James Revill

The Rise of Biosecurity in International Arms Control

Multilateral arms control and partial disarmament treaties — such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) — are a product of their geostrategic context. They are constructed and reconstructed by the evolving interests and understandings of the States Parties. Thus, such treaties do not operate in a vacuum, rather they are sculpted by shifting perceptions of, inter alia, security and science. In the BWC and elsewhere, this has resulted in a degree of convergence in states’ treatment of biosecurity.

From Cases to Capacity? A Critical Reflection on the Role of ‘Ethical Dilemmas’ in the Development of Dual-Use Governance

The dual-use issue is often framed as a series of paralyzing ‘dilemmas’ facing the scientific community as well as institutions which support innovation. While this conceptualization of the dual-use issue can be useful in certain contexts (such as in awareness-raising and as part of educational activities directed at the scientific community) its usefulness is more limited when reflecting on the governance and politics of the dual-use issue. Within this paper, key shortcomings of the dilemma framing are outlined. It is argued that many of the issues raised in the most recent debates about ‘dual-use’ bird flu research remain unresolved. This includes questions about the trajectories of certain lines of research, as well as broader trends in the practice and governance of science. This leads to difficult questions about current approaches to the dual-use issue within the US, as well as internationally.

Chemical and Biological Weapons in the ‘New Wars’

AbstractThe strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being ‘tended to’ in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

Lessons learned from implementing education on dual-use in Austria, Italy, Pakistan and Sweden

This paper provides insights into the achievements and challenges of implementing education on dual-use in four countries: Austria, Italy, Pakistan and Sweden. It draws attention to the different institutional mechanisms through which dual-use education may be introduced into academic curricula and some of the difficulties encountered in this process. It concludes that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to the implementation of dual-use education. Rather, initiatives must be tailored to suit the teaching traditions, geographical and historical context in which they are being delivered. However, a number of common principles and themes can be derived from all four cases. All these courses bring together a number of different topics that place ‘dual-use’ in the broader context of biosafety, biosecurity, ethics, law and the environment. The case studies suggest that success in this area depends largely on the leadership and commitment of individuals directly involved in teaching, who are active within the scientific community.

Life scientists and the need for a culture of responsibility: After education … what?

The challenge of dual-use biotechnology in the 21st century has led the scientific community to the conclusion that greater education of life scientists is needed regarding the biological weapons threat. While education is undoubtedly important, when looking at the analogous situation with the antinuclear movement during the Cold War it becomes apparent that scientific networks contributed much more than just education. This paper suggests contributions the life science community could make towards dealing with the biochemical weapons threat, taking into consideration the evolving geostrategic and technological climate. The paper concludes that after education there is a great deal more the life science community needs to do. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

From the Gunpowder Revolution to Dynamite Terrorism

This chapter provides a short history of the early use of explosives in warfare beginning with the emergence of gunpowder and moving to the employment of dynamite, paying particular attention to the evolution of early improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the USA and Crimea.

‘We’re Doomed!’ a Critical Assessment of Risk Framing Around Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

‘Risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ rhetoric has become pervasive in twenty-first century politics and policy discourses. Although a number of different meanings of ‘risk’ are evident, the concept frequently purports to be an objectively, quantifiable and rational process based on the likelihood and consequences of adverse events. However, using the example of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), this chapter argues that security-related risks are not always objectively analysable, let alone quantifiable. Moreover, the process of risk assessment is not always ‘rational’. This is, first, because efforts to quantify CBW-related risks normally require a body of data from which to inform assessments of probability when in fact there are limitations in data pertaining to the human dimension of CBW terrorism; with considerable gaps in knowledge of CBW incidents and a need for caution because of the emotive power of allegations of association with CBW. Second because the consequences of a CBW event are often informed by a wide range of variables, which make such weapons highly unpredictable. Third because conclusions that are drawn from any dataset often depend on the questions asked and the assumptions and values that ‘subjectify’ risk calculations, not least depending on if and how ‘expertise’ on risk is defined. This is not to say that risk assessment is not important, but that CBW risks might require a combination of a more rational phase of risk characterization with a more ‘subjective’ process of risk evaluation that acknowledges uncertainty of probabilistic modelling, deals with ambiguity, and opens-up the questions and assumptions that inform the risk assessment process to wider scrutiny and to the consideration of social and other factors.

Dynamite Terrorism and the Fin de Siècle

This chapter outlines how a number of technical and social changes combined to feed into the rise of dynamite terrorism in the late nineteenth century, something illustrated through three micro case studies looking at Irish nationalists, the Russian Peoples Will, and Anarchist groups.

IEDs in “New Wars”

This chapter looks at the role and rise of IEDs in the New Wars of the twenty-first century, paying particular attention to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but also looking across the globe at how IEDs have emerged as the paradigmatic weapons of asymmetrical conflicts.

IEDs in the Twentieth Century

This chapter looks at the rise of IEDs over the course of the twentieth century and illustrates how IED component technology and information further diffused around the globe over the course of a number of conflicts endured during the last century.