Brian Ribeiro

Hume'S Changing Views on the ‘Durability’ of Scepticism1

While Hume is famous for his development and defence of various arguments for radical scepticism, Hume was bothered by the tension between his ‘abstruse’ philosophical reflections and ordinary life: If he often felt intensely sceptical in his study, he nonetheless felt genuinely unable to take these sceptical views seriously when he returned to the concerns and activities of everyday life. Humes published work shows a deep and ongoing preoccupation with this tension, and I believe it also shows that Humes view about the ‘durability’ of scepticism (that is, the extent to which sceptical insights can have an abiding impact on our cognitive lives) underwent an evolutionary development throughout the course of his publishing career. In this paper I propose to trace these textual developments in detail. In particular, I will argue that Humes concern for intellectual stability is what drives the evolution, as he struggled to understand the ‘durable value’ in scepticism.

A Distance Theory of Humour

I propose to offer a programmatic theory-sketch of a new theory of humor, pitched at roughly the same level of detail, and intended to have roughly the same level of inclusiveness, as the other available philosophical “theories” of humor. I will call the theory I propose the distance theory. After an appeal to some intuitive illustrations of the distance theory’s attractions, I move on to offer an analysis of observational comedy using the distance theory. I conclude the paper with some speculative remarks about the possible connections between the practice of observational comedy and the discipline of philosophy.

Must the Radical Skeptic Be Intellectually Akratic

Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery.

Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands

Over the last twenty-five years skeptical theism has become one of the leading contemporary responses to the atheological argument from evil. However, more recently, some critics of skeptical theism have argued that the skeptical theists are in fact unwittingly committed to a malignant form of moral skepticism. Several skeptical theists have responded to this critique by appealing to divine commands as a bulwark against the alleged threat of moral skepticism. In this paper we argue that the skeptical theists’ appeal to divine commands fails to rescue their position from the threat of a worrisome form of moral skepticism.

Montaigne on Witches and the Authority of Religion in the Public Sphere

While contemporary readers may find what appear to be appealing streaks of liberalism in Montaigne, I argue that a more careful analysis suggests that Montaigne’s overall stance is quietist and conservative. To help support this claim I offer a close reading of Montaigne’s essay “Of Cripples” where he develops his well-known critique of the witch trials of early modern Europe. Once Montaigne’s objections to the witch trials are properly understood, we see that Montaigne did not seriously or consistently dispute the Church’s authority in political matters, though certain undeveloped seeds of liberalism do leave an unresolved tension in his writings.