Brett Edwards

A life scientist, an engineer and a social scientist walk into a lab: challenges of dual-use engagement and education in synthetic biology

The discussion of dual-use education is often predicated on a discrete population of practicing life scientists exhibiting certain deficiencies in awareness or expertise. This has lead to the claim that there is a greater requirement for awareness raising and education amongst this population. However, there is yet to be an inquiry into the impact of the ‘convergent’ nature of emerging techno-sciences upon the prospects of dual-use education. The field of synthetic biology, although often portrayed as homogeneous, is in fact composed of various sub-fields and communities. Its practitioners have diverse academic backgrounds. The research institutions that have fostered its development in the UK often have their own sets of norms and practices in engagement with ethical, legal and social issues associated with scientific knowledge and technologies. The area is also complicated by the emergence of synthetic biologists outside traditional research environments, the so called ‘do-it-yourself’ or ‘garage biologists’. This paper untangles some of the complexities in the current state of synthetic biology and addresses the prospects for dual-use education for practitioners. It provides a short overview of the field and discusses identified dual-use issues. There follows a discussion of UK networks in synthetic biology, including their engagement with ethical, legal, social and dual-use issues and limited educational efforts in relation to these. It concludes by outlining options for developing a more systematic dual-use education strategy for synthetic biology.

From Cases to Capacity? A Critical Reflection on the Role of ‘Ethical Dilemmas’ in the Development of Dual-Use Governance

The dual-use issue is often framed as a series of paralyzing ‘dilemmas’ facing the scientific community as well as institutions which support innovation. While this conceptualization of the dual-use issue can be useful in certain contexts (such as in awareness-raising and as part of educational activities directed at the scientific community) its usefulness is more limited when reflecting on the governance and politics of the dual-use issue. Within this paper, key shortcomings of the dilemma framing are outlined. It is argued that many of the issues raised in the most recent debates about ‘dual-use’ bird flu research remain unresolved. This includes questions about the trajectories of certain lines of research, as well as broader trends in the practice and governance of science. This leads to difficult questions about current approaches to the dual-use issue within the US, as well as internationally.

Point of View: A transatlantic perspective on 20 emerging issues in biological engineering

Advances in biological engineering are likely to have substantial impacts on global society. To explore these potential impacts we ran a horizon scanning exercise to capture a range of perspectives on the opportunities and risks presented by biological engineering. We first identified 70 potential issues, and then used an iterative process to prioritise 20 issues that we considered to be emerging, to have potential global impact, and to be relatively unknown outside the field of biological engineering. The issues identified may be of interest to researchers, businesses and policy makers in sectors such as health, energy, agriculture and the environment.

Taking Stock of Security Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology in an Age of Responsible Innovation

In early May, the German Ethics Council produced an in-depth report on the oversight of dual-use research of concern (DURC) (1). The report follows in the wake of recent international emergency reviews of avian influenza research and builds on discussions, which have been taking place internationally for over a decade (2). In addition to calling for greater awareness raising and education in the scientific community, the report also calls for the establishment of a new legal framework to address DURC within Germany. This framework would provide a legal definition of DURC and would require researchers to report to a newly established central DURC committee before embarking on certain lines of research. Such a legal framework would also generate new responsibilities for those outside the research team who impact upon the research process; from funding right through to publication. For example, this would include new legal responsibilities for Laboratory Biosecurity Officers. Such an approach would be in stark contrast to the patch-work of largely voluntary measures, which are in place in the rest of the world. The German Ethics Council has also taken the view that Germany should encourage the adoption of similar review models at EU level and internationally.

The politics of international chemical weapon justice: The case of Syria, 2011–2017

ABSTRACT There has been near-universal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. The international community has nevertheless struggled to make progress on holding the perpetrators to account. This article reviews developments at the international level in terms of Syrian chemical weapon justice between 2011 and 2017. It argues that there have been substantive disagreements between states on the rationale and means of justice in the Syrian case. It also argues that international initiatives have been tightly intertwined with developments in chemical disarmament and conflict resolution processes as well as the broader war. The article describes progress and challenges to chemical weapon justice in a number of distinct formal international mechanisms during the period studied. The analysis concludes by contextualizing international responses—including the U.S. tomahawk strikes against a Syrian airbase—to the Khan Shaykhun chemical attacks of April 2017.

What counts as the hostile use of chemicals

Acid violence (AV), that is the deliberate use of acid (or alkalis)1 to attack another human being, is a frequent occurrence around the world. Yet, although clearly reliant on the hostile exploitation of chemicals, acid attacks are rarely described as chemical weapon attacks within the parlance of international diplomacy. This is somewhat of an anomaly when one considers the increasing attention given to terrorism at both the national and international level. Within this chapter we explore the significance of this apparent anomaly for our understanding of how chemical weapon issues are framed as political problems. In particular we examine how such processes shape which issues get attention and lead to others being ignored.

Escaping the False Dilemma of Strategic Nuclear and Biological Deterrence

Seth Baum’s proposal has been understood as naı̈ve and misguided by several academics and experts working in disarmament and has been subject to sustained criticism. They claim that Baum’s thought experiment relies on a grossly oversimplified understanding of the nature of, and relationship between, biological and nuclear security. Historically, faith in nuclear deterrence has contributed to the decision of at least one state to limit its biological weapon aspirations. However, this does not mean that the international norm against biological weapons is, or should be, subservient to the nuclear disarmament challenge. Indeed, as Nicholas Sims notes in making this point, from a disarmament perspective it is the nuclear sector which lags behind the international biological and chemical weapon treaties. Furthermore, analysis of historical programmes as well as contemporary assessments of biological weapons clearly points to the conclusion that biological weapons are neither strategically, technically or ethically suitable replacements for existing nuclear stockpiles. This means that Dr Baum’s approach is in no way reconcilable with the understandings of those who have critiqued his work publicly. As I have noted previously, Baum’s tentative hypothesis is not convincing enough to overturn the major canons of biological disarmament. Furthermore, it would be misguided to invest time and effort assessing this particular policy programme, in both ethical and practical terms. The key value of Baum’s academic thought experiment has been that the paper has stimulated reflection on the reasons why biological weapons are not, and should not be, part of today’s military arsenals. Such a discussion is important, as in recent years the question of ‘why’ biological weapons are prohibited has often taken a backseat to the distinct question of ‘how’ biological weapons are prohibited. It is apparent, for example, that the emergence of concerns about terrorism since 2001 has contributed to further stigmatization of biological weapons, which has meant that less emphasis has been placed on the need for reflection upon why all forms of biological weaponry are prohibited. There are of course a wide range of reasons why such prohibitions continue, which go beyond those immediately elicited by Baum’s proposal. With this in mind, I want to take the opportunity afforded by this symposium to outline two key approaches to arguing against Baum’s proposal. The first approach, which I refer to as the ‘modular’ approach, accepts, for the purposes of argument, the initial terms of the deal proposed by Baum. In this approach arguments about the desirability of biological weapons are reduced to technical discussions about their suitability as a strategic deterrent weapon in terms of

An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Market-Driven Science

orientation strategies, such as maintaining constant bearings relative to a cue, vector navigating, piloting, and inertial navigation—all of which require some sort of precise timing ability—in order to migrate. The remaining chapters then reveal how animals employ similar but often very different means from humans’ nautical approach to establishing their positions and discuss the wide range of available backup strategies, should any cue fail.