Branko Urosevic

Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large Shareholder

We analyze the optimal trading and ownership policy of a large shareholder who must trade off diversification and monitoring incentives. Without commitment, the problem is similar to durable goods monopoly: the share price today depends on expected future trades. We show that the large shareholder ultimately trades to the competitive price‐taking allocation, even though it entails inefficient monitoring. With continuous trading, the large shareholder trades immediately to this allocation if moral hazard is weak enough that her private valuation of a share is decreasing in her stake. Otherwise, the large shareholder adjusts her stake gradually. We consider implications for asset pricing, IPO underpricing, and lockup provisions.

Bankruptcy Risk Model and Empirical Tests

We analyze the size dependence and temporal stability of firm bankruptcy risk in the US economy by applying Zipf scaling techniques. We focus on a single risk factor—the debt-to-asset ratio R—in order to study the stability of the Zipf distribution of R over time. We find that the Zipf exponent increases during market crashes, implying that firms go bankrupt with larger values of R. Based on the Zipf analysis, we employ Bayes’s theorem and relate the conditional probability that a bankrupt firm has a ratio R with the conditional probability of bankruptcy for a firm with a given R value. For 2,737 bankrupt firms, we demonstrate size dependence in assets change during the bankruptcy proceedings. Prepetition firm assets and petition firm assets follow Zipf distributions but with different exponents, meaning that firms with smaller assets adjust their assets more than firms with larger assets during the bankruptcy process. We compare bankrupt firms with nonbankrupt firms by analyzing the assets and liabilities of two large subsets of the US economy: 2,545 Nasdaq members and 1,680 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) members. We find that both assets and liabilities follow a Pareto distribution. The finding is not a trivial consequence of the Zipf scaling relationship of firm size quantified by employees—although the market capitalization of Nasdaq stocks follows a Pareto distribution, the same distribution does not describe NYSE stocks. We propose a coupled Simon model that simultaneously evolves both assets and debt with the possibility of bankruptcy, and we also consider the possibility of firm mergers.

Zipf rank approach and cross-country convergence of incomes

We employ a concept popular in physics —the Zipf rank approach— in order to estimate the number of years that EU members would need in order to achieve convergence of their per capita incomes. Assuming that trends in the past twenty years continue to hold in the future, we find that after t≈30 years both developing and developed EU countries indexed by i will have comparable values of their per capita gross domestic product . Besides the traditional Zipf rank approach we also propose a weighted Zipf rank method. In contrast to the EU block, on the world level the Zipf rank approach shows that, between 1960 and 2009, cross-country income differences increased over time. For a brief period during the 2007–2008 global economic crisis, at world level the of richer countries declined more rapidly than the of poorer countries, in contrast to EU where the of developing EU countries declined faster than the of developed EU countries, indicating that the recession interrupted the convergence between EU members. We propose a simple model of GDP evolution that accounts for the scaling we observe in the data.

European bond ETFs: tracking errors and the sovereign debt crisis

This study examines the tracking performance of 31 eurozone sovereign debt exchange traded index funds (ETFs) during 2007-2010. The tracking performance is assessed by four different tracking error models. Overall, funds underperform their respective benchmarks. Active returns (net of fees) vary substantially (from +46.74 to -30.36 basis points) and are of considerable economic interest. The significant differences in the performance of swap-based and in-kind funds highlight the importance of appropriate (e.g. correlation vs. cointegration based) metrics required for the assessment of funds adopting different replication methods. We also document important changes in the tracking performance due to the changing characteristics of EU sovereign bonds since the start of the sovereign debt crisis.

Optimal Loan Interest Rate Contract Design

This paper analyzes optimal loan interest rate contracts under conditions of risky, symmetric information for one-period (static) and multi-period (dynamic) models. The optimal loan interest rate depends upon the volatility of, and co-variation among the market interest rate, borrower collateral, and borrower income, as well as the time horizon and the risk preferences of lenders and borrowers. For a risk-averse borrower with stochastic collateral, variable interest rate contracts are, in general, Pareto optimal. For plausible assumptions, the optimal loan interest rate for the multi-period model often exhibits “muted” responses to changes in market interest rates, making fixed rate loans a reasonable approximation for the optimal loan. Hence, in the absence of optimal contracts, long-term (short-term) borrowers tend to prefer fixed rate (variable) contracts.

Noise and Aggregation of Information in Large Markets

We study the relation between noise (liquidity traders, endowment shocks) and the aggregation of information in financial markets with large number of agents. We show that as long as noise increases with the number of agents, the limiting equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivial information acquisition, even when per-capita noise tends to zero. In such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play different roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per-capita noise is finite. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, and information acquisition in multi-asset markets, showing that it leads to qualitatively different results with respect to those in the existing literature. Our conditions on noise are shown to be necessary and sufficient to have limiting economies with perfectly competitive behavior consistent with endogenous information acquisition.

Market risk management in a post-Basel II regulatory environment

We propose a novel method of Mean-Capital Requirement portfolio optimization. The optimization is performed using a parallel framework for optimization based on the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II. Capital requirements for market risk include an additional stress component introduced by the recent Basel 2.5 regulation. Our optimization with the Basel 2.5 formula in the objective function produces superior results to those of the old (Basel II) formula in stress scenarios in which the correlations of asset returns change considerably. These improvements are achieved at the expense of reduced cardinality of Pareto-optimal portfolios. This reduced cardinality (and thus portfolio diversification) in periods of relatively low market volatility may have unintended consequences for banks’ risk exposure.

Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of Reits

We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit, ex ante, to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines toward the competitive market allocation. Both the speed of adjustment and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a larger number of insiders, ceteris paribus. Using data from U.S. real estate investment trusts, we then test the model and find that the predictions of the model are verified empirically.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive’s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Classical p-adic space-time

A classical space-time manifold with p-adic valued coordinates is introduced and it is shown that special care is needed to distinguish space-like and time-like directions. Lorentz invariance and isometries of the manifold are derived. From a variational principle, it is shown how free particle motion satisfies a product formula.