important context that dictates foreign policy action is in operation. This provides the context for Russia’s use of new foreign policy tactics. Our argument is that the rivalry between Russia and US continues but has shifted in scope and fits with the reduced reliance on conventional forms of power.

Russian Foreign Policy in the Arctic Region: Issues, Preferences, and Conflict Moderation

In August 2007, a Russian expedition sent an unmanned submarine to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean and planted a Russian flag on the geographic North Pole. Canadian Foreign Minister Peter Mackay gave his opinion shortly thereafter: “This isn’t the fifteenth century. You can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘we’re claiming this territory.’”1 Echoes of this sentiment were heard from Western politicians in the United States and Europe. Russia is now deeply invested in the Arctic region, and the question we ask in this chapter is what sort of dynamics will this evolving situation lead to? What does it portend for Russian foreign policy?