Brent L. Hughes

The neural bases of distraction and reappraisal

Distraction and reappraisal are two commonly used forms of cognitive emotion regulation. Functional neuroimaging studies have shown that each one depends upon interactions between pFC, interpreted as implementing cognitive control, and limbic regions, interpreted as mediating emotional responses. However, no study has directly compared distraction with reappraisal, and it remains unclear whether they draw upon different neural mechanisms and have different emotional consequences. The present fMRI study compared distraction and reappraisal and found both similarities and differences between the two forms of emotion regulation. Both resulted in decreased negative affect, decreased activation in the amygdala, and increased activation in prefrontal and cingulate regions. Relative to distraction, reappraisal led to greater decreases in negative affect and to greater increases in a network of regions associated with processing affective meaning (medial prefrontal and anterior temporal cortices). Relative to reappraisal, distraction led to greater decreases in amygdala activation and to greater increases in activation in prefrontal and parietal regions. Taken together, these data suggest that distraction and reappraisal differentially engage neural systems involved in attentional deployment and cognitive reframing and have different emotional consequences.

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Processes in Emotion Generation Common and Distinct Neural Mechanisms

Emotions are generally thought to arise through the interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes. However, prior work has not delineated their relative contributions. In a sample of 20 females, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to compare the neural correlates of negative emotions generated by the bottom-up perception of aversive images and by the top-down interpretation of neutral images as aversive. We found that (a) both types of responses activated the amygdala, although bottom-up responses did so more strongly; (b) bottom-up responses activated systems for attending to and encoding perceptual and affective stimulus properties, whereas top-down responses activated prefrontal regions that represent high-level cognitive interpretations; and (c) self-reported affect correlated with activity in the amygdala during bottom-up responding and with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during top-down responding. These findings provide a neural foundation for emotion theories that posit multiple kinds of appraisal processes and help to clarify mechanisms underlying clinically relevant forms of emotion dysregulation.

Neural systems supporting the control of affective and cognitive conflicts

Although many studies have examined the neural bases of controlling cognitive responses, the neural systems for controlling conflicts between competing affective responses remain unclear. To address the neural correlates of affective conflict and their relationship to cognitive conflict, the present study collected whole-brain fMRI data during two versions of the Eriksen flanker task. For these tasks, participants indicated either the valence (affective task) or the semantic category (cognitive task) of a central target word while ignoring flanking words that mapped onto either the same (congruent) or a different (incongruent) response as the target. Overall, contrasts of incongruent > congruent trials showed that bilateral dorsal ACC, posterior medial frontal cortex, and dorsolateral pFC were active during both kinds of conflict, whereas rostral medial pFC and left ventrolateral pFC were differentially active during affective or cognitive conflict, respectively. Individual difference analyses showed that separate regions of rostral cingulate/ventromedial pFC and left ventrolateral pFC were positively correlated with the magnitude of response time interference. Taken together, the findings that controlling affective and cognitive conflicts depends upon both common and distinct systems have important implications for understanding the organization of control systems in general and their potential dysfunction in clinical disorders.

Orbitofrontal Cortex and Anterior Cingulate Cortex Are Modulated by Motivated Social Cognition

Neural research on social cognition has not examined motivations known to influence social cognition. One fundamental motivation in social cognition is positivity motivation, that is, the desire to view close others in an overly positive light. Positivity motivation does not extend to non-close others. The current functional magnetic resonance imaging study is the first to identify neural regions modulated by positivity motivation. Participants compared the personalities of a close other (i.e., romantic partner) and a non-close other (i.e., roommate) with their average peer. Romantic partners were perceived as above average under certain conditions; roommates were perceived as similar to an average peer across conditions. Neural regions previously associated with social cognition did not significantly relate to positivity motivation. Instead, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and, to a lesser extent, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activation increased when social targets were perceived as similar to an average peer. Furthermore, OFC activity negatively correlated with the extent to which a social target was perceived as above average. Intimacy with the social target modulated the extent to which ventral ACC distinguished positive from negative stimuli. The results expand current knowledge about neural regions associated with social cognition and provide initial information needed to create neural models of social cognition.

