Bruce D. Mann

Urban industrial tax subsidies: A non-cooperative equilibrium approach

Abstract This paper provides a model of firm and city governmental behavior which predicts tax subsidies to firms as a result of non-cooperative equilibrium behavior on the part of both firms and the government. The total amount of subsidies given in this non-cooperative equilibrium is greater than the subsidies which would be offered if urban governments acted cooperatively. The model has four-stage sequential decision making with the behavior of the urban government modeled as the hierarchal actions of a city council and a community development agency. The non-cooperative equilibrium in the model is a four-stage perfect equilibrium.

Moderate Rent Controls: A Microeconomic and Public Choice Analysis

Why do people vote for (and against) moderate rent controls? The microeconomic effects of rent controls are complex-they affect both renters and homeowners in many ways, creating a complicated pattern of winners and losers. Renters stand to gain initially from the controlled rents, but competition for scarce housing dissipates these gains. Homeowners are affected by changing housing demand patterns and shifts in property tax burdens. An econometric analysis of the 1980 Seattle, Washington rent control referendum supports the conclusion that voters recognized the microeconomic gains and losses and voted accordingly on this issue. Use of census tract data makes this public choice analysis particularly strong compared to other studies that aggregate voters at the city or county level, possibly missing important intrajurisdiction voting patterns. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.