Brendan O'Leary

The politics of antagonism : understanding Northern Ireland

Auditing the antagonism the colonial roots of antagonism - fateful triangles in Ulster, Ireland and Britain 1609-1920 exercising control - the second Protestant ascendancy 1920-1962 losing control - the collapse of the Unionist regime 1963-72 deadlock 1972-85 - the limits to British arbitration the making and meaning(s) of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985-9 - the limits to coercive consociationalism transcending antagonism? Resolving Northern Ireland in 1990s epilogue - the Brooke initiative and after, 1990- postscript - a tract of time between war and peace.

The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland

The merits of consociation as a means of solving the Northern Ireland conflict are presented through contrasting it with other ways of stabilizing highly divided political systems. Why voluntary consociation has been unsuccessful in Northern Ireland and unfortunately is likely to remain so is explained. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) must be understood against the background of the failure of previous consociational experiments. The AIA partly represented a shift in British strategy from voluntary to coercive consociationalism. The prospects for this coercive consociational strategy and variants on it are evaluated. Irish history is something Irishmen should never remember, and Englishmen should never forget.

An iron law of nationalism and federation?: A (neo‐Diceyian) theory of the necessity of a federal Staatsvolk, and of consociational rescue

A federal state requires for its formation two conditions. There must exist, in the first place, a body of countries _ so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of their inhabitants, an impress of common nationality _ A second condition absolutely essential to the founding of a federal system is the existence of a very peculiar _ sentiment _ the inhabitants _ must desire union, and must not desire unity _ Albert Venn Dicey (1915: 75)

Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?

This article questions the widely held assumption that pluri-national federations are likely to break down or break apart. It shows that the case against pluri-national federalism needs to be substantively qualified, and then outlines the conditions that facilitate successful pluri-national federations. The argument is preliminary in nature, but suggests a more balanced and nuanced account of the durability of pluri-national federations than is associated with either its critics or its arch-supporters.

On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism

Ernest Gellners is the best-known modernist explanatory theory of nationalism. This article summarizes its expression and development before considering its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion centres on Gellners functionalist mode of explanation, the place of nationalism in his philosophy of history, the predictive and retrodictive nature of his theory, and the merits of his typology of nationalism. The apolitical character of his writings is emphasized: in particular, though Gellner established the connections between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies, he did not emphasize the mutually reinforcing relationships between nationalism, egalitarianism and democratization; moreover, his contempt for nationalist doctrines is not something liberals, socialists and conservatives need share.

Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus Power-sharing

Would anyone imagine an international court telling the US government that the rules on eligibility for the Office of US President are incompatible with its international human rights commitments and therefore must be amended? The authors present this unlikely—though certainly thought-provoking—futuristic scenario to juxtapose it with a real case adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights some time ago. In the 2009 case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 the Court found some of the respondent state’s constitutional provisions discriminatory, as they impeded the applicants (citizens of Bosnia) from standing for parliamentary or presidential elections due to their ethnic background. The applicants, identifying themselves to be of Roma or Jewish origin, respectively, were ineligible for elections according to domestic law since they did not declare affiliation to any of the “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. Bosniacs, Croats, or Serbs. This case led the authors to ask crucial questions as to international courts’ faculty in pronouncing on constitutional rules being part of political power-sharing bargains known as “consociations.” Arguably, the idea of “consociationalism” sounds more familiar to political scientists than it does to human rights lawyers. The authors begin by explaining the notion as “an alternative strategy for managing differences” within democratic societies by means of “institutional arrangements that combine principles of parity, proportionality, autonomy, and veto rights.”2 Notwithstanding their doctrinal nuances and practical implications, consociations assume cross-community power-sharing, co-decision making rules, various forms of self-governmental autonomy, proportional allocation of representatives and public expenditures, and veto rights granted to each community in order to protect its vital interests. The Bosnian Constitution might serve as a standard example of such an arrangement. It is also noteworthy that consociational features are present in several other power-sharing deals throughout the world, including Belgium, Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and Burundi. Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary recall that some scholars find consociational principles hardly reconcilable with the very foundations of human rights thinking. Essential as the powersharing arrangements are—or may be— for maintaining political stability among diversified communities, consociations indeed cause some uneasiness from the human rights point of view. They might imply a potential risk of discrimination due to race, ethnicity, religion, or language, as well as infringements on the right to participate in the political process on equal terms with others. Admittedly, consociational agreements usually do not overprivilege the individualist paradigm or the principle of equal participation in the political process. The authors address some of these concerns, noting, however, that human rights are far from absent in

Five fallacies: Northern Ireland and the liabilities of liberalism

Abstract Five fallacies in the misinterpretation of conflict in Northern Ireland, which are characteristic of liberal readings of ethno‐national conflicts, are identified and criticized in this article: (i) blaming the conflict on extremist political and religious elites; (ii) assuming that the conflict has fundamental economic and material foundations; (iii) assuming that the conflict flows from archaic religious or non‐religious political cultures; (iv) assuming that segregation is the key social and structural cause of conflict; and (v) assuming that individual discrimination is the primary motor of antagonisms. The authors insist on the ethno‐national nature of the conflict and the need for appropriate political means to address it.

How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity

Preface PART I. EVALUATING THE U.S.-LED INTERVENTION IN IRAQ Chapter 1. The Bush Administrations Formal Goals Chapter 2. Bipartisan Congressional Goals for Iraq Chapter 3. The Imputed Goals of the Bush Administration PART II. THE CASE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE WITHDRAWAL Chapter 4. Costs, Sunk Costs, and Potential Benefits Chapter 5. Securing the Iraqi Federation for All Its Peoples PART III. LEAVING WITH INTEGRITY Chapter 6. Respecting Iraqs Constitutional Integrity Chapter 7. Respecting Iraqs Territorial Integrity Chapter 8. Informing, Calming, and Working with the Neighbors. Chapter 9. Cleaning Up Without Ruling Appendices 1. On Difficulties in Counting Deaths in Iraq 2. Xenophobia, Sexism, In-Group Solidarity, Traditional Religiosity, and Democratic Dispositions in Iraq Notes Index Acknowledgments and Sources

The Anglo‐Irish agreement: Folly or statecraft?

This article analyses the significance of the Anglo‐Irish Agreement, and using research and interview material critically assesses explanations as to why it was signed. An interim evaluation of the consequences of the Agreement up to 12 July 1986 is made before considering the prospects of the Agreements survival. A brief normative defence of the Agreement is also presented.

Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of Northern Ireland

Abstract Power-sharing coalitions in deeply divided places can take centripetal or consociational forms. Respectively, these aim to foster moderation and inclusivity by restricting coalitions to moderate parties or proportionately to incorporate the main political forces. Using the case of Northern Ireland (1973–2015), this article assesses the merits of a particular consociational coalition, based on sequential and proportional allocation rules, by contrast with centripetal (and alternative consociational) coalitions. Sequential and proportional coalitions have clear constitutional design advantages that deserve more attention from academics and policy-makers concerned with the government of deeply divided places.