Protecting the self: The effect of social-evaluative threat on neural representations of self

One of the most robust ways that people protect themselves from social-evaluative threat is by emphasizing the desirability of their personal characteristics, yet the neural underpinnings of this fundamental process are unknown. The current fMRI study addresses this question by examining self-evaluations of desirability (in comparison with other people) as a response to threat. Participants judged how much personality traits described themselves in comparison with their average peer. These judgments were preceded by threatening or nonthreatening social-evaluative feedback. Self-evaluations made in response to threat significantly increased activation in a number of regions including the OFC, medial pFC, lateral pFC, amygdala, and insula. Individual differences in the extent to which threat increased desirability were significantly correlated with medial OFC activity. This is the first study to examine the neural associations of a fundamental self-protection strategy: responding to threat by emphasizing the selfs desirability. Although neural research has separately examined self-evaluation processes from the regulation of social-evaluative threat, little is known about the interplay between the two. The findings build on this previous research by showing that regions, often associated with self-evaluation, are modulated by the degree to which people respond to threat by emphasizing their own desirability.

Medial orbitofrontal cortex is associated with shifting decision thresholds in self-serving cognition.

Recent research has begun to identify neural regions associated with self-serving cognition, that is, the tendency to make claims that cast the self in an overly flattering light, yet little is known about the mechanisms supported by neural activation underlying self-serving cognition. One possibility suggested by current research is that MOFC, a region that shows reduced recruitment in relation to self-serving cognition, may support changes in the decision thresholds that influence whether information should be expressed in an evaluation. The current fMRI study addresses this question by combining a signal detection approach and a contextual manipulation that permits the measurement of changes in decision threshold. Participants evaluated their familiarity with blocks of existent and nonexistent information when they believed that self-serving claims of knowledge could either be exposed (accountable condition) or not (unaccountable condition). When held accountable, participants tended to shift their decision thresholds in a conservative (i.e., less self-serving) direction and showed greater activation in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Furthermore, the extent to which participants adopted more conservative (i.e., less self-serving) decision thresholds as a function of context (i.e., accountability), the more they recruited MOFC activation. These findings refine current knowledge about the mechanisms performed by neural regions involved in self-serving cognition and suggest a role for MOFC in changing decision thresholds that influence whether information should be expressed in an evaluation.

Power Heightens Sensitivity to Unfairness Against the Self

Power is accompanied by a sense of entitlement, which shapes reactions to self-relevant injustices. We propose that powerful people more strongly expect to be treated fairly and are faster to perceive unjust treatment that violates these expectations. After preliminary data demonstrated that power leads people to expect fair outcomes for themselves, we conducted four experiments. Participants primed with high (vs. low) power were faster to identify violations of distributive justice in which they were victims (Study 1). This effect was specific to self-relevant injustices (Study 2) and generalized to violations of interpersonal justice (Study 3). Finally, participants primed with high power were more likely to take action against unfair treatment (Study 4). These findings suggest a process by which hierarchies may be maintained: Whereas the powerless are comparatively less sensitive to unfair treatment, the powerful may retain their social standing by quickly perceiving and responding to self-relevant injustices.

Trusting outgroup, but not ingroup members, requires control: neural and behavioral evidence

Abstract Trust and cooperation often break down across group boundaries, contributing to pernicious consequences, from polarized political structures to intractable conflict. As such, addressing such conflicts require first understanding why trust is reduced in intergroup settings. Here, we clarify the structure of intergroup trust using neuroscientific and behavioral methods. We found that trusting ingroup members produced activity in brain areas associated with reward, whereas trusting outgroup members produced activity in areas associated with top-down control. Behaviorally, time pressure—which reduces people’s ability to exert control—reduced individuals’ trust in outgroup, but not ingroup members. These data suggest that the exertion of control can help recover trust in intergroup settings, offering potential avenues for reducing intergroup failures in trust and the consequences of these failures.

Motivation alters impression formation and related neural systems.

Abstract Observers frequently form impressions of other people based on complex or conflicting information. Rather than being objective, these impressions are often biased by observers’ motives. For instance, observers often downplay negative information they learn about ingroup members. Here, we characterize the neural systems associated with biased impression formation. Participants learned positive and negative information about ingroup and outgroup social targets. Following this information, participants worsened their impressions of outgroup, but not ingroup, targets. This tendency was associated with a failure to engage neural structures including lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, Insula and Precuneus when processing negative information about ingroup (but not outgroup) targets. To the extent that participants engaged these regions while learning negative information about ingroup members, they exhibited less ingroup bias in their impressions. These data are consistent with a model of ‘effortless bias’, under which perceivers fail to process goal-inconsistent information in order to maintain desired conclusions.