Kyle Irwin

Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare

Solutions to social dilemmas require cooperation. Given that there are commonly multiple avenues for cooperation, sometimes social dilemmas require coordination of strategies in addition to sufficient cooperation to be successful. This study examines one social dilemma where such coordination is necessary: supporting the general welfare. Using World Values Survey data from 33 nations, we compare active membership in charitable organizations versus attitudes toward government welfare programs as examples of two different types of cooperation. We argue that culture influences the form of cooperation a group adopts via the amount of trust it generates. Specifically, individualist cultures promote relatively high levels of trust, which produce first-order cooperation (here, involvement in charitable organizations). Collectivist cultures generate relatively low trust levels, facilitating second-order cooperation (here, greater support for government welfare programs). Findings support our arguments and thus suggest that culture, mediated by trust, shapes individuals’ perceptions about creating and sustaining public goods.

A normative explanation of antisocial punishment

While much research shows that people punish free-riders, recent studies find evidence that people also engage in antisocial punishment. That is, they sometimes punish those who contribute generously to collective actions. Such sanctioning is puzzling because generous individuals increase the welfare of all group members. When and why are such individuals punished? In this paper, we propose that descriptive norms are part of the explanation. People may sanction those whose behavior is atypical - even when that behavior benefits the group. We test our theory with a laboratory experiment. We examine the effect of descriptive norms on sanctioning of generous and stingy deviants and find that descriptive norms encourage antisocial punishment, but not punishment of free-riders.

Trust, Culture, and Cooperation: A Social Dilemma Analysis of Pro-Environmental Behaviors

Social dilemmas require a choice between cooperation, or sacrificing for the greater good, and self-interest. One commonly studied social dilemma is environmental conservation. Previous work suggests that trust predicts cooperation in the form of environmental protection. We contend that this view ignores cultural factors. Building on prior cross-cultural research, we predict an interaction between strength of social ties and trust on cooperation. Findings from General Social Survey data indicate that low trust levels found in the U.S. South (a collectivist culture) renders trust ineffective at promoting environmental protection. However, trust predicts cooperation in nonsouthern regions (which are more individualist), where trust levels are higher.

Does a “Norm of Self-Interest” Discourage Prosocial Behavior? Rationality and Quid Pro Quo in Charitable Giving:

Previous studies by Holmes, Miller, and Lerner (2002) support the norm of self-interest and exchange fiction hypotheses. Together these arguments state that people want to act on compassionate feelings (e.g., by donating to charities) but are reluctant to do so if they cannot justify their behavior as being in line with their own self-interest. Thus a person will be more likely to contribute to a charity when he or she receives a product in exchange for the contribution. This exchange fiction gives the person egoistic cover for the compassionate act. In this paper we critically evaluate the evidence for this line of reasoning and offer an alternative explanation for that evidence based on cognitive dissonance theory. We report the results of a new field experiment designed to tease apart the exchange fiction argument and the alternative approach. Results of the study support our application of dissonance theory over the exchange fiction account.

The Trouble with Invisible Men

Traditionally, research on the causes of prosocial behavior – acts that benefit others, often at a cost to the self – has focused on the role of either material incentives or altruistic motivations in fostering generosity. Here, we review research on a third class of explanation based on reputation. In recent years, research on the interplay between prosocial behavior and reputation has drawn the attention of researchers from disciplines as diverse as economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and biology, along the way establishing complex, reciprocal links between reputational standing and generosity. Here, we review some promising strains of research in this area, focusing on the dynamics of reputational gain as a reward encouraging prosociality, how reputation systems are maintained in groups, and evolutionary models relating reputation and prosocial behavior. This review establishes that (1) individuals receive diverse social and material benefits for developing a reputation as a generous person, (2) these rewards for prosocial behavior influence decisions to behave prosocially in at least two theoretically distinct ways, (3) reputational differentiation, in terms of status, structures contributions to group efforts in ways that can make groups more productive, (4) reputations are critical to the maintenance of informal, social sanctioning systems, (5) reputation systems are maintained in part because individuals spontaneously share information on others’ past levels of prosocial behavior, and (6) reputational dynamics may have encouraged the evolution of prosociality via biological and/or cultural evolution.

The Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Intragroup Trust

Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, a growing body of research finds that punishment systems generate a range of negative side effects, including an undermining of trust in fellow group members’ cooperative intentions. The present work asks whether reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems (increased cooperation) without the negative side effects (decreased interpersonal trust) or whether reward systems also lead to detrimental effects on trust. In two experiments we find that once removed, reward systems, like punishment systems, reduced trust to levels below a control group who never experienced sanctions. This research highlights the detrimental effects of punishment and reward systems on intragroup trust and thus shows that while reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems, they also generate the same negative side effects.

The Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Intragroup Trust Comparing Punishments and Rewards

Recent work shows that both reward and punishment systems increase short-term cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, a growing body of research finds that punishment systems generate a range of negative side effects, including an undermining of trust in fellow group members’ cooperative intentions. The present work asks whether reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems (increased cooperation) without the negative side effects (decreased interpersonal trust) or whether reward systems also lead to detrimental effects on trust. In two experiments we find that once removed, reward systems, like punishment systems, reduced trust to levels below a control group who never experienced sanctions. This research highlights the detrimental effects of punishment and reward systems on intragroup trust and thus shows that while reward systems can generate the same positive effects as punishment systems, they also generate the same negative side effects.

Gender, trust and cooperation in environmental social dilemmas.

This research addresses gender differences in environmental protection efforts. Recent work indicates that, across a variety of domains, women are more generous, charitable, and prosocial than men. Despite above-average levels of these motivators for cooperation, considerable experimental research points to no difference in cooperation between genders. What can explain womens lower-than-expected cooperation levels? Prior research indicates that, compared to men, women are less trusting and respond to fear incentives in social dilemmas - they are concerned about being exploited. We test these arguments in the context of environmental behaviors and argue that lower trust and greater responses to fear incentives mean that womens cooperation is predicated on trust. For men, trust does not predict environmental cooperation. The current research represents the first empirical test of these arguments. Using data from the General Social Survey we focus on private sphere behaviors and political participation and predict an interaction between gender and trust on cooperation. Results support this prediction.

Sympathy and Social Order

Social order is possible only if individuals forgo the narrow pursuit of self-interest for the greater good. For over a century, social scientists have argued that sympathy mitigates self-interest and recent empirical work supports this claim. Much less is known about why actors experience sympathy in the first place, particularly in fleeting interactions with strangers, where cooperation is especially uncertain. We argue that perceived interdependence increases sympathy towards strangers. Results from our first study, a vignette experiment, support this claim and suggests a situational solution to social dilemmas. Meanwhile, previous work points to two strong individual-level predictors of cooperation: generalized trust and social values. In Study Two we address the intersection of situational and individual-level explanations to ask: does situational sympathy mediate these individual-level predictors of cooperation? Results from the second study, a laboratory experiment, support our hypotheses that sympathy mediates the generalized trust-cooperation link and the relationship between social values and cooperation. The paper concludes with a discussion of limitations of the present work and directions for future research.

Metanorms and antisocial punishment

Abstract Contributions to public goods benefit all group members, yet research shows that generous group members are sometimes punished. We argue that when such antisocial punishment efforts are public, the consistency of group member contributions will encourage individuals to punish atypically generous group members. Similarly, when behavior of group members is consistent, the publicness of punishment will increase antisocial punishment. Both of these effects will be weaker for individuals who are interested in getting to know the generous deviant. We test our hypotheses in a public goods experiment and find support. Our findings contribute to the norms literature, in particular, to understanding of antisocial punishment.