Ryan C. Maness

The dynamics of cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001-11

Much discussion of the concept of cyberwar, cyber conflict, and the changing dynamic of future security interactions is founded upon the study of what could be, conjured through spectacular flights of the imagination. The goal of this research article is to exhaustively collect information on cyber interactions between rival states in the last decade so that we can delineate the patterns of cyber conflict as reflected by evidence at the international level. The field of cyber security needs a clear return to social science in order to be able to definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures, and theory. To that end we provide a dataset of cyber incidents and cyber disputes that spans from 2001 to 2011. Our data include 110 cyber incidents and 45 cyber disputes. Further, we test our theory of cyber conflict which argues that restraint and regionalism should be expected, counter-intuitive to conventional wisdom. We find here that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals does not match with popular perception; 20 of 126 active rivals engaged in cyber conflict. The interactions that are uncovered are limited in terms of magnitude and frequency suggesting cyber restraint. Further, most of the cyber disputes that are uncovered are regional in tone, defying the unbounded nature of cyberpower. The coming era of cyber conflict may continue to exhibit these patterns despite fears mentioned in the discourse by the media and cyber security professionals.

Russia and the Near Abroad: Applying a Risk Barometer for War

The steps-to-war theory has made important strides in uncovering the causes of interstate armed conflict. Scholars now have a reliable way to delineate the path to war or towards peace. This article explores the relationship between Russia and its ‘Near Abroad’ neighbors Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia to investigate the probability of war and conflict in the region during the post-Cold War era. Here, we create a risk barometer for war by combining recent empirical findings with qualitative foreign policy analysis. The analysis demonstrates Estonias probable successful path out of war with Russia, while the Ukraines growing risk for coming conflict increases as the variables of interest pile on. Georgia and Russia have already had a war that followed the path outlined in the theory and might battle again in the future based on our findings. This article demonstrates how an empirical theory of international relations behavior can be used to explore the potential for future conflict in the region so as to inform policy analysis.