Brent Simpson

Sex, Fear, and Greed: A Social Dilemma Analysis of Gender and Cooperation

Results from previous studies have led many researchers to conclude that sex has no effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. This article reconciles strong theoretical expectations of sex differences in cooperation with the dearth of empirical evidence for such differences. I show that several theories of sex- or gender-related behavior suggest we should expect males and females to respond more strongly to greed and fear, respectively, in social dilemmas. I argue that previous research has failed to find differences because researchers have consistently used the Prisoners Dilemma game (or its public goods variants) to investigate whether sex affects cooperation. Because Prisoners Dilemma contains both fear and greed, the theories outlined in this article predict no sex differences in cooperation in Prisoners Dilemma. A series of hypotheses about the conditions under which sex affects cooperation are proposed and tested against the results of two new studies. Results from both studies support two of the three hypotheses. I conclude by discussing some implications of the findings for collective action and inequality and by suggesting directions for future research.

Network exchange theory : Recent developments and new directions

The new millennium opens the third decade of work on network exchange theory. During two decades of continuous growth, the program has been tested as intensively and extensively as any in sociology. This article summarizes existing research and describes new directions. First, we describe basic network connections and recently discovered structural power conditions that sharply affect exchange ratios. Then we show how game theory enhances understanding of collective action in exchange networks. Two new research programs link network exchange theory to status characteristics theory: the first demonstrates that power produces status, and the second shows how status value produces power. Finally, we discuss how questions about network dynamics, complexity, and legitimation define paths for future theory growth.

Status Hierarchies and the Organization of Collective Action

Most work on collective action assumes that group members are undifferentiated by status, or standing, in the group. Yet such undifferentiated groups are rare, if they exist at all. Here we extend an existing sociological research program to address how extant status hierarchies help organize collective actions by coordinating how much and when group members should contribute to group efforts. We outline three theoretically derived predictions of how status hierarchies organize patterns of behavior to produce larger public goods. We review existing evidence relevant to two of the three hypotheses and present results from a preliminary experimental test of the third. Findings are consistent with the model. The tendency of these dynamics to lead status-differentiated groups to produce larger public goods may help explain the ubiquity of hierarchy in groups, despite the often negative effects of status inequalities for many group members.

Power, Identity, and Collective Action in Social Exchange

Our research aims to bring collective action back into the study of structural determinants of power in social exchange. Previous research has focused primarily on the bargaining power of actors whose locations in exchange networks confer different risks of exclusion. We argue that structural position affects not only bargaining power but also the ability of low-power actors to organize against unequal bargaining power. We hypothesize that collective action among low-power actors is facilitated by identification with others who are structurally disadvantaged. We test two identity-theoretic expected utility models that specify how actors in a mixed-motive coalition game might take into account the payoffs to others in structurally equivalent positions. In the utilitarian model, actors maximize the greatest good to the greatest number. In the collectivist model, actors also seek to minimize in-group inequality. Results show some support for the utilitarian model among female participants and strong support for the collectivist model among both males and females. We speculate about causes of gender differences and identify directions for future exchange-theoretic research on social identity and socially embedded collective action.

Does Power Affect Perception in Social Networks? Two Arguments and an Experimental Test*

This research investigates competing arguments about the relationship between power and perception in social networks. One line of research predicts that occupants of structurally advantaged positions have more accurate perceptions of ties in their networks (i.e., who is tied to whom); another line asserts that lower-power actors have more accurate perceptions. On the basis of previous work, we suggest that any relationship between power and perception (whether positive or negative) will be mediated by the distance between the perceiver and relevant ties. We explicate these arguments and test them experimentally. The results suggest that as distance between the perceiver and the tie increases, low-power actors have more accurate perceptions of the network than high-power actors.

Much Ado About Deception

Social scientists have intensely debated the use of deception in experimental research, and conflicting norms governing the use of deception are now firmly entrenched along disciplinary lines. Deception is typically allowed in sociology and social psychology but proscribed in economics. Notably, disagreements about the use of deception are generally not based on ethical considerations but on pragmatic grounds: the anti-deception camp argues that deceiving participants leads to invalid results, while the other side argues that deception has little negative impact and, under certain conditions, can even enhance validity. These divergent norms governing the use of deception are important because they stifle interdisciplinary research and discovery, create hostilities between disciplines and researchers, and can negatively impact the careers of scientists who may be sanctioned for following the norms of their home discipline. We present two experimental studies aimed at addressing the issue empirically. Study 1 addresses the effects of direct exposure to deception, while Study 2 addresses the effects of indirect exposure to deception. Results from both studies suggest that deception does not significantly affect the validity of experimental results.

Trust and embedded markets: A multi-method investigation of consumer transactions

Previous work shows that, as the buyers uncertainty about the quality of some good or service increases, so does the tendency to purchase that good or service via embedded transactions, rather than from strangers. While this previous work explains variation in embedded exchange across different types of purchases, it does not address variation in embedded exchange across persons. Our research integrates the embeddedness and trust literatures to explain variation in within-network exchanges based on an interaction of the purchasers generalized trust and the level of uncertainty entailed in the purchase (i.e., whether there exists an incentive for the seller to misrepresent the quality of some good or service). For purchases involving uncertainty, low-trusters will tend to forgo risky transactions with strangers, opting instead for the increased certainty of embedded markets. High-trusters, on the other hand, will be more likely to transact with strangers (despite the increased risk), from whom they can often find better deals. We should not expect any differences between high- and low-trusters for products that do not entail uncertainty. Results from two data sources, responses from a nationally representative survey of the U.S. population and behavioral responses in new laboratory experiments, provide support for the arguments.

Network knowledge and the use of power

Complementing recent work on the effects of power on network perceptions, we offer a theory specifying how knowledge of network structures and exchange processes differentially affect the use of power by advantaged and disadvantaged positions. We argue that under certain conditions, network knowledge is beneficial to occupants of low-power positions, but not to occupants of high-power positions. Any low-power actor can benefit from having superior information, but if all low-power actors have equally sound knowledge, then all are worse off—a type of social trap. We tested these arguments by manipulating power and the availability of information on network structure and exchange processes in an experimental exchange network setting. The results were supportive.

Does a “Norm of Self-Interest” Discourage Prosocial Behavior? Rationality and Quid Pro Quo in Charitable Giving:

Previous studies by Holmes, Miller, and Lerner (2002) support the norm of self-interest and exchange fiction hypotheses. Together these arguments state that people want to act on compassionate feelings (e.g., by donating to charities) but are reluctant to do so if they cannot justify their behavior as being in line with their own self-interest. Thus a person will be more likely to contribute to a charity when he or she receives a product in exchange for the contribution. This exchange fiction gives the person egoistic cover for the compassionate act. In this paper we critically evaluate the evidence for this line of reasoning and offer an alternative explanation for that evidence based on cognitive dissonance theory. We report the results of a new field experiment designed to tease apart the exchange fiction argument and the alternative approach. Results of the study support our application of dissonance theory over the exchange fiction account.

Strong ties promote the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks

Abstract Research on the evolution of cooperation in networked populations has assumed that ties are simply present or absent. Here we bring relational sociological insights about the strength of ties to bear on the problem of cooperation in dynamic networks. We argue that the value of ties affects their strength, which in turn promotes cooperation. We evaluate this argument with two studies. First, results from an agent-based model are consistent with the logic of our argument and are robust across a variety of initial conditions. Second, results from a controlled laboratory experiment with human participants support the key predictions. Across both studies we demonstrate that tie strength, operationalized as relationship duration, mediates the impact of tie value on cooperation.